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This dissertation comprises of three chapters on the economics of harmful child labor. 
The first chapter is theoretical. Using household survey data from the Philippines, the 
second and third chapters examine whether a model assumption and an explanation for 
a model prediction in the first chapter are supported empirically. 
In Chapter 1, I model the labor market and welfare effects of banning harmful 
child labor. The effects are examined in two informational cases: (1) the parent has 
perfect information on harmful child labor and (2) the parent does not. The effects 
under both cases are contrasted between when the parent is the welfare evaluator for 
the household and when the child is, given imperfect parental altruism. Under both 
informational cases, the ban generates re-equilibrating labor market adjustments that 
expand employment and reduce wages in the non-harmful child labor market, as well 
as reduce child labor force participation. Under the first case, the ban is welfare-
reducing. Under the second case, it is generally welfare-reducing; under special 
conditions, it can be welfare-improving. Under both informational cases and when the 
child is the welfare evaluator, a ban is generally welfare-ambiguous; under special 
conditions, it can be welfare-improving. 
In Chapter 2, I examine the existence and magnitude of positive compensating 
wages for harmful child labor. Among the various harmful child labor measures 
examined, I find consistent evidence of a large and significant earnings premium for 
physically-strenuous labor at both the conditional mean and median. The result at the 
 conditional mean is largely driven by the large and increasing premia as one moves 
down the lower half of the conditional earnings distribution.  
In Chapter 3, proxying the asymmetry in preferences and power statuses 
between the parent and child by the contradictory response of the parent when the 
child reports a work injury or illness, I examine whether parent-child injury report 
mismatches have an impact on the probability of harmful child labor. I find consistent 
evidence that mismatches have a large and significant positive effect on the 
probability of harmful child labor. 
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CHAPTER 1 
BANNING HARMFUL CHILD LABOR:  
A LABOR MARKET AND WELFARE ANALYSIS 
1.1. Introduction 
Child labor remains a mass phenomenon in much of the developing world, particularly 
in its poorer parts such as sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. The International Labor 
Organization (ILO), the major source of statistics on the extent of child labor 
worldwide, estimates that 191 million children ages 5–14 years were economically 
active in 2004, of which, 166 million were categorized as child laborers (Hagemann et 
al. 2006).1 More disconcertingly, 74 million of these 166 million child workers (or 
over 40%) were considered to be employed in harmful or exploitative situations or 
conditions. Of these, roughly 8 million children were deemed to be in what are termed 
as unconditional worst forms of child labor (ILO 2002).2  
Though informative, child labor statistics were not always produced along the 
lines reported above, and, in fact, are a rather recent development made possible by 
changes on two mutually related fronts: the evolution in the notion of harmful child 
labor in policy discussions (demand), and the collection of more detailed data on child 
labor (supply). In the early stages of the modern policy debate on harm and child 
labor, it was commonly perceived that all child labor was harmful. Any distinctions 
drawn between different types of child labor were, for the most part, seen as artificial 
                                                 
1 Economic activity covers all market production (paid work) and certain types of non-market 
production (unpaid work), including production of goods for own use. Child labor consists of all 
children under age 15 years who are economically active excluding (1) those who are under age 5 years 
and (2) those between ages 12–14 years who spend less than 14 hours a week on their jobs, unless their 
activities or occupations are hazardous by nature or circumstance. Added to this are children ages 15–
17 years in the worst forms of child labor (ILO 2002).  
2 The worst forms of child labor refers to child labor in the context of slavery or slave-like conditions, in 
prostitution or pornography, in illicit activities such as drug trafficking, or in conditions that are likely 
to adversely affect the health or safety of the children involved. Unconditional worst forms of child 
labor exclude the last type. 
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and, thus, irrelevant. This perspective was primarily based on the fact that child labor 
often occurred at the expense of schooling (i.e., human capital accumulation), which, 
in turn, likely adversely affected the employment and earnings prospects of the child 
in adulthood. This view has since been superseded by the growing recognition that not 
all child labor necessarily interferes with schooling and that some child labor might 
actually enable school attendance by augmenting scarce household income. Moreover, 
there are cases of child labor that function basically as apprenticeships or on-the-job 
training, bestowing the child with potentially valuable, durable skills in a particular 
trade. Notwithstanding, policymakers have increasingly become aware that child labor 
is, in fact, a highly complex and diverse phenomenon that belies a ready solution and 
that attempting to distinguish between different forms of child labor would indeed be a 
meaningful exercise, especially given its bearing on the formulation and prioritization 
of appropriate policy.  
In light of this, the course of the debate has gradually but perceptibly shifted 
from viewing child labor per se as inherently malignant to focusing more directly on 
certain distinct forms of child labor, specifically, those which (potentially) impair the 
physical and psychological development and health of the child. The adoption of ILO 
Convention No. 182 in 1999, which calls for immediate and effective steps to bring 
about the elimination of the worse forms of child labor, as well as its rapid and broad 
ratification by countries, strongly reflects this shift in the policy discussion and the 
growing international agreement that such practices are even less tolerable.3 The 
intensification of efforts by individual governments, either independently or in 
partnership with international agencies, to address harmful and exploitative forms of 
                                                 
3 As of the end of 2002, 132 countries had ratified Convention No. 182. Several countries are currently 
in the process of taking the necessary internal steps that will lead to eventual ratification. The pace of 
ratification of Convention No. 182 has been the fastest of any ILO Convention.  
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child labor also demonstrates the special status afforded to combating this insidious 
strain in national child labor eradication campaigns. 
This chapter focuses on harmful child labor for two reasons. First, harmful 
child labor is qualitatively different from child labor generally because employment no 
longer functions purely as a means of acquiring valuable income, where the possible 
disruption in schooling is the only issue of concern, but, rather, also potentially 
constitutes a direct source of both short- and long-term adverse health effects. 
Consequently, this aspect of the costs tied to child labor merits its own independent 
examination. Second, understanding the causes of harmful child labor, its character, 
and the settings in which it arises is necessary in order to inform the ongoing policy 
discussion in line with its current focus on harmful child labor. 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the labor market and welfare effects of 
banning harmful child labor (with perfect enforcement) because it arises in open labor 
market settings as opposed to situations in which the child labor decision by 
households is a fait accompli (e.g., child servitude, child trafficking). Harmful child 
labor is defined in a dynamic sense, namely work-related harm experienced as a child 
results in detrimental health effects which manifest themselves in the future with 
certainty, impairing the earnings potential of the child as an adult. The labor market 
analysis consists of examining the labor market participation, wage and employment 
patterns of children before and after the imposition of the ban. The welfare analysis 
comprises of examining the utilities of households before and after the ban using the 
method of welfare dominance. Household welfare is evaluated by taking the parent’s 
utility function as the household welfare function; it is also evaluated by taking the 
child’s utility function as the household welfare function, where the preferences of the 
parent and child within the household are considered to differ due to imperfect 
parental altruism. The economic effects of a ban are studied in two distinct settings. 
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The first setting, which the benchmark model is based on, is one in which parents are 
fully aware of the nature of harm associated with different child employment 
environments and accurately forecast the effect of this harm on the future wages of 
children. The second setting is one in which parents have problems in obtaining and 
properly processing relevant information regarding work-related harm, consequently, 
hampering their ability to correctly forecast future wages. 
The remaining sections of the chapter are organized as follows. Section 1.2 
presents a brief review of the related literature. Section 1.3 provides our operational 
definition of harmful child labor. Section 1.4 develops the benchmark model in which 
informational and perceptional problems related to work-related harm are absent. 
Section 1.5 discusses the labor market and welfare effects of banning harmful child 
labor in the context of our benchmark model. Section 1.6 extends the benchmark 
model to examine the labor market and welfare implications of banning harmful child 
labor in a setting in which informational and perceptional problems related to work-
related harm are prevalent. Section 1.7 examines the welfare implications of banning 
harmful child labor under both informational settings when assessed by the child given 
divergent preferences between the parent (the decision-maker) and the child (the 
decision-implementer). Finally, Section 1.8 summarizes the main results and discusses 
some policy implications. 
 
1.2. Related literature 
There is a sizable and well-developed corpus of economic literature on child labor 
generally. Motivated principally by the desire to inform the ongoing policy discussion 
on child labor, the literature delves into the causes and consequences of child labor. A 
segment of this literature also examines the welfare implications of various proposed 
measures to address child labor, chief among which is its outright prohibition. It is 
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now well-established empirically that households, given the lack of viable options, 
resort to child labor as a risk-coping strategy in the face of chronic economic 
deprivation or sudden, acute economic distress (see, for example, Basu 1999; Beegle 
et al. 2006; Edmonds 2006; Grootaert and Kanbur 1995; Ray 2000). Although child 
labor has been a longstanding subject of economic thought, formal economic models 
of child labor have appeared only more recently. In their seminal contribution, Basu 
and Van (1998) were among the first to formalize the relationship between child labor 
and poverty, and analyze the effects of imposing a ban on child labor in a labor market 
environment where adult and child workers are (imperfectly) substitutable in the 
production process. Several other researchers have since followed suit, offering 
alternative analytical explanations for the existence of child labor ranging from, for 
example, the interaction between imperfect credit markets (borrowing constraints) and 
poverty (Baland and Robinson 2000; Ranjan 1999; Ranjan 2001) to coordination 
failure between the decision of households to invest in the schooling of their children 
and the decision of firms to invest in skill-intensive technologies (Dessy and Pallage 
2001) to a social norms argument based on the mutual interdependence between the 
degree of social stigma associated with child work and the incidence of child labor in a 
society (López-Calva 2000). 
In contrast to the theoretical literature on child labor in general, analytical 
research on harmful child labor is relative scant albeit nascent. To the best of our 
knowledge, there is less than a handful of studies which strive to describe harmful 
child labor leave alone investigate the welfare implications of banning such forms of 
labor. To be sure, many of the same reasons why child labor arises are equally 
applicable to why harmful child labor arises. However, the main contribution of this 
branch of the literature lies in describing the specific processes and conditions under 
which harmful child labor emerges. 
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The study that is most pertinent to ours is Dessy and Pallage (2005). Other 
studies such as Rogers and Swinnerton (2008) and Dessy and Pallage (2003) are only 
tangentially relevant because they focus on child exploitation in settings where the 
household is fully aware of the availability and likelihood of different child 
employment outcomes but has no control over which employment outcome is realized 
for the child and, moreover, is unable to remove the child from an unfavorable 
outcome (exploitative child labor) once realized. We are more interested in 
understanding harm as it relates to work and working conditions in firms operating in 
open labor markets rather than in employment situations where the right of exit is 
effectively surrendered. 
More in line with this perspective of the child labor market, Dessy and Pallage 
(2005) analyze the case where harmful child labor—although beneficial in that it is 
accompanied by higher (compensating) child wages, thereby improving the financial 
resources of the household and making schooling more affordable for the child—is 
detrimental in that it reduces the innate endowment of human capital by impairing the 
ability of child workers to learn in school. They show that a ban on harmful child labor 
with perfect effectiveness is under most circumstances welfare-reducing for 
households, even though it raises the average human capital level of children in the 
economy and spurs technological advancement of firms which translates into a higher 
future remuneration for human capital accumulated during childhood. 
Though our model has several features in common with that of Dessy and 
Pallage (2005), there are also certain substantive differences which distinguish this 
chapter from their study. We draw attention to three such differences, in ascending 
order of importance. First, although the benefits of harmful child labor are described in 
similar fashion—namely, higher compensating wages for higher levels of harm—the 
mechanism through which the costs of harmful child labor materialize differ. Here, the 
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costs of harm arise in a more direct manner, that is, higher levels of work-related harm 
as a child are associated with reduced wages in adulthood (via lower labor 
productivity) due to the long-term detrimental effects on the health and development 
of the child. That is, the transmission mechanism is one in which the costs of harm are 
intrinsically tied to the nature of work. Second, unlike Dessy and Pallage (2005) who 
consider households to be homogenous in both preferences and resources, we consider 
households which differ in terms of parental income. The introduction of household 
heterogeneity greatly enriches the description of household behavior, particularly with 
respect to job sorting. In addition, it enables us to examine the differential impact of 
the ban on welfare across households. Third and last, like Dessy and Pallage (2005), 
we begin by analyzing the economic behavior of households and firms and the welfare 
effects of banning harmful child labor in an environment of perfect information and 
perception regarding child occupational harm. However, unlike them, we proceed to 
analyze the same issues in an environment of information asymmetry and errors in 
information processing by households. 
 
1.3. Defining harm 
We now turn briefly to a discussion of our operational definition of harmful child 
labor in this chapter. As previously alluded to, the ILO definition of the “worst forms 
of child labor” encompasses several disparate forms of child labor. However, there is 
an important common element that ties all of these forms of child labor together, 
which is that they all fundamentally relate to employment conditions that impair or 
can potentially impair the physiological or psychological well-being of the child 
worker. It is this common element that essentially defines harm in this context. 
Admittedly, certain ambiguities remain. Consequently, the definition of harmful child 
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labor is open to normative interpretation, which we do not discuss here because it lies 
outside the scope of this chapter. 
Clearly, harm is a multi-dimensional concept. However, instead of 
constructing and using a rich description of harm (which would make the concept too 
nebulous to be practicable), we formulate and apply a specific characterization of 
harm. The notion of harm we use in this chapter essentially has four main stylized 
features. First, harm is a direct consequence of the nature of work which the child is 
engaged in. That is, we abstract from indirect “harmful” effects such as on human 
capital development where the channels are as simple as child work taking time away 
from schooling or as relatively complex as the reduction in ability of children who 
work part-time to learn in school. Second, child work in certain workplaces results in 
unavoidable harm, that is, harm in a nonstochastic occurrence. Third, harm from child 
work does not manifest itself concurrently with the period of child work or in the 
short-term; rather, child work in certain workplaces results in detrimental physical or 
physiological effects later on as an adult, that is, child work has a delayed or long-term 
harmful effect on the health of the individual. Third, these adverse health effects, once 
they present themselves in adulthood, are considered to be irreversible and permanent. 
 
1.4. The benchmark model 
In this section, we develop a simple benchmark model of harmful child labor. The 
model consists of two periods, so as to allow a dynamic representation of harm, and is 
entirely deterministic. We begin by describing the informational setting related to 
harm. We then characterize the environment, the decision problem, and 
decisionmaking behavior of households and, in analogous fashion, for firms. Finally, 
we combine the optimal decision rules from the two sides of the market in order to 
characterize the market equilibrium. 
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Informational structure related to harm: Parents are considered to be fully aware of 
the extent of detrimental health effects that manifest themselves in the future from 
sending their children to work. Furthermore, parents are able to perfectly judge what 
effects child occupational harm has on the earnings potential of the child as an adult. 
In other words, parents are considered to have perfect foresight (present beliefs about 
outcomes in the future perfectly match the actual outcomes realized in the future), and 
fully take into account these effects in their decisionmaking process. 
 
Households 
Environment: We consider an economy populated by a continuum of households of 
measure I. With a slight abuse of notation, we shall also refer to the set of all 
households as I. For the sake of simplicity, each household i I∈ consists of two 
individuals, an adult (the parent) and a child. The model spans two periods. In the first 
period, both the parent and child are present, while, in the second period, only the 
child survives, having become an adult. In the first period, both the parent and child 
are endowed with one unit of time, which the parent allocates entirely to wage 
employment, while the child’s endowment of time is allocated entirely to schooling or 
wage employment.4 In the second period, the child as an adult allocates her 
endowment of one unit of time entirely to wage employment. We assume that 
households also obtain some nonlabor income. Borrowing is however not possible; 
this constraint is often broadly consistent with the reality of poor households in 
developing countries.  
We assume that adult and child workers are employed in separate labor 
markets. This is a key departure from some previous theoretical studies on child labor 
                                                 
4 The decision to abstract from intermediate cases of both schooling and work by children was made to 
simplify the analysis. The results in this chapter do not change in any qualitative manner as a result of 
this decision.  
 10 
which treat adult and child workers as substitutable (albeit imperfectly) in the 
production process (see, e.g., Basu and Van 1998). We argue that a situation of 
exclusive child labor markets can arise if child workers are always more “cost-
effective” than adult workers in the production of certain goods and services, that is, 
child workers have a higher marginal product per unit of compensation than adult 
workers. Note, however, that this assumption does not necessarily imply that child 
workers are more productive than adult workers. 
The parent is considered to be the sole decisionmaker in the household. This 
decisionmaking power is exercised in the following paternalistic fashion: the parent 
decides on behalf of the child whether the child should work or not; if the former, the 
parent also decides what type of environment the child works in with respect to the 
presence of harmful child labor. The child is assumed to fully abide by the parent’s 
decision. Given that the parent is the decisionmaker for the household, here, the 
parent’s utility function is used in characterizing the optimizing behavior of the 
household. Furthermore, parents are considered to be altruistic towards their children, 
albeit imperfectly. This is demonstrated by the parent caring positively for the health 
of the child in the manner to be delineated shortly. 
 
Preferences: All parents are assumed to have identical preferences. Denote total 
household consumption in period 1, the simple addition of adult and child 
consumption, by c, the earnings of the child as an adult in period 2 as ω ′ , and the 
parental altruism factor by β, where ( )0,1β ∈ indicates partial altruism. The utility 
function u5 for each parent i I∈ is given by  
 ln ln  .u c β ω′= +
 
 (1) 
                                                 
5 The utility function is a monotonic transformation of a standard Cobb-Douglas utility function.  The 
use of linear(ized) utility functions is common in the child labor literature (see, for example, Basu and 
Van 1998, Basu 1998, and Baland and Robinson 2000).     
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There are two important aspects related to the parental utility function that 
deserve some explanation. First, the parental utility function possesses as one of its 
arguments the child’s earnings as an adult (ω ′ ) and not the child’s consumption as an 
adult. The reason we employ this approach is two-fold: (1) it allows us to sever the 
parent’s intergenerational link with all noncontiguous future generations in the 
decisionmaking process, thereby providing significantly greater analytical tractability 
and (2) from a pragmatic standpoint, it is highly plausible that parents, in making 
decisions that have intergenerational consequences, consider (if at all) only their 
immediate children (or, at most, their grandchildren) and not all future generations. 
That is, their horizons are much shorter than the infinite horizon decision problems 
which households are often presumed to perform. Second, parental altruism enters 
instrumentally through the parent’s valuation of the child’s future earnings ω′ , where 
working in a harmful workplace as a child causes poorer health as an adult, 
consequently lowering adult labor productivity and, in turn, lowering adult labor 
earnings. Hence, although the parent cares explicitly about the earnings of the child as 
an adult, given the intertemporal link between child work in harmful workplaces and 
future adult earnings, the parent cares implicitly about the nature of child employment. 
It is in this manner that parental altruism towards children is incorporated into the 
model. Notwithstanding, the parent is assumed to only care imperfectly for the 
earnings of the child as an adult. 
 
Resource constraint: Denote the wages earned by the parent and the child in 
household i I∈
 
by P
iω and ,iω
 
respectively. Note that P
iω and iω are determined 
endogenously as equilibrium wages, as will be shown later. Parental nonlabor income 
earnings , denoted by P
iN , are considered to be exogenously determined, where 
0,P PN N ∈   and is distributed according to the continuously differentiable 
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cumulative distribution function K, where ( )PK N gives us the proportion of 
households with parental income equal to or below PN . Denote the addition of 
parental wages ( )Pω  and parental nonlabor income PN  by total parental income Py , 
where ,P P Py y y ∈    and is distributed accordingly to the continuously differentiable 
cumulative distribution function F (with the corresponding probability density 
function f ), where ( )PF y gives us the proportion of households with parental income 
equal to or below Py , and The budget constraint for household i I∈ is given by  
 i i .
Pc y ω≤ +  (2) 
Since the marginal utility of household consumption is strictly increasing in its 
argument, the budget constraint holds with equality, which permits us to rewrite the 
utility function Since the marginal utility of household consumption is strictly 
increasing in its argument, the budget constraint holds with equality, which permits us 
to rewrite the utility function for household i as 
 ( )ln ln  .Pi i iu y ω β ω′= + +  (3) 
For simplicity, suppose there are three options for the child: (1) to not work 
and go to school (denoted by N), (2) to work in an unharmful environment (denoted by 
U), or (3) to work in a harmful environment (denoted by H). Denote Uω and Hω  as the 
child wages associated with the type-U and type-H environments, respectively. In the 
next period, depending on whether the child does not work, works in a type-U 
environment, or works in a type-H environment, the child (as an adult) can expect to 
earn Nω′ , Uω ′ , or Hω ′ , respectively, where N U Hω ω ω′ ′ ′> > . Working as a child in the 
type-H environment as opposed to the type-U environment produces adverse health 
effects in the future which reduce labor productivity as an adult, and hence, labor 
earnings as an adult. Further, as discussed previously, these adverse health effects and 
their effects on adult productivity and earnings are perfectly known to the parent. On 
the other hand, not working and going to school leads to the human capital 
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development of the child, resulting in higher labor market earnings as an adult than is 
possible if the child did not go to schools and worked. 
Optimization 
The utility maximization problem for the parent of household i I∈
 
is simply 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( )
, 0, , , , ,
max ln ln .
N U U H H
P
i i iy
ω ω ω ω ω ω ω
ω β ω
′ ′ ′ ′∈
′+ +  (4)
 
Assumption 1: All three choices, namely no child work, child work in the type-U 
environment, and child work in the type-H environment, are simultaneously optimal 
for distinctly different subsets of households. 
In order for assumption 1 to be satisfied, the following conditions have to hold: 
Condition 1: 
1
, and
1
N
U
U H
N
H
β
β
ω
ω
ω ω
ω
ω
′  − ′ >
′  − ′ 
 
Condition 2: 
1
.
U
N
H U
H H
U N
β
β β
ω
ω
ω ω
ω ω
ω ω
′ −  ′ <
′ ′   −   ′ ′     
These conditions set the lower and upper bounds for 
Uω  and Hω , respectively, as a 
function of 
N
ω′ , 
U
ω′ , 
H
ω′  and ( )0,1β ∈ . 
 
Given assumption 1, solving the above utility maximization problem, those 
households i I∈ with parental income P
iy such that ˆ
P P
iy y≥  will choose not to send 
their children to work, while those households i I∈ such that ˆP P
iy y< will choose to 
send their children to work, where ˆ
1
P U
N
U
y β
ω
ω
ω
=
 ′
− ′ 
. We shall refer to parental income 
ˆ Py as the “labor force participation cutoff”. Hence, the decision to send the child to 
work is driven by insufficient household resources consistent with the luxury axiom 
established by Basu and Van (1998). To ensure that 
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children to work are feasible options for households, we make the following 
assumption: 
 
Assumption 2: The variation in parental earnings spans the labor force participation 
cutoff 
ˆ .
1
P U
N
U
y β
ω
ω
ω
=
 ′
− ′ 
 
Turning our attention to those households i I∈  with parental income ˆP P
iy y< , 
assume that there is at least one household i I∈  with parental income Pyɶ such that  
 ( ) ( )ln ln ln ln .P Pi U U i H Hy yω β ω ω β ω′ ′+ + = + +ɶ ɶ  
This implies that the household with parental income Pyɶ is indifferent between 
sending the child to work in the type-U or type-H environment. We shall refer to the 
parental income level Pyɶ as the “U-H cutoff”. Since we assume that some households 
choose to send their children to work in the type-U environment, it is easy to establish 
that the U-H cutoff Pyɶ is lower than the labor force participation cutoff ˆ Py . To ensure 
that households find it feasible to choose different work environments for their 
children, we make the following assumption:  
 
Assumption 3: The variation in parental earnings spans the U-H cutoff 
.
1
U
H U
H
P
U
H
y
β
β
ω
ω ω
ω
ω
ω
 ′ 
−  ′   =
 ′ 
−  ′   
ɶ
 
Given Assumptions 1-3, we obtain the following two results:  
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Proposition 1: Given that
U H
ω ω′ ′>  , in equilibrium, it must be the case that UH ωω > . 
This implies that a positive compensating wage differential arises for child workers 
between the type-H and type-U environments.  
 
Proof: Take the household with parental income at the labor force participation cutoff 
Py
~ . We know that this household is indifferent between sending the child to work in 
the type-U or type-H environments, that is, 
( ) ( )ln ln ln lnP PH H U Uy yω β ω ω β ω′ ′+ + = + +ɶ ɶ . 
Rearranging and simplifying, we obtain 
P
UH
P
U H
y
y
β
ωω
ω ω
′ +
=  ′+  
ɶ
ɶ
. 
Given 0 1β< < and U Hω ω′ ′> , we have that  
1
P
UH
H UP
U H
y
y
β
ωω
ω ω
ω ω
′ +
= > ⇒ > ′+  
ɶ
ɶ
.■ 
The exact value of the compensating wage differential between working in the type-H 
environment and the type-U environment, denoted by UH −ω (≡  UH ωω − ), is 
determined by the marginal household with parental income Py~ , and is given by  
( )( )1 ,PH U Uyω λ ω− = − +ɶ  
where 1,U
H
β
ω
λ
ω
′ 
= > ′ 
and the partial derivatives .01~ >−=∂
∂
=
∂
∂ −− λ
ω
ωω
U
UH
P
UH
y
 
As expected, the partial derivatives indicate that the compensating wage 
differential for working in the type-H environment increases as the parental income of 
the marginal household increases and as the wage associated with working in the type-
U environment increases. The intuition is straightforward: if a parent observes an 
increase in her own personal income or a higher child wage associated with work in 
the type-U environment, a higher wage in the type-H environment is required to 
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induce the parent to switch the child’s work environment from type-U to type-H, 
ceteris paribus. 
 
Proposition 2: Households sort themselves systematically on the basis of parental 
income between the three available choices of (1) no child work, (2) child work in the 
type-U environment, and (3) child work in the type-H environment. More specifically, 
the population of households can be split into three distinct parental income segments: 
low-income, middle-income, and high-income. Low-income households (i.e., the 
poorest households) choose to send their children to work in the type-H environment, 
middle-income households choose to send their children to work in the type-U 
environment, and, finally, high-income households (i.e., the richest households) 
choose not to send their children to work.  
 
Proof: We have already established that all households i I∈ such that parental income 
P
iy is equal to or greater than the labor force participation cutoff ˆ
Py  will choose not to 
send their children to work. Now, among those households i I∈ such that parental 
income 
P
iy is less than ˆ
Py , consider a household i I∈  with parental income at the U-H cutoff 
Py~ . We know that this household is indifferent between sending the child to work in 
the type-U and type-H environments, that is,  
( ) ( )ln ln ln ln .P PH H U Uy yω β ω ω β ω′ ′+ + = + +ɶ ɶ  
Rearranging and simplifying, we obtain  
P
UH
P
U H
y
y
β
ωω
ω ω
′ +
=  ′+  
ɶ
ɶ
. 
If the household’s parental income Py is greater than the U-H cutoff Pyɶ , then  
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( ) ( )ln ln ln ln .
P P
UH H
P P
U U H
P P
U U H H
y y
y y
y y
β
ωω ω
ω ω ω
ω β ω ω β ω
′ + +
< = ⇒ ′+ +  
′ ′+ + > + +
ɶ
ɶ
ɶ
 
This household obtains higher utility from choosing to send the child to work in the 
type-U environment. If the household’s parental income Py is less than the U-H cutoff 
Pyɶ , we obtain the reverse relationship: the household obtains higher utility from 
choosing to send the child to work in the type-H environment. ■ 
To further clarify, all households i I∈ such that )ˆ,P P Piy y y∈  ɶ , will choose to 
send their children to work in the type-U environment, while all those households 
i I∈ such that ),P P Piy y y∈  ɶ will choose to send their children to work in the type-H 
environment. 
Thus, just as how insufficient household resources or material poverty is the 
reason why parents choose to send their children to work, insufficient household 
resources also serves as the reason why parents choose to send their children to work 
in the type-H environment. Proposition 2 carries particular weight because it implies 
that the poorest households choose to send their children to work in the type-H 
environment when they are equally averse to the harmful child labor experienced by 
their children and equally altruistic towards their children as households which choose 
not to send their children to work in the type-H environment. What drives the result is 
the variation in parental income across households in the economy. 
 
Corollary 1: Among households that choose to send their children to work, for 
households with parental income Py  such that ,~ PP yy >  the higher Py  is, the higher 
the utility “rent” obtained from sending their children to work in the type-U 
environment instead of in the type-H environment. Conversely, for households with 
parental income Py  such that ,~ PP yy <  the lower Py  is, the higher the utility “rent” 
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obtained from sending their children to work in the type-H environment instead of in 
the type-U environment. 
 
Proof: First, consider households with parental income Py greater than the U-H cutoff 
Pyɶ . As we saw in the proof for Proposition 2, this implies that 
( ) ( )ln ln ln ln .P PU U H Hy yω β ω ω β ω′ ′+ + > + +
 
Define ( ) ( )ln ln ln ln 0.P PU U U H Hy yϑ ω β ω ω β ω′ ′= + + − + − >
 
Differentiating Uϑ with respect to ,
Py we obtain 
.
11
H
P
U
PP
U
yyy ωω
ϑ
+
−
+
=
∂
∂
 
Since UH ωω > (Proposition 1), P
U
y∂
∂ϑ
is positive. This implies that as Py increases, the 
positive utility difference between choosing the type-U environment over the type-H 
environment, given by the value of Uϑ , increases.  
For the case where P Py y< ɶ , in which Hϑ is defined as 
( ) ( )ln ln ln ln 0,P PH H H U Uy yϑ ω β ω ω β ω′ ′= + + − + − >  we obtain that HPy
ϑ∂
∂
is 
negative. 
In this case, this implies that as Py decreases, the positive utility difference 
between choosing the type-H environment over the type-U environment, given by the 
value of Hϑ , increases. ■ 
 
Child labor supplies: We now can characterize the child labor supplies to the type-U 
and type-H environments. Denote the set of all children that seek work in the type-U 
environment (or more accurately, the households that these children belong to) as 
){ }ˆ: ,  .P P PU ii y y yΘ = ∈  ɶ  Likewise, denote the set of all children that seek work in 
the type-H environment as ){ }: ,  .P P PH ii y y yΘ = ∈  ɶ  Accordingly, the child labor 
supplies to the type-U and type-H environments are given by  
 19 
 
( )( ) ( )( )( )
( )( )( )
ˆ ,  and
, , respectively, 
P P
U U U H
P
H U H
S I F y F y
S I F y
ω ω ω
ω ω
= × −
= ×
ɶ
ɶ
 (5) 
where ( )ˆ
1
P U
U
N
U
y β
ω
ω
ω
ω
=
 ′
− ′ 
and ( ), .
1
U
H U
HP
U H
U
H
y
β
β
ω
ω ω
ω
ω ω
ω
ω
 ′ 
−  ′  =  ′  −  ′  
ɶ  
The signs of the own- and cross-wage first derivatives of the supply functions are  
(1) ,0>
∂
∂
U
US
ω
(2) ,0<
∂
∂
H
US
ω
(3) ,0>
∂
∂
H
HS
ω
 and (4) 0<
∂
∂
U
HS
ω
. The signs of the 
derivatives of total child labor supply ( )U HS S+  with respect to the wages in the type-
U and type-H labor markets are 
( )
0U H
U
S S
ω
∂ +
>
∂
 and , 
( )
0U H
H
S S
ω
∂ +
>
∂
, respectively 
(see the Appendix for the workings out).  
 
Firms 
Environment: All firms are considered to produce a single identical consumption good 
with a fixed price normalized to one. Suppose that there are a measure J and K firms 
with type-U and type-H environments, respectively. The type-of-environment choice 
is considered to be a historical decision – in the current period, we begin with the ex 
post equilibrium number of type-U and type-H firms. Both sets of firms are owned by 
employers in the economy who are distinct from the households in the economy. All 
profits generated from producing the good are fully consumed by the employers (i.e., 
profits are not shared with the set of households I). Both sets of firms are also 
considered to operate in a competitive market taking output and input prices as given. 
 
Production technology: Type-U firms produce the good according to the continuously 
differentiable production technology Uf  defined over child labor denoted by .Uc  
Similarly, type-H firms produce the same good according to the continuously 
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differentiable production technology Hf  defined over child labor denoted by 
.Hc These technologies are represented by  
 
( )
( ) ,
 andU U U
H H H
f c c
f c c
α
γ
=
=
 (6) 
where the exponents α and γ lie strictly between 0 and 1.  
 
Optimization  
Each type-U firm solves the following profit maximization problem:  
0
max .
U
U U U
c
c cα ω
≥
−
 
The first order condition is as follows: 
( )1: 0   if 0 .U U U Uc c cαα ω− − ≤ = >
 
By solving the analogous profit maximization problem for the type-H firms, we obtain 
the following first order condition:  
( )1: 0   if 0 .H H H Hc c cγγ ω− − ≤ = >
 
 
Child labor demands: Consequently, the individual firm demand function by type-U 
and type-H firms are , and 
1
1
1
1
−−






=





=
γα
γ
ω
α
ω H
H
U
U dd respectively. 
Accordingly, the market child labor demands by the type-U and type-H firms are 
defined as  
 
1
1
1
1
 and
,  respectively.
U
U U
H
H H
D Jd J
D Kd K
α
γ
ω
α
ω
γ
−
−
 = =  
 
 
= =  
 
 (7) 
As expected, the signs of the first derivatives of the labor demand functions with 
respect to their wages are (1) 0<
∂
∂
U
UD
ω
 and (2) .0<
∂
∂
H
HD
ω  
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Future adult labor demand: Denote e as an efficiency unit of the future adult labor of 
children, where the amount of efficiency units of labor that a child possesses as an 
adult is a function of whether or not the child worked (N) and, if the child worked, 
whether it was in a harmful setting (H) or not (U), namely N U He e e> >  . Children as 
adults observe the following constant returns to scale (CRS) production function for 
their labor services 
 ( ) ,f e Ae=  (8) 
where A, the efficiency parameter, is positive. 
Denote eω as the wage rate for one efficient unit of labor. In equilibrium, A equals eω . 
Consequently, Nω′ , Uω′ , and Hω′ equal NAe , UAe , and HAe , respectively. Given the 
form of the production function, the future adult labor market clears trivially. Further, 
changes in future adult labor supply only affect equilibrium employment and not the 
wage rate for efficiency labor. This feature of the future adult labor market should be 
noted because key aspects of the general equilibrium results of banning of harmful 
child labor hinges on this particular feature.  
 
Present adult labor demand: Demand for parental labor in the present period is 
determined analogously to the demand for future adult labor of children discussed 
above. Denote Pe as an efficiency unit of parental labor, where, like for children, the 
amount of efficiency units possessed by parents is a function of whether or not the 
parent worked as a child (N) and, if the parent worked, whether it was in a harmful 
setting (H) or not (U), namely P P PN U He e e> >  . Parents observe an identical CRS 
production function to (8), and observe the same equilibrium wages, namely 
P P
N NAeω = , 
P P
U UAeω = , and
P P
H HAeω = . 
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Market equilibrium 
Child labor market 
Definition 1: An equilibrium is a pair of child labor wages ( )** , HU ωω such that:  
1) ( ) ( )*** , HUUUU SD ωωω =  (Market clearing condition in the type-U child labor 
market); 
2) ( ) ( )*** , HUHHH SD ωωω =  (Market clearing condition in the type-H child labor 
market); and 
3) ** UH ωω >  (Compensating wage differential for harmful child labor). 
See Proof 1 in the Appendix for existence, uniqueness, and stability proofs. 
 
1.5. Ban on harmful child labor with perfect enforcement 
In this section, we examine the labor market and welfare effects of a ban on harmful 
child labor with perfect enforcement. A ban on harmful child labor with perfect 
enforcement implies that child workers can no longer be employed in the type-H 
environment; further, the ban is introduced early enough for child workers in the type-
H environment to escape the future adverse health effects. After the ban comes into 
effect, each type-H firm faces three distinct choices: (1) shut down operations; (2) 
maintain the same work environment (i.e., the same occupational health and safety 
standards) but employ adult workers instead; or (3) raise the occupational health and 
safety standards to at least the minimum level considered to be acceptable by the 
authorities and continue to hire child workers (this transformation will certainly 
involve a cost). We consider the scenario where the ban on harmful child labor results 
in all type-H firms shutting down. Admittedly extreme, we can conceive of such a 
case arising when the cost of raising the occupational health and safety standards up to 
the minimum acceptable level is prohibitively high or, alternatively, maintaining the 
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same standards and hiring adult workers to replace child workers are neither possible 
nor economically viable.  
 
Labor market effects: If all the type-H firms cease to operate after the ban on harmful 
child labor, the only remaining firms that hire child workers are the type-U firms. Let 
B
U
*ω denote the market-clearing wage for work in the type-U environment after the ban 
on harmful child labor is introduced and effectively enforced, that is, 
( ) ( )* * .B BU U U UD Sω ω=  
 
Proposition 3: The post-ban equilibrium wage in the type-U child labor market, 
,*BUω is less than the pre-ban equilibrium wage in the same market, .
*
Uω  In other 
words, after the ban, the equilibrium wage in the type-U child labor market falls. 
 
Proof: Suppose instead that 
B
U
*ω is greater than or equal to .*Uω  Using (5), it is 
straightforward to determine that ( )BUUS *ω  is strictly larger than ( )** , HUUS ωω . Since, 
in equilibrium, the amount of labor demanded equals the amount of labor supplied, 
( )BUUD *ω  must also be larger than ( )* .U UD ω  Given that UD is decreasing in Uω , this 
implies that 
B
U
*ω is less than ,*Uω which contradicts our initial claim. On the other 
hand, we do not necessarily arrive at a contradiction when we consider 
B
U
*ω is less than 
.*Uω  If 
B
U
*ω is less than ,*Uω then ( )BUUD *ω  is greater than ( ).*UUD ω  Thus, in 
equilibrium, ( )BUUS *ω  must be greater than ( )** , HUUS ωω . Using (5) again, it is easy to 
verify that this holds so long as ( )** , HUHS ωω  is greater than the decline in total child 
employment resulting from the ban. ■ 
 
Corollary 2: Child employment in the type-U child labor market is larger after the 
ban. 
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Proof: See latter part of proof for Proposition 3.  
 
The intuition for Proposition 3 and Corollary 2 is as follows. Suppose prior to the ban 
there were 
*
UE  children working in the type-U environment and receiving ,
*
Uω while 
there were 
*
HE children working in the type-H environment and receiving .
*
Hω  
Immediately after the ban, the total supply of child workers to the type-U environment 
will increase to ,** HU EE + as the parents who chose to send their children to work in 
the type-H environment before the ban will now choose to send their children to work 
in the type-U environment (a result related to Proposition 2). This means that at 
*
Uω  
the supply of child labor to type-U firms will exceed the demand for child labor by 
these firms. As a result, the equilibrium wage will adjust downwards until the type-U 
child labor market clears once again. This happens when the equilibrium wage falls to 
.*BUω  Clearly, at ,
*B
Uω there will be more than 
*
UE  child workers employed in the type-
U environment.  
 
Corollary 3: Total post-ban child employment is less than total pre-ban child 
employment. 
 
Proof: From Section 1.4 we know that the lower bound on parental income for 
choosing no child work is given by ( ).ˆ UPy ω  Since 
B
U
*ω is less than *Uω  (from 
Proposition 3), and 
Pyˆ  is increasing in ,Uω ( )BUPy *ˆ ω  is less than ( ).ˆ *UPy ω  The lower 
child labor force participation cutoff implies that less parents choose to send their 
children to work after the ban. 
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Which children work after the ban? Consider a parent with own income 
P
iy
ɶɶ who 
chooses to send her child to work. Denote Uωɶɶ  as the wage associated with 
employment in the type-U environment such that the parent with own income 
P
iy
ɶɶ sets 
the utility obtained from sending the child to work in the type-U environment equal to 
the utility obtained from not sending the child to work. This condition is satisfied for 
parent income 
P
iy
ɶɶ  when  
1 .P P NU i
U
y
β
ω
ω
ω
  ′
 = −  ′  
ɶ ɶɶ ɶ  
Differentiating 
P
iy
ɶɶ  with respect to ,Uωɶɶ  we see that parental income 
P
iy
ɶɶ  is increasing 
in .Uωɶɶ  This indicates that as Uω  falls (in our case, as a result of the ban), households 
with the highest parental income which initially chose to send their children to work 
will be the first to choose to remove their children from work followed in order by 
those with degressively lower parental income. This process will continue until Uω  
settles at .*BUω  At ,
*B
Uω those households Ii∈ such that parental income 
P
iy  is equal 
to or greater than ( )BUPy *ˆ ω  will choose not to send their children to work at all, while 
those households Ii∈ such that parental income Piy  is less than ( )BUPy *ˆ ω  will choose 
to send their children to work in the type-U environment. 
 
To sum up, the labor market effects of the ban on harmful child labor which results in 
the shutdown of type-H firms are as follows: 
1. The equilibrium wage associated with the type-U environment falls ( )* * .BU Uω ω<  
2. The number of children not working increases. In other words, total child 
employment falls in the economy.  
3. The number of child workers in the type-U environment increases.  
4. While the number of households in each relevant labor market choice have 
changed, the household sorting pattern across labor market choices remains: 
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richer households choose not to send their children to work, while the poorer 
households choose to send their children to work in the type-U environment.  
 
Welfare effects: In order to examine the welfare consequences of the ban on harmful 
child labor, we compare the distribution of utility levels of households before and after 
the ban on harmful child labor; note, here, we use the parent’s utility function as the 
household’s welfare function. We use the method of welfare dominance to rank the 
distributions of household utilities under different situations, when possible. The 
criterion we consider is first-order (or first-degree) dominance.6  
 
Definition of first-order dominance: Consider situations A and B. Denote the 
cumulative distribution of household utilities under situation A as AG  and the 
cumulative distribution of household utilities under situation B as .BG  Situation A is 
considered to “first-order dominate” situation B if  
( ) ( )iBiA uGuG ≤  for all Uui ∈ and ( ) ( )iBiA uGuG <  for some .Uui ∈  
Furthermore, if situation A first-order dominates situation B, then any welfare measure 
w that belongs to the class of social welfare functions W which are anonymous and 
increasing in its arguments will assign a higher rank to situation A than to situation B 
(Fields 2001).7 
 
                                                 
6 This criterion is fairly stringent, though not as stringent as Pareto dominance. 
7 The property of anonymity indicates that social welfare depends on the level of utilities of households 
and not on which households has which level. That is, all households are treated identically and no 
other information other than their utility levels matter. The property of increasing indicates that social 
welfare is increasing in the utility level of a household, holding the utility levels of all other households 
under consideration as constant.  
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Proposition 4: In the case of perfect information, a ban on harmful child labor results 
in an unambiguous decrease in the welfare status of households. That is, the pre-ban 
situation first-order dominates the post-ban situation.  
 
Instead of presenting a formal proof involving the comparison of utilities of 
households before and after the ban on harmful child labor, we discuss the basic 
intuition behind Proposition 4 because it serves the purpose just as well, and is, in our 
view, more illuminating. Consider a set of alternatives { }0 , ,N U HX x x x=  available to 
a collection of households. Households choose among the alternatives in 
0X and we 
have that each alternative is preferred over the other two by a subset of households. 
Suppose set 
0X is permanently substituted with a new set of alternatives 
{ }, .B N UX x x= ɶ  In this new set ,BX alternative Hx is no longer available and 
alternative Ux has been replaced by Ux
~ where alternative Ux
~ is not as attractive as 
alternative Ux . Alternative Nx is the same in both sets. Households now choose among 
the alternatives in set .BX  Clearly, households that chose either alternatives Ux or 
Hx from set 
0X will experience a decline in their welfare when set 0X is replaced by 
set .BX  The only households that experience no change in their welfare are those 
households that chose alternative Nx  from set 
0X  and continue to choose the same 
alternative from set .BX
 
In our study, sets 
0X and BX represent the choice sets before and after the ban 
on harmful child labor, where alternative Nx corresponds to the no-work choice, Ux  to 
the pre-ban type-U child work choice, Ux
~  to the post-ban type-U work choice (where 
Ux
~ is not as attractive as Ux  
due to market adjustments which reduce the equilibrium 
wage in the type-U child labor market), and Hx  to the type-H child work choice. The 
subset of households unaffected by the ban are those households Ii∈  such that 
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( )*ˆ ˆP Pi Uy y ω≥ , while the subset of household adversely affected by the ban are those 
households Ii∈  such that ( )*ˆ ˆP Pi Uy y ω< . 
Hence, clearly, i
B
i uu ≤  for all households Ii∈  and i
B
i uu <  for some 
households .Ii∈
 
It is easy to see that this implies that  
( ) ( )iBi uGuG ≤0  for all Uui ∈ and ( ) ( )iBi uGuG <0  for some ,Uui ∈  
where 0G and BG are the cumulative distribution functions of utilities before and after 
the ban on harmful child labor, respectively.  
 
Corollary 4: Among households that initially chose to send their children to work in 
the type-H environment, the poorer the household is in terms of parental earnings, the 
larger the welfare loss experienced by the household as a result of the ban.  
 
Among households that initially chose to send their children to work in the type-H 
environment, given that the utility “rent” from choosing the type-H environment rather 
than the type-U environment increases monotonically as parental income falls (see 
Corollary 1), following the ban on harmful child labor, the situation is reversed: utility 
loss increases monotonically as parental income falls. The fact that the equilibrium 
wage 
*
Uω  falls in the type-U environment as a result of adjustments in labor market 
supply only serves to enlarge the utility loss experienced by these households. 
To summarize, the individual policy of banning harmful child labor results in a 
distribution of household utilities which is first-order dominated by the distribution of 
household utilities prior to the ban. In fact, the result is much stronger: the pre-ban 
distribution of household utilities Pareto-dominates the post-ban distribution of 
household utilities. This indicates the policy has been unambiguously welfare-
reducing, that is, although not all households experience a decline in utility as a result 
of the ban, no household experiences an increase in utility. Further, among households 
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that initially chose to send their children to work in the type-H environment, the 
poorer the household is in terms of parental income, the larger the welfare loss 
experienced by the household as a result of the ban. 
As a final point, recall that future adult labor demand was derived from a 
production process that exhibits constant returns to scale. Allowing the future wages 
of children to instead adjust to shifts in aggregate adult labor supply does not alter the 
welfare result in any qualitative way as the ban, resulting in the shutdown of firms 
which impair the future productivity of child workers, results in a higher aggregate 
supply of adult efficiency units in the future, thus reducing equilibrium adult wages. 
This downward adjustment in equilibrium adult wages only acts to reinforce our 
welfare result. 
 
1.6. Systematic informational and perceptional biases in relation to harmful child 
labor 
In this section, we retain the same stylized description of harm described in Section 
1.3, that is, child work in the type-H environment results in adverse health effects that 
are certain, manifest themselves in adulthood, and are permanent in nature. We also 
maintain the core features and mechanisms of the benchmark model. Here, however, 
we relax the assumption that households possess correct and complete information 
about the nature of occupational harm associated with type-H work and, in addition, 
that households are able to process the available information properly. 
 
Motivation: There are several reasons why we expect informational problems or 
perceptional errors to play an especially important role in this context of harmful child 
labor. We present three possible reasons. 
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Employee-worker information asymmetry: Parents might be unaware about the exact 
nature of harm suffered by their working children due to employers intentionally 
withholding vital information regarding the extent of occupational harm in their 
workplaces. Because most child labor occurs in workplaces that are entirely 
unregulated or at very best loosely regulated by the authorities, employers often have 
wide latitude with respect to what work-related information to divulge to their 
workers, both incumbent and prospective. Unchecked by any real regulation, there are 
clear incentives for employers to limit or even misrepresent information on the nature 
of occupational harm. Such informational malpractices on the part of employers might 
be particularly egregious in cases where the adverse health effects from occupational 
harm suffered during childhood manifest themselves only in the future, such as in 
adulthood, as employers stand to benefit greatly from exploiting this temporal 
separation in cause and effect. When the informational asymmetry related to 
occupational harm between employers and households is finally resolved in the future, 
the adverse health effects are already irreversibly present. Furthermore, if the adverse 
health effects are sufficiently far ahead in the future, it might be difficult for 
households to draw a clear link between past child employment and the poor health 
status of the adult. 
 
Parent-child information asymmetry: Even if we take for granted that employers do in 
fact voluntarily and fully reveal information on occupational harm to their workers 
(i.e., the children), the fact that the parent decides what type of employment setting (in 
terms of the associated level of occupational harm) to send her child to, but does not 
personally experience the health-related consequences of her decision, creates another 
source of potential information asymmetry, in this case engendered by the physical 
separation between the decision-maker (the parent) and the decision-implementer (the 
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child). Child workers in harmful employment settings may not be able to perfectly 
convey information about the nature of their work and working conditions to their 
parents, even if they are able to accurately assess for themselves the extent of harm 
they encounter. Harm in such cases may be more appropriately viewed as an 
experience good where unless the individual personally experiences the good, an 
accurate assessment of the “qualities” of the good is difficult, if not impossible, to 
make. There is some evidence from the social psychology literature that individuals do 
a better job of assessing the risk of some negative event when they have personally 
experienced that event (e.g., food poisoning, heart attacks, crime). Given the highly 
dynamic nature of labor markets with the emergence of new, unfamiliar employment 
opportunities as well as changing work and working conditions in old, familiar 
employment opportunities, parents might not have the relevant personal work 
experience to draw from in ascertaining the occupational risks that their children 
might be facing in their particular jobs. 
 
Imperfect information processing (optimism bias): In our context, optimism bias refers 
to the tendency by individuals to view certain negative events as less likely to occur to 
themselves than to others. There is growing survey-based evidence in the social 
psychology literature which shows that the majority of individuals believe that they 
are less likely than others to experience certain negative events (for reviews, see 
Helweg-Larsen and Sheppard 2001; Klein and Weinstein 1997). The various risks 
examined include pregnancy, sexually-transmitted diseases, cancer, smoking, 
substance abuse, environmental, and general health. This systematic misperception of 
the risks leads to behaviors that can actually contribute to increasing the probability of 
a negative event. In the case of harmful child labor, unrealistic optimism can 
conceivably take the form of the parent underestimating the level of occupational 
 32 
harm suffered by her own child even when the parent correctly assesses the level of 
harm suffered by other child workers in the same employment activity. Some of the 
reasons why researchers believe individuals exhibit optimism bias include the lack of 
previous personal experience and defensive denial. Defensive denial refers to the 
phenomenon where individuals deliberately deny that they are at risk of experiencing 
a negative event to psychologically cope with their risk-prone behavior. 
 
Pre-ban labor market equilibrium: Suppose, for the reasons discussed above, 
households uniformly underestimate the true level of occupational harm associated 
with child employment in the type-H environment. That is, parents believe that 
children employed in the type-H environment experience adverse health effects that 
are less injurious to their physical health than actually turns out to be the case. 
Consequently, parents overestimate the future adult earnings of child workers 
employed in the type-H environment.  
Hereinafter, let the subscript 1 on a variable indicate its value under the present 
case of informational and perceptional problems regarding occupational harm while 
the subscript 0 indicates its value under the benchmark case of perfect information and 
information processing analyzed in Sections 1.4 and 1.5. Further, notation sans the 0 
or 1 subscript which previously denoted specific values of the variable will hereinafter 
denote the variable itself. Applying these notational rules, we have that 1Hω′  is greater 
than 0Hω ′ . Note that since households only underestimate the level of occupational 
harm associated with work in the type-H environment, the future labor market 
earnings of child workers in the type-U environment remains unchanged, that is, 1Uω ′  
equals 0Uω′ . We, however, assume that 0Uω′  is greater than 1Hω′ , that is, even though 
parents overestimate the future labor earnings of child workers in the type-H 
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environment, the estimate does not exceed the future labor earnings of child workers 
in the type-U environment.  
The decision problem for household i I∈  remains the same as in Section 1.4 
except that the parent takes into consideration 1Hω′  instead of 0Hω ′ . The decision 
problem for type-U and type-H firms remains unchanged by this misjudgment by 
households. The misjudgment however affects the equilibrium child wages and 
employment in both the type-U and
 
type-H labor markets. 
In order to determine the labor market outcomes under the imperfect 
information case relative to the perfect information case, we need to investigate how a 
change in 1Hω′  affects the equilibrium wages 
*
Uω  and 
* .Hω We determine that 
*
Uω  is 
increasing in Hω′  while 
*
Hω  is decreasing in Hω′ (see the Appendix for the workings 
out). Thus, given 0 1 1 0 ,H H U Uω ω ω ω′ ′ ′ ′< < = relative to the perfect information case, we 
obtain the following equilibrium wage results: 
1. Equilibrium wage in the type-U environment is higher ( )* *1 0 ;U Uω ω>  
2. Equilibrium wage in the type-H environment is lower ( )* *1 0 ;  H H andω ω<  
3. The compensating wage differential for harmful child labor is smaller 
( )* * * *1 1 0 0 .H U H Uω ω ω ω− < −  
In addition, the equilibrium wage pair ( )* *1 1,U Hω ω implies the following employment 
results relative to the perfect information case:  
1. Equilibrium child employment in the type-U environment is lower; 
2. Equilibrium child employment in the type-H environment is higher; and 
3. Total child employment is higher ( ) ( )( )* *1 0ˆ ˆ .P PU Uy yω ω>  
The intuition for these equilibrium wage and employment results relative to the 
perfect information case is probably most straightforward to explain if we consider the 
economy shifting from the labor market equilibrium under the perfect information 
case to that under the imperfect information case. That is, suppose 
Hω ′  increases from 
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0Hω ′ to 1.Hω ′  This increase in Hω ′ will induce a flow of child labor from the type-U to 
the type-H labor market, decreasing child labor supply in the former and increasing 
child labor supply in the latter labor market. This flow raises the equilibrium wage in 
the type-U labor market ( )*Uω  while lowering the equilibrium wage in the type-H 
labor market ( )*Hω . The increase in the equilibrium wage in the type-U labor market 
serves to induce a flow of child labor from out-of-labor-force and into the type-U 
labor market. Given the nature of the equilibrium wage changes, the flow of child 
labor into the type-U labor market is exceeded by the flow out of the type-U labor 
market and into the type-H labor market.  
 
Ban on harmful child labor 
Labor market effects: A ban on harmful child labor with perfect effectiveness (which 
entails the shutdown of type-H firms) generates the same labor market outcomes 
discussed in Section 1.5, because the ban eliminates the child labor market beset by 
informational problems regarding occupational harm. Thus, the ban on harmful child 
labor returns the economy to the post-ban perfect information case, where the post-ban 
equilibrium wage in the type-U child labor market is .* 0
B
Uω  Although, the labor market 
effects of banning harmful child labor under the imperfect information case is 
qualitatively the same as under the perfect information case, the extent of the changes 
in the equilibrium wage in the type-U child labor market, child employment, and child 
labor force participation are larger. 
 
Welfare effects: In order to determine the welfare effects of banning harmful child 
labor, we examine the utilities of households before and after the ban by separately 
considering three distinct groups of households: (1) those households that initially 
(pre-ban) chose not to send their children to work; (2) those households that initially 
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chose to send their children to work in the type-U environment; and (3) those 
households that initially chose to send their children to work in the type-H 
environment. 
 
1. Households which initially chose not to send their children to work will experience 
no change in their utility from the ban on harmful child labor. 
 
Before the ban, all households Ii ∈  such that parental income Piy was equal to or 
exceeded ( )* 1ˆ UPy ω  chose not to send their children to work. Define 
( ){ }*1 1ˆ: , .P P PN i UI i y y y Iω = ∈ ⊂   After the ban, the equilibrium wage in the type-U 
environment falls from * 1Uω  to 
*
0 ,
B
Uω  which implies that the level of parental earnings 
that constitutes the child labor force participation cutoff also falls from ( )* 1ˆ UPy ω  to 
( )* 0ˆ ,P BUy ω  indicating that the set of households which choose not to send their 
children to work expands as a result of the ban. The fall in the equilibrium wage in the 
type-U environment only acts to reinforce the pre-ban choice of households in 
1NI  as 
it widens the utility difference between their pre-ban choice and the remaining 
alternative (child work in the type-U environment). Thus, households in 
1NI  continue 
to choose not to send their children to work, and their utilities before and after the ban 
remain unchanged, which implies that these households are unaffected by the ban on 
harmful child labor. 
 
2. Households which initially chose to send their children to work in the type-U 
environment will experience a fall in their utility from the ban on harmful child 
labor. 
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Before the ban, all households Ii ∈  such that parental income Piy was lower than the 
child labor force participation cutoff ( )* 1ˆ UPy ω  and equal to or higher than the U-H 
cutoff ( )* *1 1,P U Hy ω ωɶ  chose to send their children to work in the type-U environment. 
Define ( ) ( )){ }* * *1 1 1 1ˆ: , , .P P PU i U H UI i y y y Iω ω ω= ∈ ⊂ ɶ  After the ban, households 1Ui I∈  
are forced to reevaluate their choice as a result of the fall in the equilibrium wage in 
the type-U environment caused by the flow of child labor from the now-nonexistent 
type-H environment. Those households 
1Ui I∈ such that the post-ban utility from 
sending their children to work in the type-U environment, ( )* 0 0ln ln ,P Bi U Uy ω β ω′+ +  is 
less than or equal to the utility from their children not working, 0ln ln ,
P
i Ny β ω′+ will 
choose to remove their children from the type-U environment. Whereas, those 
households 
1Ui I∈ such that ( )* 0 0ln lnP Bi U Uy ω β ω′+ + exceeds 0ln lnPi Ny β ω′+  will 
choose to continue to send their children to work in the type-U environment. 
Regardless of their respective choices, all households in 
1UI  will experience a fall in 
utility after the ban as  
( ) ( ){ }* *1 0 0 0 0ln ln max ln ln , ln ln .P P P Bi U U i U i U Uy y yω β ω β ω ω β ω′ ′ ′+ + > + + +
 
 
3. Households which initially chose to send their children to work in the type-H 
environment can potentially experience an increase in their utility from the ban on 
harmful child labor. 
 
Before the ban, all households Ii ∈  such that parental earnings Piy were lower than the 
U-H cutoff ( )* *1 1,P U Hy ω ωɶ  chose to send their children to work in the type-H 
environment. Define ( )){ }* *1 1 1: , , .P P PH i U HI i y y y Iω ω= ∈ ⊂ ɶ  The ban on child work in 
the type-H environment makes households realize that the true level of occupational 
harm was such that the future earnings of child workers in the type-H environment 
before the ban was actually 0Hω ′ and not 1,Hω ′  where 0 1.H Hω ω′ ′< Households in 1HI  
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discover that the utility level from their choice was ( )* 1 0ln lnPi H Hy ω β ω ′+ +  and not 
( )* 1 1ln lnPi H Hy ω β ω ′+ + as previously thought, where 
( ) ( )* *1 0 1 1ln ln ln ln .P Pi H H i H Hy yω β ω ω β ω′ ′+ + < + +  After the ban, even though the 
equilibrium wage in the type-U environment falls to * 0 ,
B
Uω  those households 1Hi I∈  
such that ( ) ( ){ }* *1 0 0 0 0ln ln max ln ln , ln lnP P B Pi H H i U U i Ny y yω β ω ω β ω β ω′ ′ ′+ + < + + +
 
will experience an increase in utility as a result of the ban. On the other hand, those 
households 
1Hi I∈ such that 
( ) ( ){ }* *1 0 0 0 0ln ln max ln ln , ln lnP P B Pi H H i U U i Ny y yω β ω ω β ω β ω′ ′ ′+ + > + + +
 
will experience a decrease in their utility. 
The extent of the equilibrium wage decline in the type-U environment as a 
result of the ban determines the incidence of households in 
1HI which experience an 
increase in utility after the ban. At one extreme, if * *0 1,
B
U Hω λω>  where 
0
0
1,H
U
β
ω
λ
ω
 ′
= < ′ 
 then all households in 
1HI  experience an increase in utility from the 
ban on harmful child labor. At the other extreme, if 
( ) ( )* * * *0 1 1 11 , ,B PU U H Hyω λ ω ω λω< − +ɶ  then all households in 1HI  experince a decrease in 
utility as a result of the ban on harmful child labor. Finally, if * 0
B
Uω assumes some 
intermediate value, that is, ( ) ( )* * * * *1 1 1 0 11 ,P BU H H U Hyλ ω ω λω ω ω− + < <ɶ , some households 
in 
1HI  experience an increase in utility while other households in 1HI  experience a 
decrease in utility. 
 
4. If the post-ban equilibrium wage in the type-U environment, * 0 ,
B
Uω  lies in the range 
( ) ( )( )* * * *1 1 1 11 , ,P U H H Hyλ ω ω ω λω− +ɶ , then those households in 1HI who have 
relatively higher parental income experience an increase in welfare from the ban, 
while those households in 
1HI who have relatively lower parental income 
experience a decrease in welfare. In other words, if the post-ban equilibrium wage 
in the type-U environment, * 0 ,
B
Uω  is such that some households in 1HI observe a 
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decrease in welfare, these households are invariably the poorest ones in terms of 
parental income. Furthermore, among these households, the poorer the household 
is in terms of parental income, the larger the welfare loss experienced by the 
household. 
 
5. Using any welfare measure w belonging to the class of social welfare functions W 
which are anonymous and increasing, the ban on harmful child labor will either 
be unambiguously welfare-reducing or, at best, welfare-ambiguous for households 
in the economy. Which welfare outcome result is realized hinges on the size of the 
wage decline in the type-U environment. 
 
In the case of informational and perceptional problems regarding occupational 
harm analyzed in this section, a ban on harmful child labor may still be first-order 
dominance worsening, but unlike the case analyzed in Section 1.5, this result is no 
longer guaranteed. Under the case examined in this section, the ban on harmful child 
labor may improve the welfare status of some households while hurting the welfare 
status of others, rendering the ban welfare-ambiguous. In no case is a ban on harmful 
child labor first-order welfare dominant. 
 
1.7. Welfare effects of banning harmful child labor: the child as the welfare 
evaluator 
Thus far, the welfare effects of banning harmful child labor with perfect enforcement 
under both informational settings have been evaluated by using the parent’s utility 
function as the household’s welfare function. In the benchmark model, the parent is 
considered the sole decisionmaker of the household, and the child is assumed to fully 
abide by the choices made by the parent. In addition, the parent is assumed to only 
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care imperfectly for the future welfare of children as captured in the parental altruism 
factor β , where 0 1β< < . Consequently, the parent’s and the child’s utility functions 
may well diverge, in this case, in how they individually evaluate the future welfare of 
the child. That is, while the parent’s utility function for household i I∈  is given by 
ln lni ic β ω′+  (see (1)), the child’s utility function for household i I∈ is given by  
 ln ln .i ic ω′+  (9) 
In this section, we evaluate the welfare effects of banning harmful child labor 
from the perspective of the child given the divergence in preferences between parent 
and child specified above. As in the benchmark model, the parent remains the 
decisionmaker of the household and the optimizing behavior of the household follows 
the parent’s preferences. This implies that the pre- and post-ban labor market choices 
of households under both informational settings are identical to those discussed in 
Sections 1.5 and 1.6. That is, the labor market undergoes, both qualitatively and 
quantitatively, the same wage and employment changes as a result of the ban.  
Table 1.1 summarizes the cases examined in this chapter, the welfare analysis 
completed thus far, and the analysis to follow. 
Before discussing the labor market and welfare effects for cases 3 and 4, we 
first have to establish the counterfactual pre-ban situation if the child was the 
decisionmaker instead of the parent. The next section does this.  
 
Counterfactual pre-ban employment choices: To facilitate the analysis of whether the 
welfare assessment of the ban differs between the parent and the child, it is useful to 
answer the following counterfactual question: Given the child’s utility function in (9) 
and supposing the child was the decisionmaker in the household, to what extent would 
the pre-ban labor market choices of the household be similar or different between the 
parent and the child?  
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To begin answering this question, we know from Section 1.4. that if we used 
the parent’s utility function and the parent was treated as the decisionmaker, the 
parental income Py  such that the household is indifferent between the child not  
working and the child working is given by ( )ˆ
1
P U
U
N
U
y β
ω
ω
ω
ω
=
 ′
− ′ 
. 
 
Table 1.1. Welfare effects of a ban on harmful child labor under alternative 
cases—partial 
  Welfare evaluator in the household 
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 Parent Child 
Perfect information 
processing by 
parent 
CASE 1 
Welfare reducing. 
Discussed in Section 
1.5. 
CASE 3  
? 
To be discussed in 
Section 1.7.B. 
Imperfect 
information 
processing by 
parent 
CASE 2  
In general, welfare 
reducing. 
 In special case, 
welfare ambiguous 
Discussed in Section 
1.6. 
CASE 4 
? 
To be discussed in 
Section 1.7.C. 
Alternatively, if we use the child’s utility function and the child is the 
decisionmaker, the “counterfactual labor participation cutoff” in terms of parental 
income Py  would be ( )ˆ
1
P U
c U
N
U
y
ω
ω
ω
ω
=
 ′
− ′ 
. Given that 0N Uω ω′ ′> >  and 0 1β< < , 
( ) ( )ˆ ˆP Pc U Uy yω ω< . That is, a smaller number of households would choose child work 
if the child was the decisionmaker. Specifically, for households i  such that 
( ) ( )( )ˆ ˆ,P P Pi c U Uy y yω ω∈ , the parent chose child work the type-U environment but the 
child would choose no work. The share of such households in the economy is given by 
( )( ) ( )( )ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ;P Pc
P P
U c Uy y
F F y F yω β ω
−
= − .8  
                                                 
8 It is easy to see that 
ˆ ˆP Pcy y
F
−
is decreasing in β , indicating that as the level of parental altruism falls, 
the number of households suboptimally in the type-U environment (based on the child’s assessment) 
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In analogous fashion, if we used the parent’s utility function and the parent 
was treated as the decisionmaker, the level of parental income Py  such that the 
household is indifferent between the child working in the type-U environment and in 
the type-H environment is given by ( ),
1
U
H U
H
P
U H
U
H
y
β
β
ω
ω ω
ω
ω ω
ω
ω
 ′ 
−  ′   =
 ′ 
−  ′   
ɶ . Alternatively, 
if we use the child’s utility function and the child is the decisionmaker, the 
“counterfactual U-H cutoff” in terms of parental income Py  would be 
( ),
1
U
H U
HP
c U H
U
H
y
ω
ω ω
ω
ω ω
ω
ω
 ′ 
−  ′  =
 ′ 
−  ′  
ɶ . Given that U Hω ω′ ′> , U Hω ω< , and 0 1β< < , 
( ) ( ), ,P Pc U H U Hy yω ω ω ω<ɶ ɶ . That is, a smaller number of households would choose to 
send their children to work in the type-H environment if the child was the 
decisionmaker. Specifically, for households i  such that 
( ) ( )( ), , ,P P Pi c U H U Hy y yω ω ω ω∈ ɶ ɶ , the parent chose child work in the type-H 
environment but the child would choose child work in the type-U environment. The 
share of such households in the economy is given by 
( )( ) ( )( ), ; ,P P
c
P P
U H c U Hy y
F F y F yω ω β ω ω
−
= −
ɶ ɶ
ɶ ɶ .9  
While possible, not all households necessarily experience a mismatch between 
the parent and the child in child employment choices. Specifically, for households 
i such that ( )ˆ ,P P Pi Uy y yω ∈   , the parent chose no child work and the child would do 
the same; for households i such that ( ) ( )ˆ, ,P P Pi U H c Uy y yω ω ω ∈  ɶ , the parent chose 
                                                                                                                                            
increases. 
9 The share P P
cy y
F
−ɶ ɶ
is decreasing in β , indicating that as the level of parental altruism falls, the number 
of households suboptimally in the type-H environment (based on the child’s assessment) increases. 
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child work in the type-U environment and the child would do the same; and, finally, 
for households i such that ( ), ,P P Pi c U Hy y y ω ω ∈  ɶ , the parent chose child work in the 
type-H environment and the child would do the same.  
Thus, in total, there are five types of households in this economy: three types 
of households where the child employment choices of the household match between 
the child and the parent and two types of households where they do not. 
The above results are summarized in Table 1.2, with all households in the 
economy organized by parental income ranges from highest to lowest as we go from 
the top of the table to the bottom.  
 
Table 1.2. Distribution of households by match and mismatch in parent and 
child decisions on child work— Perfect information processing case 
Parental income range Parent 
choice 
Child choice Result 
( )ˆ ,P P Pi c Uy y yω ∈    No child 
work 
No child 
work 
Match 
( ) ( )( )ˆ ˆ,P P Pi c U Uy y yω ω∈  Child work 
in type-U 
environment 
No child 
work 
Mismatch 
( ) ( )ˆ, ,P P Pi U H c Uy y yω ω ω ∈  ɶ  Child work 
in type-U 
environment 
Child work 
in type-U 
environment 
Match 
( ) ( )( ), , ,P P Pi c U H U Hy y yω ω ω ω∈ ɶ ɶ  Child work 
in type-H 
environment 
Child work 
in type-U 
environment 
Mismatch 
( ), ,P P Pi c U Hy y y ω ω ∈  ɶ  Child work 
in type-H 
environment 
Child work 
in type-H 
environment 
Match 
 
Welfare effects of banning harmful child labor under perfect information processing 
As a reminder, a ban on harmful child labor with perfect enforcement implies that 
child workers can no longer be employed in the type-H environment. This triggers a 
process of labor market adjustment, in which equilibrium wages in the type-U labor 
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market falls, equilibrium employment in the type-U labor market rises, and total child 
employment falls (see Section 1.5 for a detailed discussion). 
 
1. Generally, given imperfect altruism by the parent, for households for which the 
child employment choice matches between the parent and the child, household 
welfare (assessed by either the parent or the child) either remains the same or falls 
as a result of the ban on harmful child labor. 
 
There are three types of households for which the decision made by the parent 
matches with that which would be made by the child if the child was the 
decisionmaker (see Table 1.2). The welfare results for these households follow the 
same logic as the welfare effects discussion in Section 1.5. Specifically, for 
households i  such that ( )ˆ ,P P Pi Uy y yω ∈   , for which the parent chose no child work, 
there is no change in welfare as a result of the ban on harmful child labor. For 
households i  such that ( ) ( )ˆ, ,P P Pi U H c Uy y yω ω ω ∈  ɶ , for which the parent chose child 
work in the type-U environment, the fall in equilibrium wages in the type-U labor 
market reduces the welfare of these households, even for those households for which 
the fall in wages precipitates the exit of the children from the labor market altogether. 
Finally, for households i  such that ( ), ,P P Pi c U Hy y y ω ω ∈  ɶ , for which the parent chose 
child work in the type-H environment, the elimination of this choice from their choice 
set reduces their welfare, irrespective of whether the children end up shifting to the 
type-U environment or exiting from the labor market altogether.  
 
2. Generally, given imperfect altruism by the parent, for households for which the 
child employment choice made by the parent does not match with that which would 
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be made by the child, household welfare (as assessed by the child) increases as a 
result of the ban if the following two conditions simultaneously hold: 
(a) ( ) ( )* *ˆ ˆP B PU c Uy yω ω≤ , and 
(b) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
* * * *
* *
     , , , ,  
ln ln ln ln  
P P P
i c U H U H
P B P
i U U i H H
for all i such that y y y
y y
ω ω ω ω
ω ω ω ω
 ∈  
′ ′+ + > + +
ɶ ɶ
. 
 
Condition (a) is relevant for households i such that ( ) ( )( )* *ˆ ˆ,P P Pi c U Uy y yω ω∈ . It states 
that so long as the post-ban labor force participation cutoff ( )*ˆ P BUy ω  is equal to or less 
than the counterfactual labor force participation cutoff ( )*ˆ Pc Uy ω , that is, the labor 
market adjusts so that the children that exit the labor market at least include all those 
for whom the type-U environment was suboptimal to begin with, these households 
experience a gain in welfare as a result of the ban. This condition bounds the post-ban 
equilibrium wage in the type-U labor market ( )*BUω  from above.  
Likewise, Condition (b) pertains to households i such that 
( ) ( )( )* * * *, , ,P P Pi c U H U Hy y yω ω ω ω∈ ɶ ɶ . So long as the post-ban equilibrium wage in the 
type-U labor market ( )*BUω  yields a higher level of welfare than that observed in the 
type-H labor market, these households also experience a gain in welfare as a result of 
the ban. This condition bounds the post-ban equilibrium wage in the type-U labor 
market ( )*BUω  from below. The bounding from above and below sets a range of values 
for *BUω  for which Conditions (a) and (b) simultaneously hold.  
In general, the net welfare effect of banning harmful child labor under the 
perfect information setting and where the child is the welfare evaluator for the 
household is ambiguous. As shown above, some households experience a gain in 
welfare, others a loss in welfare, and yet others experience no change in their welfare. 
However, under a special case, a ban on harmful child labor in this setting can yield a 
welfare improvement.  
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3. Specifically, given imperfect altruism by the parent, household welfare (as 
assessed by the child) either increases or remains unchanged for all households in 
the economy if the following four conditions simultaneously hold: 
(a) ( )* *,P Pc U Hy yω ω =ɶ , 
(b) ( ) ( )* * *ˆ ,P Pc U U Hy yω ω ω= ɶ , 
(c) ( ) ( )* * *ˆ ,P B PU U Hy yω ω ω= ɶ , and 
(d) 
( )
( ) ( )
* *
* *
     , , ,  
ln ln ln ln  .
P P P
i U H
P B P
i U U i H H
for all i such that y y y
y y
ω ω
ω ω ω ω
 ∈  
′ ′+ + > + +
ɶ
 
Thus, under the above four conditions, using any welfare measure w belonging to 
the class of social welfare functions W which are anonymous and increasing, the 
ban on harmful child will be unambiguously welfare-improving. 
 
Conditions (a) and (b) state that the parental incomes associated with the 
counterfactual U-H and labor force participation cutoffs ( ( )* *,Pc U Hy ω ωɶ  and ( )*ˆ Pc Uy ω ) 
perfectly coincide with the lower bound on parental income in the economy Py  and 
the actual pre-ban U-H cutoff ( )* *,P U Hy ω ωɶ , respectively. Condition (a) states that, if 
the child was the decisionmaker, all households which chose child work in the type-H 
environment would have instead chosen child work in the type-U environment. 
Likewise, Condition (b) states that, if the child was the decisionmaker, all households 
which chose child work in the type-U environment would have instead chosen no 
child work. That is, all households which sent their children into the labor market face 
a situation of incompatible choices between the child and the parent. Condition (c) 
states that when child employment adjusts as a result of the ban, it adjusts to the point 
where the post-ban labor force participation cutoff ( )*ˆ P BUy ω perfectly coincides with 
the pre-ban U-H cutoff ( )* *,P U Hy ω ωɶ . That is, all child workers initially in the type-H 
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environment flow into the type-U environment, and all child workers initially in the 
type-U environment exit the labor market. Finally, Condition (d) pertains to child 
workers initially in the type-H environment. It states that, despite the downward 
adjustment, the post-ban equilibrium wage in the type-U labor market ( )*BUω  yields a 
higher level of welfare than that observed in the type-H labor market. 
 
Welfare effects of banning harmful child labor under imperfect information 
processing: If parents in the economy uniformly overestimate the future earnings level 
of children who works in the type-H environment—that is, under imperfect 
information processing, they assume future earnings of 1Hω′ , but under perfect 
information processing, they would assume future earnings of 0Hω′ , where 
1 0H Hω ω′ ′> —and the parents are decisionmakers for the households, this causes a 
distortion in the labor market (see Section 1.6 for the discussion of the distortionary 
effects of imperfect information processing on the labor market).  
Combining imperfect information processing by the parent with imperfect 
parental altruism exacerbates the problem of a mismatch in choices between the parent 
and the child; it also spreads the problem to a larger number of households. 
Specifically, for households i such that ( ) ( )( )0 1ˆ ˆ,P P Pi c U Uy y yω ω∈ , where 
( ) ( )1 0ˆ ˆP PU Uy yω ω> , the parent chose child work in the type-U environment but the 
child would choose no work. Similarly, for households i such that 
( ) ( )( )0 0 1 1, , ,P P Pi c U H U Hy y yω ω ω ω∈ ɶ ɶ , where ( ) ( )1 1 0 0, ,P PU H U Hy yω ω ω ω>ɶ ɶ , the parent 
chose child work in the type-H environment but the child would choose child work in 
the type-U environment. 
However, as under the perfect information processing setting, these are three 
subsets of households in the economy where, despite the imperfect information 
processing and imperfect altruism by the parent, the choice made by the parent 
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matches with the one the child would have made if the child was the decisionmaker. 
Specifically, for households i such that ( )1ˆ ,P P Pi Uy y yω ∈   , the parent chose no child 
work and the child would choose the same; for households i such that 
( ) ( )1 1 0ˆ, ,P P Pi U H c Uy y yω ω ω ∈  ɶ , the parent chose child work in the type-U environment 
and the child would choose the same; and, finally, for households i such that 
( )0 0, ,P P Pi c U Hy y y ω ω ∈  ɶ , the parent chose child work in the type-H environment and 
the child would choose the same. 
The above results are summarized in Table 1.3, with all households in the 
economy organized by parental income ranges from highest to lowest as we go from 
the top of the table to the bottom.  
 
Table 1.3. Distribution of households by match and mismatch in parent and 
child decisions on child work—imperfect information processing case 
Parental income range Parent 
choice 
Child choice Result 
( )1ˆ ,P P Pi Uy y yω ∈    No child 
work 
No child 
work 
Match 
( ) ( )( )0 1ˆ ˆ,P P Pi c U Uy y yω ω∈  Child work 
in type-U 
environment 
No child 
work 
Mismatch 
( ) ( )1 1 0ˆ, ,P P Pi U H c Uy y yω ω ω ∈  ɶ  Child work 
in type-U 
environment 
Child work 
in type-U 
environment 
Match 
( ) ( )( )0 0 1 1, , ,P P Pi c U H U Hy y yω ω ω ω∈ ɶ ɶ  Child work 
in type-H 
environment 
Child work 
in type-U 
environment 
Mismatch 
( )0 0, ,P P Pi c U Hy y y ω ω ∈  ɶ  Child work 
in type-H 
environment 
Child work 
in type-H 
environment 
Match 
 
Given this, the welfare results for the imperfect information processing case 
are qualitatively the same as for the perfect information processing case. They are as 
follows.  
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1. Generally, in a setting of imperfect information processing and given imperfect 
altruism by the parent, for households for which the child employment choice 
matches between the parent and the child, household welfare (as assessed by 
either the parent or the child) either remains the same or falls as a result of the 
ban on harmful child labor. 
 
2. Generally, in a setting of imperfect information processing and given imperfect 
altruism by the parent, for households for which the child employment choice 
made by the parent does not match with that which would be made by the child, 
household welfare (as assessed by the child) increases as a result of the ban if the 
following two conditions simultaneously hold: 
(a) ( ) ( )* *0 0ˆ ˆP B PU c Uy yω ω≤ ; and 
(b) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
* * * *
0 0 1 1
* *
0 0 1 0
     , , , ,  
ln ln ln ln .
P P P
i c U H U H
P B P
i U U i H H
for all i such that y y y
y y
ω ω ω ω
ω ω ω ω
 ∈  
′ ′+ + > + +
ɶ ɶ
 
3. Specifically, in a setting of imperfect information processing and given imperfect 
altruism by the parent, household welfare (as assessed by the child) either 
increases or remains unchanged for households in the economy if the following 
four conditions simultaneously hold: 
(a) ( )* *0 0,P Pc U Hy yω ω =ɶ ; 
(b) ( ) ( )* * *0 1 1ˆ ,P Pc U U Hy yω ω ω= ɶ ; 
(c) ( ) ( )* * *0 1 1ˆ ,P B PU U Hy yω ω ω= ɶ ; and 
(d) 
( )
( ) ( )
* *
1 1
* *
0 0 1 0
     , , ,  
ln ln ln ln  
P P P
i U H
P B P
i U U i H H
for all i such that y y y
y y
ω ω
ω ω ω ω
 ∈  
′ ′+ + > + +
ɶ
. 
Thus, using any welfare measure w belonging to the class of social welfare 
functions W which are anonymous and increasing, the ban on harmful child will 
be unambiguously welfare-improving. 
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Thus, to summarize, in general, in a setting where the parent is imperfectly altruistic 
and is the decisionmaker but the child is the household welfare evaluator, a ban on 
harmful child labor with perfect enforcement can result in some households 
experiencing a gain in welfare but not all. Specifically, those households for which the 
child employment choice made by the parent does not match with what the child 
would have made can potentially experience a welfare gain; the numbers of such 
households increase when, under the imperfect information processing case, parents 
also underestimate the future consequences of the harm suffered by the child in the 
type-H environment. However, under certain special conditions, all households in the 
economy can experience a welfare gain. Specifically, if the parental decision to send 
the child to work in either the type-U or type-H environment is suboptimal from the 
point of the view of the child, a ban on harmful child labor which results in these 
children ending up in their optimal employment choices (no work for type-U workers 
and work in type-U environment if type-H workers) yields an unambiguous welfare 
improvement. These results hold under the case of perfect as well as imperfect 
information processing by the parent regarding the nature of occupational harm in the 
type-H environment. The full set of welfare results for the different cases is 
summarized in Table 1.4. 
 
1.8. Conclusion 
This chapter examines the labor market and welfare effects of banning harmful child 
labor with complete effectiveness. Harm is defined as certain, irreversible adverse 
health effects that emerge later in life as a result of child work undertaken in particular 
(type-H) workplaces, and where a ban on harmful child labor leads to the shutdown of 
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such workplaces. These effects of the ban are analyzed in two different informational 
settings.  
 
Table 1.4. Welfare effects of a ban on harmful child labor under alternative 
cases—complete 
  Welfare evaluator in the household 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
 s
et
ti
n
g
s 
re
g
ar
d
in
g
 c
h
il
d
 
o
cc
u
p
at
io
n
al
 h
ar
m
 
 Parent Child 
Perfect information 
processing by 
parent 
CASE 1 
Welfare reducing. 
Discussed in Section 
1.5. 
CASE 3 
In general, welfare 
ambiguous. 
In special case, 
welfare improving. 
Discussed in Section 
1.7.B. 
Imperfect 
information 
processing by 
parent 
CASE 2  
In general, welfare 
reducing. 
 In special case, 
welfare ambiguous 
Discussed in Section 
1.6. 
CASE 4 
In general, welfare 
ambiguous. 
In special case, 
welfare improving.  
Discussed in Section 
1.7.C. 
 
In the first setting (our benchmark case), households possess perfect 
information on the nature of occupational harm associated with different types of child 
employment environments and correctly assess the effect of such harm on the future 
wages of child workers. Under the perfect information case, in terms of labor market 
effects, the ban reduces the equilibrium wage and increases employment in the type-U 
child labor market, although it reduces overall child employment. In terms of welfare 
effects, given the labor market adjustments that occur, the ban unambiguously reduces 
the welfare of all households which initially chose to send their children to work; 
those households which initially chose not to send their children to work experience 
no change in the welfare. In addition, among households which initially chose to send 
their children to work in type-H firms, the poorer the household is in terms of parental 
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income, the larger the welfare loss experienced by the household due to the ban on 
harmful child labor. 
The extension to the benchmark case relaxes the assumption of perfect 
information availability and information processing regarding occupational harm 
experienced by child workers and alternatively considers a setting in which 
informational problems are rife, causing all households to uniformly underestimate the 
adverse health effects of child work in type-H firms. This systematic misjudgment on 
the part of households creates a distortion in the labor market. Relative to the perfect 
information case, the labor market equilibrium that emerges is characterized by higher 
wages and lower employment in the type-U child labor market, lower wages and 
higher employment in the type-H child labor market, lower compensating wage 
differentials, and higher overall child employment. 
Banning harmful child labor, by precipitating the shutdown of type-H firms, 
eliminates the segment of the child labor market beset by the informational and 
perceptional problems. It follows then that, in terms of labor market effects, the ban 
under the imperfect information case has qualitatively the same set of effects as under 
the perfect information case, although the magnitude of the labor market adjustments 
that occur are larger than under the former.  
In terms of welfare effects, depending on the size of the resulting wage decline 
in the type-U child labor market, the ban can potentially raise the welfare of some if 
not all households that initially chose to send their children to work in the type-H child 
labor market. The more moderate is the wage decline, the larger is the share of 
households that experience welfare gains. However, as the wage falls in the type-U 
child labor market, those households that initially chose to send their child to work in 
the type-U child labor market will experience welfare losses. Furthermore, among 
those households that initially chose to send their child to work in the type-H child 
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labor market, if the wage decline is such that some fraction of these households 
experience welfare gains while other households experience welfare losses, the 
households that experience welfare losses are invariably the poorest. Thus, under the 
imperfect information case, the ban on harmful child labor is, at best, welfare-
ambiguous. 
The benchmark model also assumes that the parent, who is the decisionmaker 
for the household, cares imperfectly for the welfare of the child. Specifically, the 
parent is considered not to care for the future welfare of the child to the same extent 
that the child does. Given these divergent preferences, treating the child as the welfare 
evaluator for the household, a ban on harmful child labor with perfect enforcement can 
result in some households experiencing a gain in welfare but not all. Specifically, 
those households for which the employment choice made by the parent does not match 
with what the child would have made can potentially experience a welfare gain; the 
numbers of such households increase when, under the imperfect information 
processing case, parents also underestimate the future consequences of the harm 
suffered by child workers in the type-H environment. Furthermore, under certain 
special conditions, all households in the economy can experience a welfare gain. 
Specifically, if the parental decision to send the child to work in either the type-U or 
type-H environment is suboptimal from the point of the view of the child, a ban on 
harmful child labor which results in these children ending up in their optimal 
employment choices (no work for type-U workers and work in type-U environment if 
type-H workers) yields an unambiguous welfare improvement. These results hold 
under both informational cases. 
In general, the welfare results that emerge critically hinge on the post-ban 
adjustments that take place in the labor market as it recalibrates. The welfare 
improvement results in the chapter rely on the wage in the type-U environment not 
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falling below a certain threshold (where the threshold varies depending on the 
particular case under examination). The wage decline that occurs as a result of the ban 
is more likely to be moderate if the size of the type-H child labor market is small 
relative to the type-U child labor market. It also helps if labor demand in the type-U 
child labor market is relatively elastic or if labor demand is increasing. Some of this 
increase in labor demand can conceivably come about if instead of type-H firms 
shutting down as a result of the ban, some of them raise their occupational health and 
safety standards to become type-U firms and continue to employ children.
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APPENDIX 
Proof 1: Market equilibrium existence, uniqueness, and stability 
Dropping the star superscripts from the wage variables, define 
( ) ( ) ( ), , 0,  andU U H U U U U HF D Sω ω ω ω ω= − =  
( ) ( ) ( ), , 0.H U H H H H U HF D Sω ω ω ω ω= − =  
Solving for partial derivatives, we obtain the Jacobian matrix 
.
U U
U H
H H
U H
U U U
U U H
H H H
U H H
F F
J
F F
D S S
S D S
ω ω
ω ω
ω ω ω
ω ω ω
∂ ∂ 
 ∂ ∂ =
 ∂ ∂
 ∂ ∂ 
∂ ∂ ∂ − − ∂ ∂ ∂ =
 ∂ ∂ ∂
− − ∂ ∂ ∂ 
 
The determinant of J is 
.
U UH H
U H U H
U U UH H H
U U H H U H
U U U U UH H H H H
U H U H H U U H U H
F FF F
J
D S SD S S
D D S S SD S D S S
ω ω ω ω
ω ω ω ω ω ω
ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ω
∂ ∂∂ ∂
= −
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
      ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂
= − − − − −      ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂      
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= − − + −
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
 
It is straightforward to see that 
( )( ) ( ) ,U H
U H
D D
ω ω
∂ ∂
= − − = +
∂ ∂  
( ) ( ) ( ) ,  andU H
U H
D S
ω ω
∂ ∂
= − + = −
∂ ∂  
( )( ) ( ).UH
H U
SD
ω ω
∂∂
= − + = −
∂ ∂  
For the others, we obtain the following detailed derivatives:
 
( ) ( )ˆˆ ,
P P
P PU
U U U
S y y
I f y f y
ω ω ω
 ∂ ∂ ∂
= − ∂ ∂ ∂ 
ɶ
ɶ
 
 55 
( ) ,
P
PH
H H
S y
I f y
ω ω
 ∂ ∂
=  ∂ ∂ 
ɶ
ɶ  
( ) ,  and
P
PU
H H
S y
I f y
ω ω
 ∂ ∂
= −  ∂ ∂ 
ɶ
ɶ  
( ) .
P
PH
U U
S y
I f y
ω ω
 ∂ ∂
=  ∂ ∂ 
ɶ
ɶ
 
Thus,
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2ˆˆ
U UH H
U H U H
P P P P P P
P P P P
U H U H U H
S SS S
y y y y y y
I f y f y f y f y
ω ω ω ω
ω ω ω ω ω ω
∂ ∂∂ ∂
−
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
 ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= − + ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ
ɶ ɶ ɶ  
( ) ( )2 ˆˆ .
P P
P P
U H
y y
I f y f y
ω ω
∂ ∂
=
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ɶ
ɶ
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ˆ
0
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ω
∂
>
∂
 and 0,
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H
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ω
∂
>
∂
ɶ
 
( ) ( )2 ˆˆ 0.
P P
P PU UH H
U H U H U H
S SS S y y
I f y f y
ω ω ω ω ω ω
∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
− = >
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
ɶ
ɶ
 
Thus,
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0.
U U U U UH H H H H
U H U H H U U H U H
D D S S SD S D S S
J
ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ω
       ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= − − + −       ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂       
= + − − − − + + >  
The determinant of J is nonzero for all positive pairs of child wages. Since the 
determinant of J is not identically zero for all values of child wages, the 
functions
U
F and 
H
F are nonlinearly independent, which means that a nontrivial 
solution exists. Further, since the determinant of J is always positive, this ensures that 
the system of nonlinear equations has a unique solution which is stable. 
 
Claim: *
Uω  is increasing in Hω′ ; 
*
Hω  is decreasing in Hω′ . 
Proof 2: Dropping the star superscripts from the variables, define 
( ) ( ) ( ), , , , 0,  andU U H H U U U U H HF D Sω ω ω ω ω ω ω′ ′= − =   ( .10) 
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            ( ) ( ) ( ), , , , 0.H U H H H H H U H HF D Sω ω ω ω ω ω ω′ ′= − =  ( .11) 
By totally differentiating equations (A.1) and (A.2) with respect to ,
U
ω ,
H
ω and 
,
H
ω′ we obtain 
 0,  andU U UU H H
U H H
F F F
d d dω ω ω
ω ω ω
∂ ∂ ∂
′+ + =
′∂ ∂ ∂
 ( .12) 
 0.H H HU H H
U H H
F F F
d d dω ω ω
ω ω ω
∂ ∂ ∂
′+ + =
′∂ ∂ ∂
 ( .13) 
By simultaneously solving (A.3) and (A.4) for Udω and ,Hdω we obtain  
U UH H
H H H H
U H
F FF F
d d
J
ω ω ω ω
ω ω
∂ ∂∂ ∂ − ′ ′∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
′ =
 
  
 
,
U UH H
H U H U
H H
F FF F
d d
J
ω ω ω ω
ω ω
∂ ∂∂ ∂ − ′ ′∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
′ =
 
  
 
where 0 (see Proof 1 in the Appendix).U UH H
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CHAPTER 2 
DO WAGES COMPENSATE FOR HARMFUL CHILD LABOR? 
QUANTILE REGRESSION EVIDENCE FROM THE PHILIPPINES 
2.1. Introduction 
Child labor remains a mass phenomenon in much of the developing world, particularly 
in its poorer parts such as sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. The International Labor 
Organization (ILO), the major source of statistics on the extent of child labor 
worldwide, estimates that 191 million children ages 5-14 years were economically 
active in 2004, of which, 166 million child workers were categorized as child laborers 
(Hagemann et al. 2006).10 More disconcertingly, 74 million of these 166 million child 
workers (or over 40%) were considered to be employed in harmful or exploitative 
situations or conditions. Of these, roughly 8 million children were deemed to be in 
what are termed as unconditional worst forms of child labor (ILO 2002).11  
In order to gain some insight into the reasons behind harmful child labor and 
the socioeconomic conditions underlying its existence, in this chapter, I examine 
whether child workers in harmful employment settings are compensated monetarily in 
the form of higher labor market earnings. This is an important question, especially 
from a policy perspective, as it indicates the extent to which market mechanisms 
operate to compensate child workers for the disutility of experiencing harmful child 
labor. In particular, it also provides indirect evidence of the extent to which child 
workers (or their parents as decisionmakers on behalf of their children) are informed 
                                                 
10 Economic activity covers all market production (paid work) and certain types of non-market 
production (unpaid work), including production of goods for own use. Child labor consists of all 
children under age 15 years who are economically active excluding (1) those who are under age 5 years 
and (2) those ages 12-14 years who spend less than 14 hours a week on their jobs, unless their activities 
or occupations are hazardous by nature or circumstance. Added to this are children ages 15-17 years in 
the worst forms of child labor (ILO 2002). 
11 The worst forms of child labor refers to child labor in the context of slavery or slave-like conditions, 
in prostitution or pornography, in illicit activities such as drug trafficking, or in conditions that are 
likely to affect the health or safety of the children involved. Unconditional worst forms of child labor 
exclude the last type.  
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about the extent and nature of the potential harm they are facing, and whether they 
have the market power to extract compensation for experiencing harmful child labor.  
The theoretical literature on harmful child labor has proceeded in two distinct 
directions. In the first, labor markets are characterized along largely standard textbook 
lines where poor households possess some information about the nature of potential 
harm associated with different employment opportunities for their children and 
maintain the right to exit from an employment relationship (see, e.g., Chapter 1; Dessy 
and Pallage 2005). In the second, households effectively relinquish the child’s right to 
exit from an employment relationship such as under child servitude or child trafficking 
(see, e.g., Rogers and Swinnerton 2003; Dessy and Pallage 2003). The predictions 
regarding the relationship between child earnings and harmful child labor between the 
two characterizations of the labor market differ. Under the first characterization, 
positive compensating wages arise for harmful child labor, while under the second 
characterization, negative compensating wages arise (i.e., poor working conditions are 
accompanied by low earnings).  
To the best of my knowledge, to date, there has been no research on estimating 
compensating wage differentials for harmful child labor. In fact, there has been very 
little work on estimating earnings equations for child workers in general. The bulk of 
the empirical literature on child labor has focused on estimating child labor force 
participation equations in order to identify the key determinants of child labor and, to a 
lesser extent, the effects of child labor force participation and earnings on household 
and child socioeconomic outcomes such as nutrition, fertility, and education (see, e.g., 
Brown et al. 2003 for an extensive survey of the empirical literature on child labor).  
In recent years, there has been some empirical research on harmful child labor. 
However, the focus of this strand of research has been on estimating the adverse health 
effects of child labor both in the short-term and long-term (see, e.g., Beegle et al. 
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2005; O’Donnell et al. 2005; Rosati and Straub 2007; Rogerro et al. 2008). The rest of 
this research essentially consists of descriptive statistics on child work-related injury 
or illness rates. For example, Ashagrie (1998) provides information on the incidence 
of workplace injuries and illnesses among child workers disaggregated by industry and 
gender from household survey data collected in four countries.  
The empirical research on compensating wage differentials for occupational 
harm and hazards for adult workers is extensive (see, e.g., Viscusi 1993 and Viscusi 
and Aldy 2003 for surveys of the literature). In general, in this literature, harmful labor 
is defined by aggregating work-related injury or illness data to certain level, typically 
either at the detailed industry or occupation level, and assigning all individual workers 
in a given occupation-industry cell the average work-related injury/illness rate in that 
occupation-industry cell. Compensating wage differentials are then estimated for an 
occupation-industry level dataset.  
This approach is not feasible in this study for two reasons. First, the occupation 
and industry classifications for child workers are not detailed enough to permit a 
reasonable sample size once the data are collapsed to an occupation-industry level 
dataset. Second, labor force (wage) labor market participation rates among children 
are significantly lower than for adults; further child workers are more concentrated in 
certain industries and occupations than adult workers—consequently, even if sufficient 
detail were present in the occupation and industry classifications, it is likely that a 
significant share of occupation-industry cells would be lack (sufficient numbers of) 
observations. Notwithstanding, individual-level injury and illness data are available in 
my data; using these data at this level would however be a flawed approach. Given 
that these data represent the overt and immediate manifestation of harmful child labor, 
they would, as a result, likely grossly understate the true extent of harmful child labor 
across child workers. That is, there are likely to be large number of cases where child 
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workers would not have suffered a work-related injury or illness in the survey 
reference period but may nevertheless be employed under harmful employment 
conditions. 
In this chapter, I define harmful child labor as child labor in certain workplaces 
that is likely to result in adverse health effects in the short-term and/or over the longer-
term. Specifically, given the available data, harmful child labor is defined as child 
labor in activities in which children self-report to be physically strenuous, 
psychologically stressful, or hazardous. This is in contrast to Chapter 1, where I define 
harmful child labor as child labor in certain workplaces which results in adverse, 
irreversible health effects later in life (as an adult) in a deterministic way. This 
stylization of harmful child labor facilitated the modeling of household 
decisionmaking over child employment choices without having to resort to the use of 
expectations. In reality however harm is typically a stochastic event. Irrespective of 
whether harmful child labor is treated as a deterministic or stochastic event, what is 
common across the definitions is that workplaces are viewed to systematically differ 
in their capacity to cause harm to the child worker.  
This research benefits from the discussions on methodological issues and 
various empirical approaches undertaken to estimate compensating wage differentials 
in the literature in general (e.g., Greene 2001; Moretti 2000; Gunderson and Hyatt 
2001); these lessons are reflected in the design of the empirical framework. In this 
chapter, I attempt to estimate the earnings-harmful child labor trade-off using both 
parametric (ordinary least squares) and semiparametric methods (quantile regression). 
I first examine the simple bivariate relationship between harmful child labor and 
earnings. This serves as a starting point for the conditional analysis, where I estimate a 
log-linear earnings equation via ordinary least squares and quantile regression. The 
latter method serves as a more robust alternative e
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estimator at the center of the conditional distribution of earnings; it also allows me to 
characterize the earnings-harmful child labor trade-off at different points along the 
conditional distribution of earnings. Needless to say, the conditional analysis provides 
the more compelling evidence on the nature of the relationship between earnings and 
harmful child labor. However, it is important to note that the evidence on an earnings-
harmful child labor trade-off is descriptive—the available data do not allow me to 
address the potential simultaneity and selectivity problems that are generally present in 
earnings estimations.  
The analysis yields six main empirical results. First, I find that children who 
work in paid employment systematically report higher incidences of harmful child 
labor than those who work in unpaid employment. Second, I find strong evidence of 
an unconditional positive relationship between earnings and harmful child labor, 
irrespective of the type of harmful child labor examined. Third, examining this 
relationship within a multiple regression framework with a range of 
sociodemographic, employment, and other controls, I find evidence of positive 
compensating wages only for hazardous labor and physically strenuous labor when 
evaluated at the conditional mean of earnings via ordinary least squares; further, the 
result for hazardous labor is not robust when evaluated at the conditional median of 
earnings via quantile regession. Fourth, in the cases of psychologically stressful and 
physically strenuous labor, I do not find any evidence that children receive additional 
positive compensating wages at the conditional mean or median for higher levels of 
harmful child labor, as represented by the frequency of harmful child labor. Fifth, I do 
not find evidence that compensating wages for harmful child labor at the conditional 
mean or median systematically vary between girls and boys or between urban and 
rural children. Sixth and last, I find that the estimated earnings premia for physically 
strenuous and hazardous labor at the conditional mean appear to be largely driven by 
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substantial premia in the bottom half of the conditional distribution of earnings; the 
premia in the upper half of the conditional distribution of earnings are relatively 
modest and not significantly different from zero.  
The remaining sections of the chapter are organized as follows. Section 2.2 
presents the data and the sample. Section 2.3 presents the various empirical strategies 
employed to determine the regression relationship between harmful child labor and 
child earnings. Section 2.4 presents the main findings from the unconditional and 
conditional analyses of the earnings-harmful child labor trade-off. Section 2.5 
concludes by summarizing the main results and briefly discussing them. 
 
2.2. Data and sample 
2.2.1. Data 
The chapter uses observational individual- and household-level data from the Filipino 
2001 Survey on Children: 5 to 17 Years Old (2001 SOC). The 2001 SOC is a 
nationally-representative sample survey conducted by the National Statistics Office 
(NSO), the Philippines, in collaboration with the International Labor Organization’s 
International Program on the Elimination of Child Labor (ILO-IPEC). Its purpose was 
to gather a wide range of information on child work activities.  
The 2001 SOC adopted the same three-stage sample design as the 2001 NSO 
Labor Force Survey, using listings from the 1995 Population Census. The first stage 
consisted of the systematic selection of barangys, the smallest administrative unit in 
the country, with probability proportional to size. In order to ensure broad geographic 
coverage, prior to their selection, the barangys were stratified explicitly along urban-
rural lines as well as implicitly by, inter alia, municipal district affiliation and 
groupings based on accessibility and similarities in socioeconomic characteristics and 
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religious composition.12 The second stage consisted of the systematic selection of 
enumeration areas (EAs), physical divisions of barangys, with probability proportional 
to size. These EAs serve as the primary sampling units (PSUs) in the sample. The 
master sample consisted of 3,416 PSUs, out of which, a subsample of 2,247 PSUs, 
designated as the core sample, was used for the 2001 SOC. In the third stage, from 
each PSU in the core sample, a total of twelve households were selected 
systematically, providing a total of 26,964 private households for the 2001 SOC.13 
Two separate survey questionnaires were fielded as part of the 2001 SOC: 
SOC Form 1 which largely collected information on the socioeconomic characteristics 
of households with children aged 5-17 years and SOC Form 2 which collected detailed 
information on the employment characteristics of working children. The respondent 
for the SOC Form 1 was either the parent or guardian of the child or children aged 5-
17 years; the main purpose of this survey was to identify eligible child respondents for 
administering the SOC Form 2. The respondents for the SOC Form 2 were children 
aged 5-17 years who engaged in any economic activity for at least one hour in the 
twelve months preceding the interview date (September 2000-October 2001). 
Information for both survey questionnaires was collected through personal interviews 
conducted by field interviewers. 
Out of the sample of 26,964 households, 17,454 households (64.7%) had 
members aged 5-17 years; 17,444 of these households (or 99.9%) were successfully 
interviewed using the SOC Form 1. Among the interviewed households, 6,523 
children indicated that they worked during the reference period, of which, 6,365 
children (97.6%) were successfully interviewed using the SOC Form 2. Consequently, 
                                                 
12 Information for the explicit and implicit stratification was obtained from the 1990 Census of 
Population and Housing as well as other administrative reports produced by the NSO.  
13 Individuals who reside in institutions or establishments were not covered as part of the 2001 SOC.  
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survey nonresponse by households and children appears to be a negligible source of 
selection bias.  
Several steps were taken to ensure the reliability and interpersonal 
comparability of the data. For example, survey interviewers were expected to read the 
questions exactly as worded in the questionnaires (either in English or the local 
language), and maintain a professional, dispassionate demeanor through the entire 
interview. In addition, to the extent possible, interviews were to be one-on-one and 
conducted in private. Castro et al. (2005) however cautions that the reliability of data 
from parents and children may be undermined if child labor is a sensitive subject (this 
is plausible as children below ages 15 and 18 are legally prohibited from general and 
hazardous work in the Philippines, respectively). They also point out that children may 
be less-reliable respondents than adults. For example, they are more likely to be (1) 
unaware of salient characteristics of their work (such as workplace hazards) and/or (2) 
unable to accurately convey them to the interviewer due to recall and spoken language 
command problems; further, these problems are likely to be exacerbated the younger 
the child. The degree to which these issues affect the reliability of these data is 
however unknown. Notwithstanding, in the SOC Form 2, the interviewer was asked to 
assess the levels of interest and sincerity of the child respondent during the interview 
(based on predefined scales) as well as note down sections and questions where the 
child had any doubts, difficulties, or apprehensions. While the notes are unavailable, I 
include the interviewers’ categorical assessments as controls in all regression 
estimations. 
 
2.2.2. Sample 
In order to arrive at the appropriate sample for the study, I pared down the survey 
sample in stages. A problem with data collection was responsible for the first round of 
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eliminations. The SOC Form 2 asks the first few questions on the two longest 
employment activities undertaken by the child by referring to them separately. 
However, the subsequent majority of questions, including the key questions on 
earnings and harmful child labor, were asked without explicitly specifying the 
employment activity of concern. Clearly, this issue poses a problem only in the cases 
in which children reported two employment activities during the reference period. 
Fortunately, this occurs only in 9% of the sample. These cases were excluded, yielding 
a sample of 5,791 children.  
The second round of eliminations targeted certain categories of child workers 
either due to their negligible shares in the sample or their incompatibility with the 
research question. Given that the aim of the chapter is to estimate the earnings-harmful 
child labor trade-off, all child workers in the sample who did not work for pay were 
excluded. These cases accounted for roughly 60% of the sample. Almost all of these 
children were employed in own household-operated enterprises. Children who 
reported that they were self-employed, whom accounted for about 7% of the sample, 
were excluded as these children, at least in principle, likely determine working 
conditions themselves. Children who reported working as paid workers in own 
household-operated enterprises, which accounted for slightly over 1% of the sample, 
were also excluded as the wage determination process is likely not (fully) subject to 
market forces. Finally, two other categories of workers, namely home-based workers 
and public sector or parastatal workers, were excluded due to their small sample size: 
they jointly accounted for less than 1% of the sample. Collectively, these exclusions 
resulted in a sample of 1,677 child workers with labor earnings, which is roughly 29% 
of the sample of children with only one employment activity in the reference period. 
These 1,677 child workers were employed in either private households (31%) or 
private enterprises (69%). 
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The third and final round of eliminations was conducted in order to restrict a 
subset of the variables to be included in the regression analysis to certain values or 
ranges. Specifically, observations with rare values were omitted. Restricting the 
sample to children (1) ages 8-17 years, (2) who were either paid on a time-rate or 
piece-rate basis, and (3) who received monetary earnings (instead of in-kind earnings), 
yielded in an eventual sample size of 1,479 children. This sample of child workers is 
hereafter referred to as the wage-earners sample. 
In addition to the wage-earners sample, in order to examine how the incidence 
and composition of harmful child labor differ between children who work in paid 
employment and children who work in unpaid employment, a corresponding sample 
of non-earners is constructed. Restricting the sample to children (1) aged 8-17 years, 
(2) who engaged in only one employment activity during the reference period, and (3) 
who are unpaid workers in an own household-operated enterprise, yielding a final 
sample size of 3,407 children. This sample of child workers is hereafter referred to as 
the non-earners sample. 
 
2.2.3. Construction of harmful child labor variables  
The variables that are used in the chapter to represent harmful child labor were 
constructed from responses to the following three questions in the SOC Form 2 
(provided verbatim): (1) “Did you or do you find your work mentally or emotionally 
stressful?”; (2) “Did you or do you perform heavy physical labor?”; and (3) “Did you 
or do you consider some aspects of your work risky or dangerous?”. The available 
response options for questions 1 and 2 were “frequently”, “sometimes”, “seldom”, and 
“never”, while the available response options for question 3 were “yes” and “no”.  
Survey interviewers are offered some guidance on what the above questions on 
harmful child labor are asking. For example, illustrative examples of heavy physical 
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work provided in the survey interviewer manual include transporting heavy loads, 
lifting heavy items, using heavy tools and machinery, digging, and quarrying. For 
stressful work, the manual provides examples of work situations which could cause 
stress such as working long hours, poor posture/vision due to lack of appropriate 
furniture/equipment, and harassment from work supervisors. For risky or dangerous 
work, the manual lists the following risks as examples: vehicular accidents for 
delivery workers; extreme light from welders which can cause loss of sight; and loud 
noise of machines which can cause loss of hearing. The manual also provided 
guidance on the meaning of the response categories. For the questions on heavy 
physical and stressful work, “frequently” was defined as occurring daily or 3-6 times 
per week, while “sometimes” was defined as occurring 1-2 times per week or 2-3 
times per month (NSO 2001). 
Five separate dichotomous variables, denoted by stressful, strenuous, 
hazardous, often stressful, and often strenuous were constructed based on the 
responses to the above questions regarding harmful child labor. The first three 
variables essentially reflect whether or not the child reported experiencing harmful 
child labor, while the latter two variables reflect whether or not the child reported 
experiencing frequent harmful child labor. First, with respect to the occurrence-related 
harmful child labor variables, the variable stressful was set equal to one if the 
respondent indicated that the work activity was frequently or sometimes 
psychologically stressful, and zero otherwise. The variable strenuous was constructed 
analogously. The variable hazardous was set equal to one if the respondent indicated 
the work activity was hazardous, and zero otherwise. Next, with respect to the 
magnitude-related harmful child labor variables, the variable often stressful was set 
equal to one if the respondent indicated to have engaged in work that was frequently 
psychologically stressful, and zero otherwise. Similarly, often strenuous was set equal 
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to one if the respondent indicated to have engaged in work that involved frequent 
physically strenuous work, and zero otherwise. 
 
2.3. Empirical methodology 
In order to test for the presence of compensating wage differentials for harmful child 
labor, I estimate a semi-logarithmic child earnings equation of the form 
 ln ,i i i i i iy h d e tβ γ λ φ ε′ ′ ′ ′= + + + +  (16) 
where iy denotes the average weekly gross cash earnings reported by child worker i; 
ih a vector of harmful child labor responses by the child; id a vector of 
sociodemographic characteristics comprising of the child’s age (in quadratic form), 
gender, urban/rural, region, highest level of formal schooling, and current school 
attendance status; ie  a vector of employment characteristics comprising of the age 
when the child first started working (in quadratic form), location of work, contract 
type, work benefits, and sector of employment; and it a vector comprised of controls 
for usual hours of work per day, usual days of work per week (in quadratic form), and 
the sincerity and interest levels during the interview as assessed by the interviewer. 
The vectors β , γ , λ , and φ  are model parameters to be estimated, and iε  is a 
stochastic error term associated with child worker i.14  
I specify the vector ih  in three alternative ways in order to permit a richer 
description of the conditional relationship between child earnings and harmful child 
labor. In the first specification, each occurrence-related measure of harmful child 
labor, namely hazardous, strenuous, and stressful, is included separately in the 
                                                 
14 A large portion of the literature on estimating compensating wage differentials uses hourly wages as 
the dependent variable in hedonic wage regressions. However, given the available data, only a crude 
measure of hourly wage can be constructed as the information on usual hours of work per day was 
collected in categorical rather than continuous form. Consequently, reported weekly earnings are used 
as the dependent variable in the estimations but usual days of work per week and hours of work per day 
are included as covariates. This alternative approach is not uncommon in the literature (see, e.g., 
Viscusi and Aldy 2003).  
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earnings regression. I refer to the specification as the individual inclusion 
specification. This particular specification allows me to estimate the partial effect for 
each type of harmful child labor, without controlling for the other types of harmful 
child labor. While the regression specification includes all the sociodemographic and 
work time controls, the specification is estimated both with and without the 
employment controls, thereby allowing me to investigate how much of the partial 
effect of harmful child labor on earnings is absorbed by these particular controls. Note 
that I perform this investigation only with the individual inclusion specification; the 
objective is to ascertain whether the included employment attributes partially account 
for harmful child labor.  
In the second specification, I include all three occurrence-related measures of 
harmful child labor in additive fashion in the regression, along with the full set of 
sociodemographic, employment, and work time control variables. I refer to this 
specification as the additive inclusion specification. This specification allows me to 
examine the partial effect of a given type of harmful child labor on earnings, 
controlling for, among other things, the other types of harmful child labor.  
In the third specification, for physically strenuous labor and psychologically 
stressful labor only, I include the occurrence-related and the magnitude-related 
measures of harmful child labor in additive fashion in the regression, along with the 
full set of sociodemographic, employment, and work time controls. I refer to this 
specification as the frequency specification. This specification allows me to examine 
the partial effect of frequent harmful child labor, controlling for, among other things, 
the occurrence of harmful child labor. 
I first estimate the alternative model specifications of the child earnings 
equation using ordinary least squares (OLS). However, given the use of survey sample 
data, the classical assumption of identically and independently distributed errors is 
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likely to be violated due to the use of stratification and clustering in the sample design. 
To explain, children found within a specific cluster are likely to possess characteristics 
that are more similar to each other than children found in other clusters. Thus, the 
amount of intra-cluster variation in the residuals is likely to be significantly different 
from the amount of inter-cluster variation. Breusch-Pagan tests of the residuals from 
estimating the various specifications of the earnings regression via OLS strongly 
suggest the presence of heteroskedasticity. Consequently, I estimate the standard 
errors by using a formula which corrects for survey design effects (see Deaton 1997 
for details). 
I also estimate the alternative model specifications of the child earnings 
equation via quantile regression. The quantile regression estimator has several 
attractive features (see Koenker and Hallock 2001 for a fuller description). First, 
quantile regression, specifically the least absolute deviations (LAD) or median 
regression, provides a robust measure of location as it minimizes a weighted sum of 
absolute deviations of errors. Thus, the estimation results are less susceptible to y-
outliers as compared to those from OLS. Second, when the error term is nonnormally 
distributed, LAD regression may be more efficient than OLS. Diagnostic tests after 
estimating the alternative model specifications of the earnings equation via OLS 
strongly suggest the presence of y-outliers and nonnormal residuals, making LAD 
regression a particularly suitable alternative estimation method.15 Third, as elaborated 
further below, quantile regression, unlike OLS, allows the regression parameters to 
vary across the entire distribution of the dependent variable.  
                                                 
15 The Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilks tests were implemented to test whether the OLS 
residuals were distributed normally or not. Both tests strongly rejected the null hypothesis of normally-
distributed residuals.  
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The basic quantile regression model specifies the conditional quantile in linear 
form. Adopting the notation in Buckinsky (1998), for the thθ  quantile, the child 
earnings regression model is given by 
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An important feature of the framework is that the partial effects of the 
covariates, given by θβ , θγ , θλ , and θφ , may differ across quantiles (different values 
of θ ). As is well known, under OLS, the partial effects of the covariates are only 
estimated at the conditional mean of ln y , and hence are constant across the 
distribution of ln y . Quantile regression relaxes this restriction, permitting me to 
characterize the partial effects of covariates along the entire conditional distribution of 
ln y . 
Apart from estimating the partial effect of harmful child labor on earnings at 
the conditional mean and median via OLS and LAD regressions, respectively, I am 
also interested in estimating the partial effects of the three forms of harmful child 
labor on earnings at various distinct quantiles, and to investigate whether there are 
systematic differences in the estimated effects across the conditional distribution of 
earnings. Specifically, I estimate the individual inclusion specification of the earnings 
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regression at quantiles [ ]0.25,0.75θ ∈ .16 Quantile regressions for 0.25θ < or 
0.75θ > are not estimated due to concerns that there may be insufficient observations 
above and below the selected quantile in the tails of the distribution to permit a robust 
fit of the data; consequently statistical inference might be impaired (Chernozhukov 
2000). 
For the purpose of statistical inference, in implementing the quantile 
regression, I estimate the standard errors by bootstrapping as the formula for obtaining 
analytical standard errors proposed by Bassett and Koenker (1982) underestimates the 
standard errors in the presence of heteroskedasticity. Bootstrapping is viewed as a 
valid alternative for estimating the variance-covariance matrix (see Deaton 1997). 
However, the standard bootstrap method corrects for heteroskedasticity but fails to 
address the problem of correlated errors. This is because the standard method 
resamples observations from the original sample by assuming that each observation 
has an equal probability of being selected into the bootstrap sample (i.e., it assumes a 
simple random sample). Given that my sample is instead generated from a complex 
survey design comprised of both stratification and clustering, the standard bootstrap 
method needs to be modified to reflect these survey design elements.  
I implement my bootstrap method in two steps. In the first step, clusters are 
randomly selected with replacement from each stratum. The number of clusters 
selected from each stratum is equal to the total number of clusters found in that 
particular stratum. In the second step, observations are randomly selected with 
replacement from each of the selected clusters from the first step. The number of 
observations selected from each cluster is equal to the total number of observations 
                                                 
16 The different quantiles are estimated by weighting the residuals differently. For the LAD or median 
regression ( 0.5θ = ), all residuals receive equal weight. However, when estimating say the 75th 
percentile, negative residuals are weighted by 0.25 and positive residuals by 0.75. The criterion is 
minimized when 75% of the residuals are negative. This is set up as a linear programming model and 
solved.  
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found in that particular cluster. In this way, each observation in the original sample 
does not have an equal probability of being selected into the bootstrap sample. Rather, 
the probability of an observation being selected into the bootstrap sample increases if 
it already includes a observation from the same cluster. Thus, the bootstrapped 
standard errors from the two-step method are robust to violations in both 
homoskedasticity and independence.  
Finally, in order to select the optimal number of bootstrap replications B, I 
apply the three-step method proposed by Andrews and Buchinsky (2000). In principle, 
the larger the number of replications, the more accurate the bootstrapped statistic is 
likely to be. However, this benefit has to be traded off against a practical constraint: 
computational time. Denote the standard error of a parameter of interest estimated 
using a finite and infinite number of bootstrap replications as ˆBσ  and σˆ∞ , respectively. 
The object is to choose B such that ˆBσ is “close” σˆ∞ , where “closeness” is defined as 
ˆ ˆ
Pr 100 1 ,
ˆ
B
pdb
σ σ
τ
σ
∞
∞
 − 
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 
 
and where pdb denotes the maximum desired percentage difference between ˆBσ  and 
σˆ∞ and τ the probability that ˆBσ  and σˆ∞ differ by more than pdb percent. For this 
study, I choose pdb and τ to be 5% and 0.05, respectively.17 
 
2.4. Findings 
2.4.1. Harmful child labor profile 
Before discussing the results from examining the conditional relationship between 
child earnings and harmful child labor, I construct a profile of the incidence and nature 
of harmful child labor in the wage-earners sample, which I then contrast against that of 
                                                 
17 These are default values in bssize, the Stata ado program that automates the procedure (see Poi 
2004). 
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the non-earners sample. This investigation is useful as it casts light on the relative 
incidence and composition of harmful child labor experienced by child workers in 
paid employment. Evidence of this kind is currently missing in the literature.  
Table 2.1 reports the incidence of harmful child labor separately by the three 
types of harmful child labor: hazardous, physically strenuous, and psychologically 
stressful labor. Column 1 refers to the wage-earners sample and Column 2 to the non-
earners sample. The evidence suggests that the incidence of harmful child labor is high 
among working children in general. Further, the evidence suggests that the incidence 
of harmful child labor is systematically higher among wage-earners than non-earners. 
Focusing first on the wage-earners sample, roughly 61% of children reported that they 
experienced at least one of the three forms of harmful child labor. Psychologically 
stressful labor is the most commonly reported form of harmful child labor (48%) 
followed, in turn, by physically strenuous labor (38%) and hazardous labor (27%). In 
contrast, in the non-earners sample, only 43% of children reported that they 
experienced at least one form of harmful child labor. What is more, while the ranking 
in terms of the incidence of harmful child labor by type is identical across the two 
samples, the incidence of each type of harmful child labor is considerably lower in the 
non-earners sample. The differences in the incidences of harmful child labor between 
the two samples are significant.  
 
Table 2.1: Incidence of reported harmful child labor, by sample 
Harmful child labor type 
(1) (2) (3) 
Wage-earners 
sample 
(in %) 
Non-earners 
sample 
(in %) 
Difference in 
proportions 
(1)-(2) 
Hazardous 27.0 14.4 12.6*** 
Stressful 48.1 29.6 18.5*** 
Strenuous 37.6 20.0 17.6*** 
N 1,479 3,407 -- 
Notes: The harmful child labor categories are not mutually exclusive. *denotes statistically 
significance at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level; and *** at the 1% level. 
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Table 2.2 provides a more detailed disaggregation of the data by distinguishing 
between various distinct combinations of the three types of harmful child labor. Again, 
Column 1 refers to the wage-earners sample and Column 2 to the non-earners sample. 
Focusing on the wage-earners sample, the most commonly reported combinations of 
harmful child labor are all three types (15%), psychologically stressful labor only 
(15%), and psychologically stressful and physically strenuous labor (14%); the 
remaining combinations all have incidences in the single digits. In contrast, the most 
commonly reported combination of harmful child labor in the non-earners sample is 
psychologically stressful labor only (14%); the remaining combinations all have 
incidences in the single digits. The statistics presented in the table also show clearly 
that (while a chi-squared test indicates that the distributions of the various 
combinations of harmful child labor across the two samples are significantly different) 
the lower overall incidence of harmful child labor in the non-earners sample is 
principally driven by the lower incidence of non-earners reporting experiencing 
multiple types of harmful child labor; the incidences of children reporting 
experiencing only one type of harmful child labor are not significantly different 
between the two samples. 
Table 2.3 reports the incidence of a higher magnitude of physically strenuous 
and psychologically stressful labor as represented by its frequency, conditional on 
having reported physically strenuous or psychologically stressful labor. Column 1 
refers to the wage-earners sample and Column 2 to the non-earners sample.  
Similar to the evidence on the incidence of harmful child labor presented 
earlier, the incidence of a higher magnitude of harmful child labor is systematically 
higher among wage-earners than non-earners. Specifically, in the wage-earners 
sample, the incidences of frequent strenuous and stressful labor are 28% and 17%, 
respectively. In contrast, the corresponding incidences in the non-earners sample are 
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14% and 10%, respectively. Further, the differences in the incidences between the two 
samples are significantly different.  
 
Table 2.2: Incidence of distinct combinations of reported harmful child labor, by 
sample 
Harmful child labor 
combination 
(1) (2) (3) 
Wage-earners 
sample 
(in %) 
Non-earners 
sample 
(in %) 
Difference in 
proportions 
(1)-(2) 
None  38.7  57.3  -21.4*** 
Hazardous only  5.2  5.3 -0.1 
Stressful only  14.5  14.2 0.3 
Strenuous only  5.9  5.9 0.0 
Stressful and Hazardous 
only 
 4.1  3.1 1.0 
Stressful and Strenuous only  14.0  8.1  5.9*** 
Hazardous and Strenuous 
only 
 3.3  1.9  1.4** 
All three types  14.5  4.2  10.3*** 
Total 100.0 100.0 -- 
N 1,479 3,407 -- 
Chi-squared test of the equality of distributions: Test statistic = 267.9; p-value = 0.0000. 
Notes: * denotes statistically significant at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level; and *** at the 1% 
level. 
 
As mentioned before, the available response options to the hazardous labor 
question in the survey precluded the construction of a magnitude-related measure 
similar to those for physically strenuous and psychologically stressful labor. However, 
a follow-up question to children who reported their work to be hazardous provided 
information on the types of work-related risks they encountered. 
 
Table 2.3: Incidence of frequent harmful child labor of type x, conditional on 
reporting type x, by sample 
Frequent type 
(1) (2) (3) 
Wage-earners 
sample 
(in %) 
Non-earners 
sample 
(in %) 
Difference in 
proportions 
(1)-(2) 
Often strenuous 27.9 13.9 14.0*** 
Often stressful 16.8  10.1 6.7** 
N 1,479 3,407 -- 
Notes: * denotes statistically significant at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level; and *** at the 1% 
level. 
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Table 2.4 presents statistics on the incidences of specific types of work-related risks 
reported by child in hazardous labor, again separately by the two samples of interest 
(wage-earners and non-earners). Among wage-earners, the most frequently reported 
risks are vehicular accidents (23%), disease and sickness (22%), falls and physical 
mutilation (16% each). Among non-earners, they are disease and sickness (38%), 
other (17%), and physical mutilation (17%). While I did not conduct any formal 
statistical tests, it appears that the major differences in the incidences of specific risks 
between wage-earners and non-earners are the higher incidence of the risk of vehicular 
accident and the lower incidence of the risk of disease and sickness in the former 
sample.  
 
Table 2.4: Distribution of specific occupational hazards cited by children in self-
reported hazardous workplaces, by sample 
Type of occupational hazard 
(1) (2) 
Wage- earners sample  
(in %) 
Non-earners sample  
(in %) 
Vehicular accident 23.1 8.5 
Burns 5.8 4.7 
Fall 15.5 12.0 
Hearing impairment 1.8 0.6 
Visual impairment 1.0 1.8 
Physical mutilation 15.5 16.5 
Disease/sickness 21.8 38.4 
Mental/psychological torture 1.0 0.2 
Other (unknown) 14.5 17.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 
N 399 492 
 
2.4.2. Unconditional analysis of the earnings-harmful child labor trade-off  
In this subsection, mainly to set the stage for the conditional results to follow, I report 
the findings on the unconditional bivariate relationship between child earnings and 
harmful child labor. I begin by comparing the full earnings distributions of children 
who reported experiencing harmful child labor and those who did not. Figure 2.1 
depicts the cumulative distribution functions of earnings separately by whether the 
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child reported engaging in hazardous labor or not. Average weekly earnings is 
reported on the x-axis and the proportion of child workers earning less than average 
weekly earnings x on the y-axis. Figures 2.2 and 2.3 depict analogous cumulative 
distribution functions for physically strenuous and psychologically stressful labor, 
respectively. A simple visual examination reveals that, for each of the three harmful 
child labor variables, until at least about the 80th percentile of earnings, the 
cumulative distribution function of earnings for child workers who reported 
experiencing harmful child labor generally lies below the cumulative distribution 
function of earnings for children who reported that they did not. This suggests that, by 
and large, children who reported harmful child labor earn more than children who did 
not. More formally, Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests 
strongly reject the null hypothesis of equality of distributions (the p-values for all test 
statistics are 0.000).18  
Next, focusing on the locations of the earnings distributions, I estimate means 
and medians of earnings separately for children who reported experiencing harmful 
child labor and those who did not. The evidence suggests that, in general, the 
differences in mean and median earnings between child workers who reported harmful 
child labor and those who did not are highly statistically significant for each type of 
harmful child labor. The only exception is the difference in mean earnings for 
psychologically stressful labor which is borderline insignificant (the test statistic is 
1.64 and the p-value 0.101).  
To summarize, the unconditional results strongly suggest that child workers 
tend to earn more when they engage in work they report to be hazardous, 
psychologically stressful, or physically strenuous. The next subsection examines 
                                                 
18 The Kolgomorov-Smirnov and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests are both nonparametric tests that 
assess whether the two samples (in my case, earners who reported harmful child labor and earners who 
did not) are drawn from the same underlying distribution.  
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Figure 2.1: Cumulative distribution functions of weekly earnings,  
by hazardous labor status  
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Figure 2.2: Cumulative distribution functions of weekly earnings,  
by strenuous labor status
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Figure 2.3: Cumulative distribution functions of weekly earnings,  
by stressful labor status
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whether the findings from the unconditional analysis remain intact qualitatively when 
the relationship between earnings and harmful child labor is investigated within a 
multiple regression framework. The results that follow are considered the more 
compelling evidence on the earnings-harmful child labor trade-off.  
 
2.4.3. Conditional analysis of the earnings-harmful child labor trade-off 
In this subsection, I present the results of estimating compensating wage 
differentials for harmful child labor via ordinary least squares as well as quantile 
regressions for the alternative model specifications of harmful child labor. Table 2.5 
presents descriptive statistics for the wage-earners sample for the regressions. Mean 
average weekly cash earnings is roughly 365 Pesos, with a maximum of 2000 Pesos 
and a minimum of 6 Pesos. In 2001 US dollars, these values translate to $7.2, $39.2, 
and $0.12, respectively. In terms of selected socio-demographic characteristics, the 
mean age of wage-earners is 15 years; 61% are male; 42% reside in urban areas; and 
40% are currently attending school. In terms of selected employment characteristics, 
the mean age when wage-earners first started working is 13 years; 60% work in non-
agriculture; 70% work in a private establishment as opposed to a private household; 
30% work at night; 22% receive piece-rate pay as opposed to time-rate pay; and 23% 
have long-term or steady employment as opposed to short-term or casual employment. 
The incidences of harmful child labor among wage-earners are not reported here as 
they were discussed earlier.  
Table 2.6 reports the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the earnings-
harmful child labor trade-off, separately by each type of harmful child labor: 
hazardous, physically strenuous, and psychologically stressful labor. The results are 
for the individual inclusion specification, where each harmful child labor variable is 
included separately. For each harmful child labor variable, the earnings regression is 
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estimated first without and then with employment controls. However, all earnings 
regressions are estimated with the full set of socio-demographic controls as well as 
controls for hours worked per day, days worked per week, and indicators for the 
child’s sincerity and interest during the interview as assessed by the interviewer. The 
full set of estimation results from fitting these regressions to the data is presented in 
Table 2.A1. Note the results in Table 2.A1 are arranged analogously to those in Table 
2.6. 
 
Table 2.5: Summary statistics for wage earners sample 
Variable Median Mean SD Max. Min. 
Avg. weekly gross cash earnings (in Pesos) 250.00 350.13 346.89 2000.00 6.00 
Natural log avg. weekly gross cash earnings 5.52 5.34 1.12 7.60 1.79 
Urban 1.00 0.58 0.49 1.00 0.00 
Male 1.00 0.60 0.49 1.00 0.00 
Age 15.00 15.00 2.00 17.00 8.00 
Age-squared 225.00 228.99 55.73 289.00 64.00 
Secondary incomplete  0.00 0.38 0.49 1.00 0.00 
Secondary complete 0.00 0.12 0.33 1.00 0.00 
Currently attending school 0.00 0.42 0.49 1.00 0.00 
Age first started working 14.00 13.12 2.53 17.00 5.00 
Age first started working squared 196.00 178.43 63.44 289.00 25.00 
Work hours/day: 5-8 hours 1.00 0.56 0.50 1.00 0.00 
Work hours/day: 9+ hours 0.00 0.24 0.43 1.00 0.00 
Work days/week 5.00 4.42 2.18 7.00 1.00 
Work days/week squared 25.00 24.29 18.16 49.00 1.00 
Hazardous 
0.00 0.27 0.44 1.00 0.00 
Strenuous 0.00 0.38 0.48 1.00 0.00 
Stressful 0.00 0.47 0.50 1.00 0.00 
Often strenuous 0.00 0.10 0.31 1.00 0.00 
Often stressful 0.00 0.08 0.27 1.00 0.00 
Night work 0.00 0.31 0.46 1.00 0.00 
Meals at work 0.00 0.22 0.42 1.00 0.00 
Work location: Farm 0.00 0.31 0.46 1.00 0.00 
Work location: Non-house and non-farm 0.00 0.30 0.46 1.00 0.00 
Worker in private establishment 1.00 0.70 0.46 1.00 0.00 
Piece rate pay 0.00 0.22 0.42 1.00 0.00 
Long-term/steady employment 0.00 0.24 0.43 1.00 0.00 
Non-agriculture 1.00 0.65 0.48 1.00 0.00 
Sincere during interview 1.00 0.61 0.49 1.00 0.00 
Interested during interview 1.00 0.80 0.40 1.00 0.00 
Notes: N = 1,479. SD denotes standard deviation. Summary statistics for region dummies are not 
reported. 
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Given that there are presently very limited examples of earnings estimations in the 
child labor literature, I take advantage of the analysis to present the earnings 
estimation results for the other covariates before turning to the main results on the 
earnings-harmful child labor trade-off (see Table 2.A1). 
 
Table 2.6: OLS regression estimates of earnings premia for harmful child labor 
Individual inclusion specification 
Covariate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Hazardous 0.104* 0.100* -- -- -- -- 
 (0.058) (0.056)     
Strenuous -- -- 0.140*** 0.135*** -- -- 
   (0.052) (0.050)   
Stressful -- -- -- -- 0.068 0.052 
     (0.049) (0.049) 
R-squared 0.469 0.481 0.471 0.483 0.469 0.481 
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Employment controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Notes: N = 1,479 for all regressions. Dependent variable is the natural log of average weekly gross 
cash earnings. Demographic controls include indicators for urban/rural, region, gender, highest 
level of formal schooling, and current school attendance status; it also includes age in quadratic 
form. Employment controls include indicators for night work, meals at work, location of work, 
payment type, contract type, and sector of activity; it also includes the age the child started working 
in quadratic form. All regressions include controls for hours worked per day and days worked per 
week as well as interviewer-assessed respondent sincerity and interest during the interview. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** denotes p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.10.  
 
To begin, it appears that the earnings regression model fitted to the data explains a 
significant share of the variation in child earnings; across the various individual 
inclusion specifications, the R-squared statistic suggests that slightly less than 50% of 
the variation in earnings is explained by the variation in the covariates. This fit is 
markedly better than what is often found with earnings regressions for adults. Turning 
to the individual model covariates, with respect to the included socio-demographic 
factors, as expected a priori, I find robust evidence that (1) earnings are increasing in 
child age; (2) boys earn more than girls; and (3) those who have completed secondary 
schooling earn more than those who have primary schooling or less. Second, with 
respect to the employment factors, again, by and large, as expected a priori, I find 
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consistent evidence that (1) children who receive meals at work earn less than those 
who do not; (2) those who receive piece-rate pay earn less than those who receive 
time-rate pay; and (3) those who work in a private establishment earn more than those 
who work in a private household.19 The evidence also shows that children who work 
on average 1-4 hours per day earn less than those who work 5-8 hours per day, and 
that earnings are increasing in days worked per week, but at a decreasing rate peaking 
outside the range of the data. There is however no evidence of earnings differences 
between urban and rural children; children who work at night and those who do not; 
and children who work in long-term or steady employment and those who work in 
short-term or casual employment. There is also no evidence that the age at which the 
child first started working matters for earnings.   
Turning next to the OLS estimates of the earnings-harmful child labor trade-off 
at the conditional mean (see Table 2.6), I find that children receive earnings premia for 
engaging in hazardous or physically strenuous labor, but do not for psychologically 
stressful labor. Further, the inference results hold even when employment controls are 
additionally included in the earnings regressions. Specifically, at the conditional mean, 
children receive roughly a 10% premium for engaging in hazardous work while they 
receive roughly a 14% premium for engaging in physically strenuous work. Children 
who engage in psychologically stressful labor obtain an earnings premium of 7% or 
5% at the conditional mean, estimated without and with the employment controls, 
respectively. These results are however not statistically significant at standard 
significance levels.  
                                                 
19 The finding regarding piece-rate pay is surprising as standard theory suggests that piece-rate pay 
should be associated with higher earnings as it promotes the self-selection of more productive workers 
into work activities with piece-rate pay systems and/or induces greater work effort.  
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Table 2.7 presents the quantile regression estimates of the earnings-harmful 
child labor trade-off at the conditional median. As mentioned before, this particular 
estimator is referred to as the least absolute deviations (LAD) estimator.  
 
Table 2.7: LAD regression estimates of earnings premia for harmful child labor 
Individual inclusion specification 
Covariate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Hazardous 0.086 0.027 -- -- -- -- 
 (0.055) (0.053)     
Strenuous -- -- 0.141*** 0.106** -- -- 
   (0.049) (0.048)   
Stressful -- -- -- -- 0.098** 0.045 
     (0.049) (0.051) 
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Employment controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Notes: N = 1,479 for all regressions. Dependent variable is the natural log of average weekly gross 
cash earnings. Demographic controls include indicators for urban/rural, region, gender, highest 
level of formal schooling, and current school attendance status; it also includes age in quadratic 
form. Employment controls include indicators for night work, meals at work, location of work, 
payment type, contract type, and sector of activity; it also includes the age the child started working 
in quadratic form. All regressions include controls for hours worked per day and days worked per 
week as well as interviewer-assessed respondent sincerity and interest during the interview. 
Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** denotes p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * 
p<0.10.  
 
Analogous to the OLS estimates presented in Table 2.6, the LAD estimates are 
for the individual inclusion specification, where each harmful child labor variable is 
included separately in the earnings regression along with the socio-demographic and 
work time controls, first without and then with the employment controls. I find that 
there are notable differences between the LAD and OLS results. While, like the OLS 
results, the LAD estimates suggest earnings premia for physically strenuous labor, 
unlike the OLS results, the LAD earnings premia estimates for hazardous labor are 
smaller and lose significance. In addition, the LAD results suggest a significant 
earnings premium for psychologically stressful labor; however the estimated earnings 
premium becomes smaller and loses significance when the employment controls are 
additionally included in the regression. Thus, in sum, the LAD results provide 
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consistent evidence of earnings premia for harmful child labor only in the case of one 
type of harmful child labor: physically strenuous labor.  
The above findings answer the question: do children receive positive 
compensating wages for a given type of harmful child labor treated in isolation? Here 
we attempt to answer the following questions: (1) do children receive positive 
compensating wages for a given type of harmful child labor controlling for other types 
of harmful child labor and (2) do children receive additional positive compensating 
wages for a higher magnitude of harmful child labor? Table 2.8 presents OLS and 
LAD estimates of the earnings-harmful child labor trade-off for the additive inclusion 
and severity specifications.  
 
Table 2.8: OLS and LAD regression estimates of earnings premia for harmful 
child labor 
Additive inclusion and severity specifications  
Covariate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Additive inclusion 
Frequency:  
Frequent strenuous 
work 
Frequency: 
Frequent stressful 
work 
OLS LAD OLS LAD OLS LAD 
Hazardous 0.064 0.008 -- -- -- -- 
 (0.060) (0.055)     
Strenuous 0.122** 0.100* 0.126** 0.121** -- -- 
 (0.054) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055)   
Often strenuous -- -- 0.034 -0.038 -- -- 
   (0.072) (0.067)   
Stressful -0.007 0.020 -- -- 0.052 0.037 
 (0.052) (0.055)   (0.051) (0.050) 
Often stressful -- -- -- -- 0.001 0.060 
     (0.081) (0.081) 
R-squared 0.484 -- 0.483 -- 0.481 -- 
Notes: N = 1,479 for all regressions. Dependent variable is the natural log of average weekly gross 
cash earnings. All regressions include the full set of demographic and employment controls. All 
regressions include controls for hours worked per day and days worked per week as well as 
interviewer-assessed respondent sincerity and interest during the interview. Analytical standard 
errors are reported in parentheses for OLS regressions. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in 
parentheses for LAD regressions. *** denotes p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.10.  
 
Columns 1 and 2 present the OLS and LAD estimates when the harmful child 
labor variables are included together in additive fashion in the regression, respectively. 
Columns 3 and 4 present the OLS and LAD estimates when physically strenuous work 
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and frequent physically strenuous work are included together in additive fashion in the 
regression, respectively. Lastly, Columns 5 and 6 present the OLS and LAD estimates 
when psychologically stressful labor and frequent stressful labor are included together 
in additive fashion in the regression, respectively. All regressions include the full set 
of controls.  
I find that children receive an earnings premium for engaging in physically 
strenuous labor, controlling for hazardous and stressful labor, among other things; the 
estimated compensating wages are 12% and 10% at the conditional mean and median, 
respectively. However, I do not find evidence that the same is true for hazardous or 
stressful labor. In addition, I find that children receive an earnings premium for 
physically strenuous labor but no additional premium for frequent strenuous labor. On 
the other hand, there is no evidence of a significant earnings premium for either the 
occurrence or a higher magnitude of psychologically stressful labor. These results are 
robust to the choice of estimator (OLS or LAD).  
Additionally, I investigate whether the presence and size of positive 
compensating wages for harmful child labor differ systematically across selected 
socio-demographic groups. Tables 2.9-2.12 present estimates of the earnings-harmful 
child labor trade-off interacted separately with the child’s gender and residence 
location (urban vs. rural). All earnings regressions estimate the individual inclusion 
specification with the full set of controls. Table 2.9 and 2.11 present the OLS 
estimation results for the trade-offs interacted with boys and urban children at the 
conditional mean, respectively. Tables 2.10 and 2.12 present the corresponding LAD 
estimation results at the conditional median. I find that compensating wages for 
harmful child labor do not systematically differ between urban and rural children or 
between girls and boys; this finding holds irrespective of the type of harmful child 
labor. The main, interaction, and joint effects are not significant for psychologically 
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stressful or hazardous labor. In the case of physically strenuous work, while the main 
and interaction effects are not individually significant, consistent with the earlier 
findings, the joint effects are significant across the LAD and OLS estimators.  
Thus far, I have used quantile regression only as a robust alternative to OLS, 
estimating the earnings-harmful child labor trade-off at the conditional median. 
Quantile regression can also be used to estimate the earnings premia of harmful child 
labor at other quantiles along the conditional distribution of earnings. Table 2.13 
reports the estimated earnings premia for the three types of harmful child labor at the 
25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of the conditional earnings distribution. The table is 
accompanied by Figures 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 which depict the estimated earnings premia 
between the 25th and 75th percentiles of conditional earnings (in 2.5 percentile 
increments) along with their respective 95% confidence intervals for hazardous, 
physically strenuous, and psychologically stressful labor, respectively. The dashed and 
dotted lines in the figures represent the OLS earnings premia estimates (evaluated at 
the conditional mean) and their 95% confidence intervals, respectively. All estimates 
are obtained from fitting the individual inclusion regression specification with all 
controls to the data.  
First, with respect to psychologically stressful labor, as shown in Table 2.13 
and Figure 2.6, I find that the earnings premia for stressful labor generally decline as 
one moves up the conditional distribution of earnings—for example, the estimated 
earnings premium at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles are 10%, 5%, and 2%, 
respectively. However, the size differences in the earnings premia at different points in 
the conditional earnings distribution are not significant; further, by and large, none of 
the estimated earnings premia are significantly different from zero. Thus, the OLS 
evidence at the conditional mean and the quantile regression evidence over a large 
range of conditional quantiles are consistent.
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Table 2.9: OLS regression estimates of earnings premia for harmful child labor, by 
gender  
Individual inclusion specification 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
Hazardous Strenuous Stressful 
Male 0.098 0.104 0.180** 
(0.062) (0.066) (0.075) 
Hazardous -0.035 -- -- 
(0.113) 
Male× Hazardous 0.176 -- -- 
(0.126) 
Strenuous -- 0.112 -- 
(0.096) 
Male× Strenuous -- 0.034 -- 
(0.111) 
Stressful -- -- 0.101 
(0.079) 
Male× Stressful -- -- -0.080 
(0.095) 
R-squared 0.482 0.483 0.481 
Notes: N = 1,479 for all regressions. Dependent variable is the natural log of average weekly gross 
cash earnings. All regressions include the full set of demographic and employment controls. All 
regressions include controls for hours worked per day and days worked per week as well as 
interviewer-assessed respondent sincerity and interest during the interview. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. *** denotes p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.10. 
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Table 2.10: LAD regression estimates of earnings premia for harmful child labor, by 
gender  
Individual inclusion specification 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
Hazardous Strenuous Stressful 
Male 0.218*** 0.017** 0.250*** 
(0.067) (0.068) (0.080) 
Hazardous -0.007 -- -- 
(0.114) 
Male× Hazardous 0.038 -- -- 
(0.130) 
Strenuous -- 0.069 -- 
(0.085) 
Male× Strenuous -- 0.048 -- 
(0.104) 
Stressful -- -- 0.071 
(0.088) 
Male× Stressful -- -- -0.049 
(0.107) 
Notes: N = 1,479 for all regressions. Dependent variable is the natural log of average weekly gross 
cash earnings. All regressions include the full set of demographic and employment controls. All 
regressions include controls for hours worked per day and days worked per week as well as 
interviewer-assessed respondent sincerity and interest during the interview. Bootstrapped standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. *** denotes p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.10. 
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Table 2.11: OLS regression estimates of earnings premia for harmful child labor, by 
urban/rural  
Individual inclusion specification 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
Hazardous Strenuous Stressful 
Urban -0.006 -0.018 0.008 
(0.065) (0.071) (0.083) 
Hazardous 0.104 -- -- 
(0.081) 
Urban× Hazardous -0.008 -- -- 
(0.100) 
Strenuous -- 0.112 -- 
(0.075) 
Urban× Strenuous -- 0.041 -- 
(0.096) 
Stressful -- -- 0.068 
(0.078) 
Urban× Stressful -- -- -0.027 
(0.099) 
R-squared 0.481 0.483 0.481 
Notes: N = 1,479 for all regressions. Dependent variable is the natural log of average weekly gross 
cash earnings. All regressions include the full set of demographic and employment controls. All 
regressions include controls for hours worked per day and days worked per week as well as 
interviewer-assessed respondent sincerity and interest during the interview. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. *** denotes p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.10. 
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Table 2.12: LAD regression estimates of earnings premia for harmful child labor, by 
urban/rural 
Individual inclusion specification 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
Hazardous Strenuous Stressful 
Urban 0.026 0.053 0.035 
(0.068) (0.076) (0.078) 
Hazardous 0.025 -- -- 
(0.075) 
Urban× Hazardous 0.003 -- -- 
(0.106) 
Strenuous -- 0.143** -- 
0.073) 
Urban× Strenuous -- -0.073 -- 
(0.097) 
Stressful -- -- 0.049 
(0.078) 
Urban× Stressful -- -- -0.004 
(0.094) 
Notes: N = 1,479 for all regressions. Dependent variable is the natural log of average weekly gross 
cash earnings. All regressions include the full set of demographic and employment controls. All 
regressions include controls for hours worked per day and days worked per week as well as 
interviewer-assessed respondent sincerity and interest during the interview. Bootstrapped standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. *** denotes p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.10. 
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Table 2.13: OLS and quantile regression estimates of earnings premia for harmful 
child labor at selected conditional quantiles  
Individual inclusion specification 
Variable Statistic 
Conditional 
mean 
Conditional quantile 
0.25 0.50 0.75 
Hazardous 
b 
100 1be× −  
s.e. 
0.100* 
10.5% 
(0.056) 
0.177*** 
19.4% 
(0.065) 
0.027 
2.7% 
(0.053) 
0.038 
4.0% 
(0.058) 
Strenuous 
b 
100 1be× −  
s.e. 
0.135*** 
14.5% 
(0.050) 
0.253*** 
28.8% 
(0.057) 
0.106*** 
11.2% 
(0.048) 
0.067 
6.9% 
(0.053) 
Stressful 
b 
100 1be× −  
s.e. 
0.052 
5.3% 
(0.049) 
0.098 
10.3% 
(0.060) 
0.045 
4.6% 
(0.051) 
0.020 
2.0% 
(0.052) 
Notes: N = 1,479 for all regressions. Dependent variable is the natural log of average weekly gross 
cash earnings. All regressions include the full set of demographic and employment controls. All 
regressions include controls for hours worked per day and days worked per week as well as 
interviewer-assessed respondent sincerity and interest during the interview. Analytical standard 
errors are reported in parentheses for OLS regressions. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in 
parentheses for quantile regressions. *** denotes p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.10. 
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Figure 2.4: Quantile regression estimates of earnings premia for hazardous labor,  
by conditional quantile 
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Figure 2.5: Quantile regression estimates of earnings premia for strenuous labor,  
by conditional quantile 
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Figure 2.6: Quantile regression estimates of earnings premia for stressful labor,  
by conditional quantile 
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In contrast, I find substantial earnings premia for hazardous and physically 
strenuous labor in the lower half of the conditional distribution of earnings. As Table 
2.13 and Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show, for both types of harmful child labor, the size of 
the estimated earnings premia falls rapidly before stabilizing somewhat as one moves 
up the conditional distribution of earnings. For example, the estimated earnings premia 
for hazardous labor at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles are 19%, 3%, and 4%, 
respectively.  Likewise, the estimated earnings premia for physically strenuous labor 
at the 25%, 50th, and 75th percentiles are 29%, 11%, and 7%, respectively.  Further, 
formal tests suggest that the estimated earnings premia at the 25th percentile for both 
types of harmful child labor are significantly different from those at the 50th and 75th 
percentiles; the earnings premia between the latter two percentiles are not. More 
generally, moving up from the bottom, by roughly the 40th percentile of conditional 
earnings for hazardous labor (roughly the 50th percentile of conditional earnings for 
strenuous labor), the estimated earnings premia for harmful chid labor cease to be 
significant. To summarize the evidence, the OLS and LAD estimates of significant 
earnings premia at the conditional mean and median for hazardous and physically 
strenuous labor appear to be driven by the substantial earnings premia in the lower 
half of the conditional distribution of earnings.  
 
2.5. Conclusion 
To summarize, in this chapter, in order to gain some insight into the reasons behind 
harmful child labor and the socioeconomic conditions underlying its existence, I 
examine whether child workers in harmful employment settings are compensated 
monetarily in the form of higher labor market earnings. I define harmful child labor as 
child labor in certain workplaces that is likely to result in adverse health effects in the 
short-term and/or over the longer-term. Specifically, given the available data, harmful 
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child labor is defined as child labor in activities in which children self-report to be 
physically strenuous, psychologically stressful, or hazardous.  
In terms of the empirical strategy, I first examine the simple bivariate 
relationship between harmful child labor and earnings. This serves as a starting point 
for the conditional analysis, where I estimate a log-linear earnings equation via 
ordinary least squares and quantile regression. The latter method serves as a more 
robust alternative estimator to the ordinary least square estimator at the center of the 
conditional distribution of earnings; it also allows me to characterize the earnings-
harmful child labor trade-off at different points along the conditional distribution of 
earnings. Needless to say, the conditional analysis provides the more compelling 
evidence on the nature of the relationship between earnings and harmful child labor. 
However, it is important to note that the evidence on the earnings-harmful child labor 
trade-off is descriptive—the available data do not allow me to address the potential 
simultaneity and selectivity problems that are generally present in earnings 
estimations.  
The analysis yields six main empirical results. First, I find that children who 
work in paid employment systematically report higher incidences of harmful child 
labor than those who work in unpaid employment. Second, I find strong evidence of 
an unconditional positive relationship between earnings and harmful child labor, 
irrespective of the type of harmful child labor examined. Third, examining this 
relationship within a multiple regression framework with a range of 
sociodemographic, employment, and other controls, I find evidence of positive 
compensating wages only for hazardous labor and physically strenuous labor when 
evaluated at the conditional mean of earnings via ordinary least squares; further, the 
result for hazardous labor is not robust when evaluated at the conditional median of 
earnings via quantile regession. Fourth, in the cases of psychologically stressful and 
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physically strenuous labor, I do not find any evidence that children receive additional 
positive compensating wages at the conditional mean or median for higher levels of 
harmful child labor, as represented by the frequency of harmful child labor. Fifth, I do 
not find evidence that compensating wages for harmful child labor at the conditional 
mean or median systematically vary between girls and boys or between urban and 
rural children. Sixth and last, I find that the estimated earnings premia for physically 
strenuous and hazardous labor at the conditional mean appear to be largely driven by 
substantial premia in the bottom half of the conditional distribution of earnings; the 
premia in the upper half of the conditional distribution of earnings are relatively 
modest and not significantly different from zero.  
A straightforward (and clearly simplistic) interpretation of the above findings 
is that there appears to be compensating wages for immediate, transparent, and certain 
harmful child labor as represented by physically strenuous labor or probabilistic 
physical harm as represented by hazardous labor, especially in relatively lower-wage 
employment activities (conditional on other factors). The findings however suggest the 
absence of compensating wages for harm that takes the relatively intangible form of 
psychological stress. The differing results across the types of harmful child labor could 
indicate perceptional differences over the types of harm. For example, households may 
tend to discount harm when it is psychological. This behavior may be exacerbated 
when the physical manifestations of this harm may occur later in life or are difficult to 
attribute to work and working conditions. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 2.A1: OLS earnings regression estimates, all model parameters 
Individual inclusion specification 
Covariate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Hazardous Strenuous Stressful 
Urban -0.009 -0.008 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 
 
(0.058) (0.059) (0.058) (0.059) (0.058) (0.059) 
Male 0.177*** 0.132** 0.159*** 0.113* 0.193*** 0.146** 
 
(0.056) (0.060) (0.057) (0.060) (0.055) (0.059) 
Age 0.326** 0.376** 0.328** 0.375** 0.314** 0.362** 
 
(0.161) (0.148) (0.158) (0.148) (0.159) (0.147) 
Age-squared -0.008 -0.010** -0.008 -0.010** -0.007 -0.010* 
 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Secondary incomplete 0.040 0.034 0.038 0.031 0.040 0.034 
 
(0.058) (0.059) (0.058) (0.059) (0.058) (0.059) 
Secondary complete 0.219*** 0.154* 0.215*** 0.148* 0.212*** 0.145* 
 
(0.079) (0.085) (0.079) (0.084) (0.079) (0.084) 
Attending school 
-
0.263*** 
-
0.236*** 
-
0.261*** 
-
0.234*** 
-
0.266*** 
-
0.239*** 
 
(0.075) (0.073) (0.076) (0.074) (0.075) (0.073) 
Hazardous 0.104* 0.100* -- -- -- -- 
 
(0.058) (0.056) 
    
Strenuous -- -- 0.140*** 0.135*** -- -- 
   
(0.052) (0.050) 
  
Stressful -- -- -- -- 0.068 0.052 
     
(0.049) (0.049) 
Work hours/day: 1-4 
-
0.510*** 
-
0.440*** 
-
0.498*** 
-
0.435*** 
-
0.508*** 
-
0.445*** 
 
(0.075) (0.077) (0.075) (0.077) (0.075) (0.077) 
Work hours/day: 9+ 0.063 0.092 0.064 0.091 0.064 0.094 
 
(0.066) (0.067) (0.066) (0.067) (0.066) (0.067) 
Work days/week 0.432*** 0.408*** 0.423*** 0.399*** 0.433*** 0.410*** 
 
(0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) 
Work days/week-
squared 
-
0.033*** 
-
0.029*** 
-
0.032*** 
-
0.028*** 
-
0.033*** 
-
0.030*** 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Age started work -- -0.076 -- -0.073 -- -0.072 
 
(0.099) (0.099) (0.100) 
Age started work-
squared -- 0.004 -- 0.004 -- 0.004 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Night work -- 0.035 -- 0.043 -- 0.036 
  
(0.059) 
 
(0.059) 
 
(0.059) 
Meals at work -- -0.142** -- -0.142** -- -0.140** 
  
(0.059) 
 
(0.059) 
 
(0.058) 
Farm -- -0.019 -- -0.020 -- -0.015 
  
(0.109) 
 
(0.109) 
 
(0.109) 
Non-farm, non-house -- 0.042 -- 0.051 -- 0.057 
  
(0.074) 
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.074) 
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Table 2.A1 (Continued) 
Private establishment -- 0.170** -- 0.174** -- 0.174** 
  
(0.074) 
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.074) 
Piece rate pay -- -0.157** -- -0.146** -- -0.145** 
  
(0.068) 
 
(0.067) 
 
(0.068) 
Long-term/steady work -- 0.064 -- 0.060 -- 0.062 
  
(0.059) 
 
(0.058) 
 
(0.058) 
Non-agriculture -- -0.118 -- -0.113 -- -0.111 
  
(0.094) 
 
(0.095) 
 
(0.094) 
Sincere in responses -0.104** -0.108** -0.100* -0.104** -0.102* -0.107** 
 
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.053) 
Interested in interview 0.051 0.052 0.040 0.041 0.045 0.047 
 
(0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) 
Constant 0.893 1.008 0.888 1.000 0.960 1.053 
 
(1.194) (1.137) (1.172) (1.118) (1.179) (1.128) 
R-squared 0.469 0.481 0.471 0.483 0.469 0.481 
Notes: N = 1,479 for all regressions. Standard errors reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimated coefficients for region dummies are not reported. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DO CONFLICTING PARENT-CHILD RESPONSES MATTER? 
INSIGHTS FROM INVESTIGATING THE HARMFUL CHILD LABOR 
DECISION 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Child labor is a mass and persistent phenomenon in much of the developing world, 
particularly in its poorer parts. According to the International Labor Organization 
(ILO), 191 million children ages 5-14 years were classified as economically active in 
2004, of which, 166 million children were classified as child laborers (Hagemann et 
al. 2006).20 What is more, 74 million children (or 39% of economically-active 
children) were classified as engaged in hazardous work, that is, in forms of 
employment likely to endanger their physiological, psychological, and/or moral health 
and development. A number of recent empirical studies find that child labor has 
adverse effects on important child outcomes such as school attainment and cognitive 
achievement (e.g., Akabayashi and Psacharopoulos 1999; Rosati and Rossi 2003; 
Gunnarsson et al. 2006), health (e.g., O’Donnell et al. 2005; Rosati and Straub 2007; 
Rogerro et al. 2008), future labor market earnings (e.g., Ilahi et al. 2005), and the 
likelihood of child labor among the child’s future sons and daughters (e.g., Emerson 
and Souza 2003).21  
                                                 
20Child labor is a more stringent definition than child economic activity or work—it takes into account 
the age of the child, the type of work, and the numbers of hours the child works. Specifically, the ILO 
classifies a child as a child laborer if (1) the child is aged 5-11 years and is economic active regardless 
of the number of hours or (2) the child is aged 12-14 years and is economically active for 14 hours or 
more per week, or works in a hazardous activity or occupation or in the “worst forms of child labor” 
regardless of the number of hours.  
21 There is also some evidence that not all child labor is necessarily potentially harmful and some forms 
may actually provide valuable apprenticeship skills or on-the-job training which raises the future labor 
productivity and earnings of the child. For example, Beegle et al. (2005) find that child labor increases 
the probability of wage employment and higher daily labor and farm earnings in the future, fully 
offsetting the forgone earnings attributable to schooling lost due to child labor.  
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Understanding the underlying reasons for why children engage in arduous 
and/or hazardous work is instrumental for devising policy and program solutions to 
effectively and sustainably extricate children from such undesirable situations. Much 
of the available research on what explains the existence of child labor, whether 
theoretical or empirical, is typically based on a unitary household model (Becker 
1981), where all household members are assumed to have identical preferences. In 
addition, parents are assumed to behave altruistically towards their children. Under 
such a model, the prevalence of child labor is typically explained by household 
characteristics such as chronic poverty (e.g., Basu and Van 1998; Basu 1999; Emerson 
and Souza 2003), risk-coping in the face of adverse income shocks (e.g., Grootaert and 
Kanbur 1995; Jacoby and Skoufias 1997; Beegle et al. 2005) or supply-side issues 
such as the low quality of or lack of access to schools (e.g., Grootaert and Patrinos 
1999), imperfect markets for credit, land, and labor (e.g., Baland and Robinson 2000; 
Ranjan 2001; Basu et al. 2007), or changes in commodity prices and labor market 
returns (e.g., Edmonds and Pavcnik 2005; Kruger 2007).  
To be sure, the same factors considered to influence households' decision to 
supply child labor can be straightforwardly shown to also influence households' 
decision on whether to send their children to work in harmful settings. The theoretical 
literature which focuses specifically on explaining harmful child labor is however 
presently limited. For example, it comprises of explanations such as household sorting 
into different child employment choices on the basis of depth of poverty in the 
presence of compensating wage differentials for potential harm in the wage labor 
market (see Chapter 1) and households' seeking immediate returns in an environment 
of limited labor market opportunities (Dessy and Pallage 2005). However, with a few 
exceptions (e.g., Chapter 2), little empirical evidence is available on what specific 
factors influence the harmful child labor decision.  
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Given growing evidence that there may be differing preferences among 
members within the household, recent studies have examined how children’s 
outcomes, including children’s labor market outcomes, are affected by conceptualizing 
the problem using an intrahousehold model (Manser and Brown 1980; Horney 1981; 
Chiappori and others 1982; 1992; 1998). However, in using the intrahousehold model, 
by and large, studies have examined how (changes in) the intrahousehold position of 
mothers vis-à-vis fathers have affected child investments and outcomes. Virtually 
none of these studies model the interaction between parents and children or treat 
children as potential decisionmakers within the households who might have distinct 
preferences from their parents.  
In this chapter, the child is viewed as having differing preferences from her 
parent over choices such as child education and labor. Further, in the presence of 
asymmetries in decisionmaking power/leverage between the parent and the child, 
specifically, in the presence of greater decisionmaking power in the hands of the 
parent, child outcomes such as whether to work or not as well as what type of setting 
the child works in in terms of harm, will reflect more the parent’s valuation of the 
costs and benefits of (harmful) child work than the child’s. Given this, one can 
conceive of a scenario where the resulting net welfare position at the household level 
is suboptimal—in other words, changing the power dynamic between the parent and 
the child may yield a higher welfare level for the household, though obviously the 
welfare gains for the household will have to be traded off against the welfare losses of 
some individuals within the household (those that initially held greater power). 
In the intrahousehold literature in general, differing preferences between 
household members are usually inferred from differences in observed household 
behavior as a function of some variable that captures divergence in decisionmaking 
power between members. For example, the conditional relationship between child 
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outcomes and (changes in the) mother-father gap in, say, income/assets is used to infer 
if households with lower mother-father income/asset gaps have systematically 
different child outcomes from those with higher mother-father income/asset gaps. In 
the household survey dataset I use, I have information on whether a working child 
suffered a work-related injury or illness as reported by the child as well as the parent. I 
use this information to construct a similar gap measure to the above example. Namely 
a gap exists if the parent reports the working child did not suffer a work-related 
injury/illness whereas the child reports that she did (I refer to this specific gap as a 
parent-child injury report mismatch) and a gap does not exist if the child work-related 
injury/illness reports by the parent and the working child are congruent. Note that 
while the reverse gap—that is, the parent reports that the child suffered a work-related 
injury/illness but the child reports that she did not—is, in principle, possible, given my 
data, it appears to be a highly rare occurrence: roughly 1-2% of all working children 
had responses of this nature.  
Using this information, this chapter examines whether parent-child injury 
report mismatches have an impact on the probability of harmful child labor, where 
harmful child labor is measured using both subjective and objective indicators of 
harmful child labor constructed from information provided by the working child. 
Given the interest in the intrahousehold literature in investigating potential gender 
differences, the chapter also examines whether the estimated impacts systematically 
differ between working boys and girls as well as by whether the respondent parent is 
the father or the mother. In attempting to answer these questions, the chapter 
contributes to the presently limited literature on the determinants of the harmful child 
labor decision, albeit from a different angle than is typically found in the child labor 
literature. While the aim of this chapter is not to challenge the assumption that parents 
behave altruistically towards their children, the constraints that poverty imposes on 
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households may well include parents valuing child welfare lower (i.e., reduced 
altruism). In other words, parental altruism may itself be a choice variable rather than 
a fixed parameter in parents’ utility functions, with altruism increasing in household 
income or wealth. 
In this chapter, I define harmful child labor as child labor in certain workplaces 
that is likely to result in adverse health effects in the short-term and/or over the longer-
term.  Specifically, given the data, harmful child labor is defined as child labor in 
activities in which children self-report to be physically strenuous or hazardous.  It also 
includes child labor in workplaces where the child reports exposure to at least one 
identified physical or chemical hazard.  This is in contrast to Chapter 1, where I define 
harmful child labor as child labor in certain workplaces which results in adverse, 
irreversible health effects later in life (as an adult) in a deterministic way.  This 
stylization of harmful child labor facilitated the modeling of household 
decisionmaking over child employment choices without having to resort to the use of 
expectations. In reality however harm is typically a stochastic event. Irrespective of 
whether harmful child labor is treated as a deterministic or stochastic event, what’s 
common across the definitions is that workplaces are viewed to systematically differ 
in their capacity to cause harm to child.                  
The impacts of parent-child injury report mismatches on the probability of 
harmful child labor are estimated using three alternative approaches for establishing a 
valid empirical counterfactual (under certain assumptions) for working children with 
parent-child injury report mismatches. The first is standard multiple regression with 
controls for a range of child, respondent parent, and household characteristics which 
also potentially explain the harmful child labor decision. The second is multiple 
regression augmented by household fixed effects to additionally control for 
unobservables that may vary between households. The third is propensity score 
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matching (matching for short), which explicitly models the parent-child injury report 
mismatch outcome and generates a presumably stronger counterfactual than is 
possible via regression by only considering similar observations. It is important to 
note that all three methods essentially assume that the selection process which 
determines the parent-child injury report mismatch outcome can be modeled using the 
available data (i.e., selection is on observables). This assumption is plausible given 
data on an extensive set of covariates collected similarly across all sample 
observations (Heckman et al. 1997; Heckman et al. 1998)  
While matching is typically used in program evaluations where exposure to or 
participation in a program (referred to in the evaluation literature as treatment) is 
binary, the method can be used more generally to estimate the impact of any binary 
variable such as the parent-child injury report mismatch variable in this chapter 
(Wooldridge 2002). For example, previous studies in the labor economics literature 
that have interpreted treatment broadly and applied matching methods include studies 
of the impact of union membership on wages (e.g., Bryson 2002) and the impact of 
migration on wages (e.g., Ham et al. 2005), both of which represent research questions 
where the estimation issues of endogeneity and selection are well-known in the 
literature (Cahuc and Zylberberg 2004).22  
All three estimators suggest that parent-child injury report mismatches have a 
large and significant positive impact on the probability of harmful child labor. This 
finding is largely robust to the choice of harmful child labor measure which comprises 
of both self-reported measures as well as measures constructed using child information 
on specific workplace hazards. While the assumption of selection on observables on 
which this empirical analysis hinges on is untestable, the results from applying a 
                                                 
22 Caliendo (2008) also lists other nonevaluation research which uses matching methods to estimate the 
effects of binary variables. 
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standard bounding test suggests that the significance of the matching-based results 
appears to be robust to the potential influence of varying degrees of arbitrary 
unobserved heterogeneity in explaining the presence of parent-child injury report 
mismatches among households. Finally, the evidence suggests that the impact of 
parent-child injury report mismatches on the probability of harmful child labor does 
not vary systematically between working boys and girls, and between children where 
the adult respondent to the question on child work-related injury is the mother or the 
father.  
The remaining sections of the chapter are organized as follows. Section 3.2 
motivates how parent-child injury report mismatches may matter for the probability of 
harmful child labor by using insights from the theoretical literature on intrahousehold 
interactions and individual and household outcomes. Section 3.3 discusses the 
identification and estimation strategies for determining the impact of parent-child 
injury report mismatches on the harmful child labor decision. Section 3.4 describes the 
data and sample for this study. Section 3.5 presents the findings. Finally, Section 3.6 
summarizes the main findings and provides some concluding remarks. 
 
3.2 Theoretical discussion 
Following Becker (1981), the standard economic model of the household assumes that 
a household behaves like a single individual; that is, all household members have 
identical preferences and household behavior reflects the solution to an optimization 
problem involving a single objective function subject to a household budget 
constraint. However, in the last two decades, the unitary model of the household has 
been challenged empirically. There is growing evidence that the distribution of 
resources and decisionmaking power between household members affect outcomes. In 
particular, greater control over resources by mothers has been consistently 
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documented to result in positive impacts on children's human capital investments and 
outcomes (see, e.g., Thomas 1990; Pitt and Khandker 1998; Duflo 2003; Pitt et al. 
2003; Duflo and Udry 2004; Schady and Rosero 2007; Rubalcava et al. 2009).  
 The findings from these studies support the intrahousehold allocation model, 
which allows for preferences to differ between household members. There are two 
main classes within intrahousehold models. The first is the bargaining model which 
was developed by Manser and Brown (1980), McElroy and Horney (1981), and 
Lundberg and Pollak (1993). In this model, household decisions are treated as the 
outcome of a bargaining game between household members. The solution to this game 
is sensitive to the threat point of each member (i.e., his or her utility if cooperation 
fails) as well as the equilibrium concept assumed, where the threat point reflects the 
“bargaining power” of the household member. The second is the collective model 
which was developed by Chiappori (1988, 1992), Bourguignon and Chiappori (1992), 
and Browning and Chiappori (1998). This model does not specify the underlying 
process within the household but assumes that households make Pareto efficient 
decisions. This assumption implies that household behavior can be modeled as the 
solution to maximizing the weighted sum of the individual utility functions of the 
household decisionmakers, where the weights reflect the bargaining powers of the 
relevant decisionmakers. 
To date, the existing theoretical and empirical child labor literature based on 
the intrahousehold model has focused on the interactions between spouses. The 
literature typically assumes a household to comprise of two heads (mother and father) 
and some number of children (who can be male or female). The male and female 
heads are assumed to have different preferences over the levels of child labor and 
schooling of their children; these preferences may also be sensitive to the gender of 
the child. The realized household outcomes are seen to be the result of the resolution 
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to a bargaining game between male and female heads, and reflect the underlying 
preferences and the bargaining powers of the two agents. The children are assumed to 
not have any say in the final outcome. This is a reasonable assumption in many 
contexts as children may have little autonomy over their fate and parents have the final 
decisionmaking authority.  
One exception to existing child labor studies is Moehling’s (2005) study of 
child labor as a decisionmaking game where the agents involved are parents and 
children. Using data from the United States from the early 20th century, she finds that 
children’s bargaining power within the household increases as their share of income 
contributed to total household income increases. She concludes that the implicit threat 
that children may cease to contribute to household income gives them the ability to 
influence parents’ spending patterns in their favor, demonstrating that children appear 
to have some agency in the child labor decision.  
Following Moehling, I model household decisionmaking as a bargaining 
process between two agents—parents and children. I posit that parents are altruistic 
and obtain utility from the human capital development of their children and disutility 
from child labor in general and harmful child labor in particular. Parents also obtain 
utility from household consumption. In a developing country setting, children can go 
to school or work (which includes working in harmful settings).23 Given that parents 
place a positive value on their children’s human capital development, they desire to 
send their children to school. However, confronted by poverty, parents decide to send 
their children to work to supplement household income. Given compensating wage 
differentials for harmful child labor, certain parents may prefer to send their children 
                                                 
23 They can also be engaged in both activities, in which case the time spent in school is the inverse of 
the time spent in harmful child labor. The discussion of the intrahousehold decision model is similar to 
that above, with parents placing a smaller negative weight on work-related injuries than their children. 
The outcome of the bargaining process would then be in terms of the number of hours in school versus 
work. 
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to work in harmful employment. Further, like parents, children too obtain utility from 
attending school as well as from household consumption. Further, like parents, they 
obtain disutility from child labor in general and harmful child labor in particular.  
Within this framework, a first potential explanation for parent-child injury 
report mismatches is simply that parents are not perfectly altruistic and thus discount 
the event and extent of work-related injury/illness experienced by the child. A second 
(and more benign) potential explanation is that harmful child labor is an “experience” 
good, whose attributes and effects cannot be perfectly communicated to parents, thus 
introducing information asymmetries within the household which can bias household 
choices. A third potential explanation is that even in the presence of full information 
as well as perfect sharing of information within the household, parents might engage 
in what is referred to in the social psychology literature as defensive distortion and 
denial, namely, phenomena in which individuals deliberately deny or minimize the 
magnitude of negative events in order to tolerate certain difficult choices.24 In a 
collective household model where the household maximizes a weighted sum of the 
utility functions of the parent and the child, and where the weights reflect the 
bargaining power of the two actors, the higher bargaining power of the parent vis-à-vis 
the child’s will result in outcomes which reflect more the parent’s preferences. Given 
the above explanations, one such outcome could well be the increased likelihood of 
the child working in a harmful setting.  
More formally, let : niu R R+ → be agent i ’s utility function, where R is the set 
of real numbers, and 
iu a well-behaved utility function. The argument 
nx R+∈ is a 
vector of n  goods consumed by the household, including the child’s schooling. The 
vector x also includes “bads” that provide disutility as consumption increases.25 Child 
                                                 
24 Defensive distortion or denial is also discussed in happiness research by economists where these 
phenomena can make subjective measures of well-being noisy (see, e.g., Veenhoven 2004).  
25 See, e.g., Felkey (2006) on modeling household “goods” and “bads”. 
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labor, including harmful child labor, can be thought of as such a “bad”. In the 
collective model approach, the household maximizes the objective function 
( )( ) 1 ( ),p cu x u xθ θΩ = + −  
where pu and cu are the utility functions of the parent and the child, respectively, and 
the parameter [ ]0,1θ ∈  reflects the balance of power between the two agents. If θ  
represents the index of parental power in the household, then θ  closer to one implies 
that the parent has a higher bargaining power relative to the child’s. The alternative 
explanations posited above suggest that the manifestation of parent-child injury report 
mismatches can be incorporated into the model to reflect either differences in the 
utility functions u between the parent and the child or differences in the perceived 
attributes of harmful child labor (one of the choice variables in the x vector) that enter 
into the utility functions.  
 Note that the above theoretical sketch is far from a structural model of the 
relationship between parent-child injury report mismatches and harmful child labor 
and does not isolate a specific channel through or set of conditions under which the 
impact of injury report mismatches emerges. The above discussion however motivates 
a reduced form approach to estimating the relationship, in which, to the extent possible 
given the data, other factors considered to be associated with the harmful child labor 
decision are controlled for. 
 
3.3 Empirical methodology 
In this section, I discuss the identification and estimation strategies used to determine 
the average partial effect of parent-child work injury report mismatches on the 
probability of harmful child labor using observational data from a single cross-
sectional household sample survey dataset, which is all that is available to me (details 
on the data are discussed in the following section). As a reminder, it is important to 
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keep in mind that parent-child injury report mismatch is defined as a mismatch in a 
particular direction: the parent reports that the working child did not suffer a work-
related injury/illness whereas the child does.  
It is plausible that there may be systematic differences between working 
children with parent-child injury report mismatches and those without which influence 
harmful child labor outcomes. I use three different empirical strategies to address this 
potential selection bias and to construct well-defined counterfactuals for the sample of 
working children with parent-child injury report mismatches. These strategies 
comprise of comparing outcomes of working children with parent-child injury report 
mismatches against those without via (1) multiple regression with a rich set of relevant 
child, adult respondent and household covariates (a standard regression estimator); (2) 
multiple regression accounting for unobserved heterogeneity that varies at the 
household level or higher (a fixed-effects regression estimator); and (3) propensity 
score matching.  
Counterfactual framework: Given that my interest lies in understanding the 
relationship between parent-child injury report mismatches and the probability of 
harmful child labor, not unlike understanding the relationship between program 
participation (where selection via endogenous program placement and participation 
can play important roles) and relevant outcomes of interest, I adopt a program 
evaluation or counterfactual framework (Rubin 1974; Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983) to 
present the problem. While uncommon, the adoption of a program evaluation 
framework for a nonevaluation problem is not an ill fit: for example, Wooldridge 
(2002) argues that consistent estimators derived under the assumptions made in the 
program evaluation framework typically reduce to familiar standard estimators such as 
OLS regression which are used for ceteris-paribus analysis and are traditionally 
derived very differently, at least prima facie.  
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Following the exposition in Todd (2008) and Ravallion (2008), suppose there 
are two states of the world for each working child i ( )1,..., N= : mismatch ( )1im = , 
that is, where the parent does not report a work-related injury suffered by the child 
whereas the child does, or match ( )0im = , that is, where the child injury reports by 
the parent and the child are congruent. Let 0iy  and 1iy denote the potential harmful 
child labor outcomes in the match and mismatch states for working child i, 
respectively. The observed outcome, iy , is then given by 
 1 0(1 ) .i i i i iy m y m y= + −  (19) 
Suppose the outcomes in the match and mismatch states are written as additive-
separable functions of a vector of observables x and an unobservable u as follows: 
 0 0 0    1,...,i i iy x u i Nβ= + =  (20) 
 1 1 1    1,..., .i i iy x u i Nβ= + =  (21) 
Incorporating (2) and (3) and rearranging terms, (1) can be rewritten as 
 ( )( ) ( ){ }0 1 0 0 1 0   1,..., .i i i i i i i iy x m x u m u u i Nβ β β= + − + + − =  (22) 
Assuming that ( ) ( )1 0| | 0E u x E u x= =  (i.e., the x vector is exogenous), the change in 
the probability of harmful child labor from moving from the match to the mismatch 
state for working child i is given by 
 ( )( ) ( )1 0 1 0   1,..., .i i i i i im x m u u i Nβ β∆ = − + − =  (23) 
It follows that the conditional mean impact on the probability of harmful child labor 
for children with mismatches is given by  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 0 1 0 1 0| , 1 | , 1 | , 1 | , 1 .E x m E y x m E y x m x E u u x mα β β≡ ∆ = = = − = = − + − =
 (24) 
This is my parameter of interest, commonly referred to in the program 
evaluation literature as the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). Estimating 
(6) requires essentially solving a missing data problem as information on 1y  is missing 
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for working children with matches ( )0m = , and, likewise, information on 0y  is 
missing for working children with mismatches ( )1m = . Thus, the impact ∆  is not 
directly observed for any working child. Consequently, (6) is unidentified. 
Importantly, information on the counterfactual conditional expectation 
( )0 | , 1E y x m =  required for obtaining the impact parameter α  is not directly 
estimable from the data. Given this, a common way to impute the missing 
counterfactual conditional expectation is to assume that 
 ( ) ( )0 0 0| , 1 | , 0 ( | ),E y x m E y x m E y x= = = =  (25) 
that is, that the counterfactual conditional expectations do not vary with mismatch 
status. Under this assumption, the impact parameter α is identified.  
 
3.3.1. Standard regression estimator 
The impact parameter α can be, for example, consistently estimated via standard 
parametric regressions of (2) and (3) for the match and mismatch samples, 
respectively. Alternatively, the parameter can be consistently estimated by pooling the 
two samples together and estimating a regression of (4). Taking (4), and assuming that 
the value of the unobservable is the same in both states, 1 0i iu u=  for all i, and that the 
value of ( )1 0ix β β−  is a constant for all i, yields the “constant effects” model 
 0 0    1,... ,i i i iy m x u i Nα β= + + =  (26) 
where *α  is defined as the solution to α . Assuming (7) under this model is equivalent 
to assuming that 
 ( ) ( )0 0 0| , 1 | , 0 ( | ),E u x m E u x m E u x= = = =  (27) 
or that selection into mismatch status is entirely conditional on observables. 
Given that the harmful child labor outcome measures of interest are dummy 
variables, (8) is formulated to represent an underlying latent variable structure. Let *iy  
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denote a latent continuous random variable, reflecting the unobserved tendency of 
working child i towards harmful child labor, determined by the regression function  
 *   1,... ,i i i iy m x u i Nα β= + + =  (28) 
where im  is a dummy variable denoting parent-child injury report mismatch, ix  a 
vector of child, adult respondent, and household covariates, α and the vector β  
parameters to be estimated, and u the stochastic error term. I estimate (10) by fitting a 
linear probability model (LPM) to the data.26 Consistency of the standard LPM 
estimator of α requires ( )| , 0i i iE u x m = . 
 
3.3.2. Fixed effects regression estimator  
I also attempt to identify and parametrically estimate the impact of parent-child injury 
report mismatches by exploiting the variation in harmful child labor outcomes among 
working children from within the same household, thus accounting for unobserved 
heterogeneity that varies between households—this heterogeneity can arise from 
differences at the household level, village level, or higher. Accounting for this source 
of potential selection bias is likely to lead to a reduction in total selection bias but may 
not completely eliminate it. The LPM is now characterized as  
                                                 
26 It is important to recognize that the LPM is not a typical choice for binary choice estimation; more 
common choices in applied econometric work are the binomial probit and logit. An important 
advantage of the LPM over these alternative estimators is that the estimated parameters can be readily 
interpreted as the marginal effects of the covariates on the conditional probability of harmful child 
labor, ( )1| ,P y x m= . On the other hand, the econometric literature points out two general weaknesses 
of the LPM relative to its nonlinear competitors. First, some of the predicted probabilities from the 
LPM can fall outside the [ ]0,1  interval. Second, a unit change in a given covariate always changes the 
conditional probability of the outcome variable by the same magnitude, irrespective of the initial values 
of the covariates. Thus, continually increasing the value of the covariate can eventually result in the 
conditional probability of the outcome falling outside the unit interval. As Wooldridge (2002) notes, if 
the objective is to estimate the marginal effects on the conditional probability of the outcome at the 
center of the distribution of the covariates or averaged over the distribution of covariates rather than at 
extreme values of covariates, then the LPM typically performs well. Nonetheless, I test the sensitivity 
of the findings to the choice of estimator; specifically, I also estimate (11) by fitting a binomial logit 
model to the data, and calculating the marginal effects averaged across the distribution of the covariates 
(the average marginal effects). 
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 * ,   1,... ,  1,... ,ih ih h ih ihy m I x u i N h Hα λ β= + + + = =  (29) 
where ihy  reflects the unobserved tendency of the working child towards harmful 
child labor and where *1 0ih ihy y = >  ,
27 ihm a dummy variable denoting parent-child 
injury report mismatch, ihx  a vector of household-varying child covariates (note that 
adult respondent and household characteristics are not included here as they are 
household-invariant), hI a vector of household-specific fixed effects, α and the vectors 
β and λ  parameters to be estimated, and ihu the error term. The error term in (11) can 
be decomposed as ih h ihu θ υ= + , where hθ denotes the effects of household-invariant 
unobservables and ihυ the standard stochastic error term. Consistency of the household 
fixed effects LPM regression estimator of α requires that 
( )( )| , , , 0,   ,ih jh ih jh ih jhE x x m m i jυ υ− = ≠ that is, that the injury report mismatch status 
of working children within the household is uncorrelated with the error term ihυ . 
 
3.3.3. Propensity score matching estimator  
As an alternative to regression, I also estimate the impact parameter α  using 
matching. Matching is similar to regression but essentially compares the average 
outcomes of working children with parent-child injury report mismatches to the 
average outcomes of similar matched working children without parent-child injury 
report mismatches. To avoid confusion, in the subsection, in line with the program 
evaluation terminology, children with parent-child injury report mismatches are 
referred to as treated observations, children without parent-child injury report 
mismatches as untreated observations, and mismatch status as treatment status; for the 
remainder of this section, the word “match” is reserved for the method.  
To begin, matching has several important advantages over standard regression 
(Ravallion 2008). First, matching does not require specifying a parametric functional 
                                                 
27 *1 0ih ihy y = >  is an abbreviated form that indicates that 1ihy = if 
* 0
ih
y > , and 0 otherwise.  
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form for relating outcomes to covariates, and thus is less exposed to potential 
misspecification bias. In contrast, following common practice, the LPM regression 
specifications discussed earlier specify the outcomes as linear functions of the 
observables. Second, matching restricts the treated and untreated observations to those 
with similar propensity scores or in the common support (these terms will be discussed 
shortly). In contrast, regression uses the full (unmatched) samples of treated and 
untreated observations, regardless of whether they are indeed comparable. Simulations 
show that impact estimates based on unmatched samples are more biased and are less 
robust to misspecification of the regression function than those based on matched 
samples (Rubin and Thomas 2000). Third, matching looks for covariates that explain 
treatment status (as well as outcomes of interest), while regression looks for covariates 
that explain the outcomes of interest, treating these covariates as exogenous. If the 
covariates only weakly explain outcomes, this poses a problem for regression. In 
contrast, these same covariates can still help attenuate potential bias in estimating the 
impact parameter under matching (Rubin and Thomas 2000). Fourth and final, in 
regression, all untreated observations receive equal weight in determining the 
counterfactual for each treated observation. On the other hand, in matching, only 
untreated observations similar to a given treated observation receive positive weight; 
further, the weights decrease in size as the distance in propensity scores between the 
positively-weighted untreated observations and the treated observation expands. In 
this way, potential bias is further attenuated. 
In order to identify and estimate the impact parameter using matching, 
following Heckman et al. (1998), I assume that there exists a set of child, adult 
respondent, and household covariates x such that  
 ( ) ( )0 0 0| , 1 | , 0 ( | ),E y x m E y x m E y x= = = =  (30) 
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that is, the treatment status m does not help predict the counterfactual outcome 0y  
conditional on the covariates x. Further, I assume that  
 ( )1| 1;P m x= <  (31) 
this assumption guarantees the possibility of an untreated analogue for each treated 
observation. Under assumptions (12) and (13), the impact parameter is given by 
 
( )
( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ){ }
1 0
1 | 1
1 | 1
| 1
| 1 | 1|
| 1 | 0 | ,
x m y
x m y
E y y m
E y m E E y m x
E y m E E y m x
α
=
=
= − =
= = − =
= = − =
 (32) 
where the second term can be estimated from the average outcomes of the matched 
untreated group. It might be the case that there does not exist a set of covariates x such 
that (12) and (13) hold, that is, the support of x does not overlap for the treated and 
untreated groups; in which case, matching is not valid. Matching can only be 
performed over the “region of common support”, and the impact parameter is in fact 
additionally defined conditional on the region of overlap.  
Matching is generally not practicable if the set of covariates x is large, as one 
has to then deal with what is commonly referred to as the “curse of dimensionality”.28 
In this context, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) provide a solution to reduce the 
dimensionality of the problem and, thus, greatly increase the tractability of matching, 
namely 
 ( ) ( )0 0| , | ( ) ,E y m x E y P x=  (33) 
that is, if the counterfactual outcomes 0y  are independent of treatment status m 
conditional on the covariates x, then they are also independent of treatment status 
conditional on the probability of treatment ( ) ( )Pr 1|P x m x= = . In other words, if I 
can match on x, I can also match on ( )P x , the propensity score. Thus, I can reduce 
the dimensionality of the matching problem to that of a univariate matching problem.  
                                                 
28 As Todd (2008) notes, if x is discrete then it is possible to have cells without matches. On the other 
hand, if x is continuous, then nonparametric estimations suffer from slow convergence rates. 
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The matching problem is then solved using a two-step process. In the first step, 
the propensity score is estimated using a binary choice model (following common 
practice, I use binomial logit regression). In the second step, observations are matched 
on the predicted probabilities of treatment obtained from the first stage using the 
selected matching estimator described next. 
Choice of matching estimator: Several alternative propensity score matching 
estimators have been proposed in the literature. A typical matching estimator for the 
impact parameter α  takes the form  
 ( )
1 0
1 0
1
1
, ,
p
M i i
i I S j I
y W i j y
n
α
∈ ∩ ∈
 
= − 
 
∑ ∑  (34) 
where 1I denotes the set of treated observations, 0I the set of untreated observations, 
pS the region of common support, and 1n the number of observations in the subset 
1 pI S∩ . The match for each treated observation 1 pi I S∈ ∩  is constructed as a 
weighted average of the outcomes of untreated observations, where the weights 
( ),W i j depend on the distance between the propensity scores iP and jP . Further, the 
untreated observations 0j I∈  matched to treated observation 1 pi I S∈ ∩  are those 
untreated observations in set ( ){ }0 |i j iA j I P C P= ∈ ∈ , where ( )iC P denotes the 
neighborhood for the treated observation i. The alternative matching estimators 
basically differ in how the neighborhood ( )iC p  is defined and how the weights 
( ),W i j  are constructed (see, e.g., Caliendo and Kopeinig 2005, Smith and Todd 
2005, and Todd 2008 for an overview of alternative estimators).  
From among the set of available estimators, I choose to implement local linear 
matching to estimate the impact parameter α . Proposed by Heckman et al. (1997), 
local linear matching is a generalized version of kernel matching. The local linear 
weighting function is given by 
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 (35) 
where ( )( )/ij j iK K P P h= − denotes a kernel function that integrates to one and has 
mean zero and h the parameter determining the kernel bandwidth. For a kernel 
bounded by -1 and 1, the neighborhood ( )iC P  equals { } 01 , .i jP Ph j I− ≤ ∈  Compared to 
standard kernel estimation, local linear estimation has been shown to have faster 
convergence rates at boundary points. This is a potentially useful property when (1) 
untreated observations are distributed asymmetrically around treated observations in 
terms of P; (2) P for some observations are near zero or one; and (3) there are gaps in 
the distribution of P (Galdo et al. 2007; Smith and Todd 2005). In addition, the 
performance of local linear regression is more robust to different data design densities 
(Fan 1992).  
Choice of kernel function: Two commonly used kernels in the applied matching 
literature are the Epanechnikov and Gaussian kernels. Black and Smith (2004) test 
both kernels in a study of the effects of college quality using data from the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), and find that the Epanechnikov kernel 
performs slightly better irrespective of bandwidth choice. Specifically, they find that 
their nonparametric estimations using the Epanechnikov kernel have faster 
convergence rates and implicitly impose the common support condition through the 
choice of the kernel bandwidth. In light of this evidence, I use the Epanechnikov 
kernel, which is a popular choice in applied studies using matching. Notwithstanding, 
simulation evidence suggests that nonparametric estimates are much less sensitive to 
the choice of kernel than the choice of bandwidth (Cameron and Trivedi 2005; Imbens 
and Wooldridge 2008).  
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Choice of kernel bandwidth: The kernel bandwidth or smoothing parameter h has 
important implications for the tradeoff between variance and bias: a smaller bandwidth 
yields a smaller bias but a larger variance (due to undersmoothing), while a larger 
bandwidth yields a larger bias but a smaller variance (due to oversmoothing). In the 
specific case of matching, too large a bandwidth size means that untreated 
observations which may be quite different from the treated observation are included in 
the estimation of the expected counterfactual outcome and too small a bandwidth size 
means that too few untreated observations are used to estimate the expected 
counterfactual outcome, yielding a noisy estimate of the impact parameter. Following 
Galdo et al. (2007), I determine the optimal bandwidth size by minimizing the mean 
squared error (MSE)—which is equal to the sum of the variance and the square of the 
bias— of the local linear matching estimator.  
Choice of variance estimator: Standard errors for impact parameter estimates are 
typically generated using bootstrap resampling methods in the applied matching 
literature. Abadie and Imbens (2006) find that standard bootstrapping does not yield 
valid standard errors in the case of the nearest-k neighbor matching estimator and 
arrive at a consistent analytical estimator for the standard error; this result does not 
apply to kernel or local linear matching estimators. In addition, Heckman et al. (1997) 
derive the asymptotic properties for the kernel and local linear matching estimators. In 
light of these results, I report both analytical and bootstrapped standard errors 
(resampling 1,000 times from the data) for the matching-based parameter estimates. 
 
3.4 Data and sample 
3.4.1. Data 
The data for this study come from the Filipino 2001 Survey of Children, 5-17 Year 
Olds (SOC). This survey was administered as a rider to the October round of the 2001 
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Labor Force Survey by the National Statistics Office in collaboration with the Bureau 
of Labour Employment Statistics of the Department of Labour and Employment, with 
technical and financial assistance from the ILO’s International Program on the 
Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC).  
The survey adopted a multi-stage clustered sampling design, yielding data that 
are representative at the national as well as regional levels.29 In the first stage, sample 
barangays (barangy is the smallest administrative unit in the country) were selected 
systematically with probability proportional to size from a frame of barangays 
stratified on the basis of province, urban/rural, and other dimensions to ensure nearly 
complete geographic coverage. In the second stage, sample enumeration areas (EAs, 
physical divisions of barangays) were selected systematically with probability 
proportional to size in the sample barangays. Finally, in the third stage, private 
households were selected systematically in the sample EAs (twelve households per 
EA) based on the 1995 population census frame.30 These complex survey design 
features of stratification, clustering, and sampling weights given the unequal 
probability of selection are incorporated into all estimations. 
The original survey sample was 2,247 primary sampling units (EAs) and 
26,964 private households. Out of this number, 17,454 households (64.7%) had 
children aged 5-17 years; 17,444 out of the 17,454 households (99.9%) were 
successfully interviewed. The total number of children residing in the interviewed 
households was 41,924; out of this number, 6,523 children (15.6%) reported that they 
worked in the twelve months preceding the survey (September 2000-October 2001); 
6,365 out of the 6,523 working children (97.6%) were successfully interviewed. 
                                                 
29 At the time of the survey, there were 16 regions in the Philippines. A region is a grouping of 
provinces (province is the largest administrative unit in the country), based on similarities in 
geographical, cultural, and ethnographic characteristics. 
30 Individuals residing in institutions or establishments were not covered in the survey. 
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Consequently, survey nonresponse by households and children appears to be a 
negligible source of selection bias. The definition of work used in the survey follows 
ILO guidelines: a child was considered to be working or economically active if at any 
time in the reference period the child was engaged in an economic activity for at least 
one hour (ILO 2009).  
Two survey questionnaires were fielded as part of the 2001 SOC: SOC Form 1 
which largely collected information on the socioeconomic characteristics of 
households with children aged 5-17 years and SOC Form 2 which collected detailed 
information on the work and working characteristics of working children. The 
respondent for the SOC Form 1 is the parent or the guardian of the child or children 
aged 5-17 years; the main purpose of this survey was to identify eligible child 
respondents for administering the SOC Form 2. The respondent for the SOC Form 2 is 
the working child residing in the household.31  
Several steps were taken to ensure the reliability and interpersonal 
comparability of the data. For example, survey interviewers were expected to read the 
questions exactly as worded in the questionnaires (either in English or the local 
language), and maintain a professional, dispassionate demeanor through the entire 
interview. In addition, to the extent possible, interviews were to be one-on-one and 
conducted in private. Castro et al. (2005) however cautions that the reliability of data 
from parents and children may be undermined if child labor is a sensitive subject (this 
is plausible as children below ages 15 and 18 are legally prohibited from general and 
hazardous work in the Philippines, respectively). They also point out that children may 
                                                 
31 A source of potential selection bias arises from the fact that comparable work data on children 
residing outside the household were not collected in the survey. The survey however collected limited 
basic data on unmarried children aged 5-17 years residing outside the household. The total number of 
such children is very small: 462. Among these, 265 children (or 57.4%) were reported to have worked 
in the reference period. Given these small absolute numbers, selection due to sample truncation is likely 
to be minor—if comparable data were available for these children, they would increase the total child 
and working child samples by 1% and 4.1%, respectively.  
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be less-reliable respondents than adults. For example, they are more likely to be (1) 
unaware of salient characteristics of their work (such as workplace hazards) and/or (2) 
unable to accurately convey them to the interviewer due to recall and spoken language 
command problems; further, these problems are likely to be exacerbated the younger 
the child. The degree to which these issues affect the reliability of these data is 
however unknown. Notwithstanding, in the SOC Form 2, the interviewer was asked to 
assess the levels of interest and sincerity of the child respondent (based on predefined 
scales) as well as note down sections and questions where the child had any doubts, 
difficulties, or apprehensions. While the notes are unavailable, I include the 
interviewers’ categorical assessments as controls in the outcome and propensity score 
regression estimations. 
Construction of the mismatch variable: The SOC Form 1 collected limited work-
related information on children from the parent; as part of this information, the parent 
was asked the question “Did you child suffer from a work-related injuries/illnesses?” 
This was followed by a related question on the type of injury or illness, which was 
postcoded by the interviewer using a scheme provided in the survey interviewer 
manual—the scheme lists different types of injuries and illnesses and provides 
definitions. Multiple responses were allowed. If the response could not be categorized 
using the given code list, the interviewer coded it as “other” and wrote in the injury or 
illness. Similarly, in the SOC Form 2, the working child was asked the question “Have 
you ever experienced any injuries/illnesses while working?” This is followed by a 
series of related questions on the different types of injuries or illnesses suffered using 
a precoded list (with multiple responses allowed), the severity of the injury or illness 
measured in terms of work cessation, and treatment.32 The equivalent questions posed 
                                                 
32 As noted by Castro et al. (2005), the questions on work-related injuries/illnesses do not explicitly 
specify a reference period (in fact, this applies to all the work-related questions); only the question used 
to screen-in respondents for the SOC Form 2 explicitly states the reference period. However, it is 
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to the parent and child on the event of injury or illness are used to construct the 
measure of parent-child injury report mismatch, where one denotes a mismatch 
( )1m = , that is, where the parent reports that the child did not suffer a work-related 
injury/illness but the child does, and zero a match ( )0m = , that is, where the child 
injury reports by the parent and the child are congruent. However, as explained later, 
this indicator is constructed for a marginally smaller sample than the full sample of 
working children due to missing data and child work-related injury reports by adult 
respondents other than parents. 
Construction of the harmful child labor variables: Data on harmful child labor are 
obtained from responses of working children in the SOC Form 2. Specifically, I use 
data from the following questions: (1) “Did/do you perform heavy physical work?”; 
(2) “Did/do you consider some aspects of your work risky or dangerous?”; (3) “Did/do 
your work often involve exposure to the following physical environmental 
characteristics?”; and (4) “Did/do your work often involve exposure to the following 
chemicals?” The response options for question (1) are “always”, “sometimes”, 
“seldom”, or “never”; for question (2), “yes” or “no”; and for questions (3) and (4), 
“yes” or “no” to a precoded list of hazards (with multiple responses allowed). The 
distributions of responses to these questions are presented in Table 3.1. 
 Survey interviewers are offered some guidance on what the above questions on 
harmful child labor are asking. For example, illustrative examples of heavy physical 
work provided in the survey interviewer manual include transporting heavy loads, 
lifting heavy items, using heavy tools and machinery, digging, and quarrying. For 
risky or dangerous work, the manual lists the following risks as examples: vehicular 
                                                                                                                                            
possible that both parents and children might report work-related injuries and illnesses that date from 
farther back in time than the last twelve months, potentially upwardly biasing injury and illness 
incidence rates in the sample. 
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accidents for delivery workers; extreme light from welders which can cause loss of 
sight; and loud noise of machines which can cause loss of hearing. 
 
Table 3.1. Sample distribution of responses to original harmful child labor questions 
 Frequency 
Share 
(%) 
 
Did/do you perform heavy physical work?   
Always 352 5.53 
Sometimes 1,376 21.62 
Seldom/rarely 986 15.49 
Never 3,651 57.36 
   
Did/do you consider some aspects of your work risky or 
dangerous? 
  
Yes 1,288 20.24 
No 5,077 79.76 
   
Did/does your work often involve exposure to the following?   
Physical hazards (multiple responses permitted)   
Noise 257 4.04 
Temperature/humidity 1,698 26.68 
Pressure 147 2.31 
Inadequate lighting 47 0.74 
Slip/trip/fall hazards 435 6.83 
Insufficient exit for prompt escape 19 0.3 
Congested layout 31 0.49 
Radiation/ultraviolet/microwave 302 4.74 
Other 307 4.82 
Not exposed to physical elements 3,122 49.05 
   
Chemical hazards (multiple responses permitted)   
Dust (e.g., silica dust, saw dust, sanding dust) 762 11.97 
Liquid (e.g., oil, gasoline, mercury) 90 1.41 
Mist/fumes/vapors (e.g., paint, insecticides, pesticides) 404 6.35 
Gas (e.g., oxygen, ammonia) 75 1.18 
Other 107 1.68 
Not exposed to chemicals 4,927 77.41 
 
 
For the questions on exposure to specified physical and chemical hazards, the 
interviewers are explicitly directed to read each listed type of hazard and explain the 
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meaning by providing examples included in the manual. The manual also provides 
guidance on the meaning of response categories. For the question on heavy physical 
work, the frequency level “always” is defined as daily to 3-6 times a week and 
“sometimes” as 1-2 times per week or 1-3 per month.  
 Using these data, the following harmful child labor indicator variables are 
constructed: physically strenuous work, where one denotes response options “always” 
or “sometimes” and zero “seldom” or “never”; risky work, where one denotes “yes” 
and zero “no”; exposure to physical hazards, where one denotes an affirmative 
response to exposure to at least one physical hazard, zero otherwise; and analogously 
for exposure to chemical hazards.  
Note that the variables physically strenuous work and risky work can be 
construed as capturing subjective data on harmful child labor, whereas the variables 
exposure to physical and chemical hazards can be viewed as capturing objective data, 
given that the underlying data required the child to specify the precise hazard. While 
these variables may not necessarily reflect the same latent distribution of harmful child 
labor (and subjective measures may be noisier due to interpersonal differences in the 
interpretation of the response scales and options), I examine whether there is 
consistency in inference results across objective and subjective measures of harmful 
child labor. Notwithstanding, alternative measures of harmful child labor are also used 
to gauge the sensitivity of the results to the choice of the harmful child labor outcome 
measure.  
 
3.4.2. Sample  
An inspection of the data indicates that the child injury report was not necessarily 
provided by the child’s parent, though the survey question was worded to suggest that 
the adult respondent was the parent. As my interest lies in understanding injury report 
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mismatches between filially-connected individuals, the sample is restricted to parent-
child pairs. First, in terms of data coverage, 6,283 out of the 6,365 working children 
(98.7%) have child injury reports by an adult respondent. Unfortunately, data that link 
the child directly to the adult respondent in terms of relationship are unavailable. 
However, a workaround solution exists. For 6,271 out of the 6,283 child injury reports 
(99.8%) by an adult respondent, information on the relationship of the adult 
respondent to the household head is available. Likewise, for all working children, 
information on their relationship to the household head is available. Thus, the 
relationship between the child and the adult respondent can be determined via the 
child’s relationship to the household head.  
Among the 6,271 working children with child injury reports by adult 
respondents, 5,520 children (or 88%) were recorded as the sons or daughters of the 
household head. For these 5,520 children, 1,562 (28.3%) and 3,650 (66.1%) children 
had child injury reports by the household head or the head’s spouse (virtually always 
female), respectively. I assume that the head’s spouse is the mother of the child. This 
is highly plausible as less than a handful of the surveyed households with working 
children had household heads with multiple spouses. Further, without accounting for 
child birth order, the 10th-90th percentile range for the age of the head’s spouses at the 
year of birth of the child was 20-36 years, which corresponds to the high fertility 
period for women generally. There will certainly be some errors of inclusion but I 
expect these cases to be low and have a negligible effect on the empirical analysis. 
Thus, at the end of this process, out of the original sample of 6,365 working children, 
5,212 children (81.9%) have child injury reports by one of their two parents.  
Two additional restrictions are imposed in order to arrive at the final sample 
used for inferring the impact of parent-child injury report mismatches on the 
probability of harmful child labor. First, working children who reported not having 
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experienced a work-related injury or illness but have a conflicting child injury report 
by one of their parents are excluded. This decision was made as this particular report 
mismatch type is arguably less salient than a conflicting parental response when the 
working child reports a work-related injury or illness; notwithstanding, the former 
mismatch type is found to be a highly rare event and one that can be plausibly 
explained by simple random reporting error (more details on this are provided in the 
next section). Second, children who reported holding more than one job in the 
reference period were excluded. This additional restriction was made due to a data 
issue: for working children that reported more than one job, data on employment 
characteristics were collected without specific reference to which particular job they 
pertain to.33 These two restrictions result in a reduction of the sample from 5,212 to 
4,600 working children (a 12% reduction in sample size).  
 
3.5 Findings 
3.5.1. Profile of work-related injuries and illnesses 
In this section, I present the main empirical findings from examining the impact of 
parent-child injury report mismatches on the probability of harmful child labor. 
However, before presenting these findings, I first provide some basic descriptive 
statistics on the incidence of work-related injuries and illnesses (hereafter, for the sake 
of brevity, referred to as injuries) among working children, the distribution of the 
types of injuries and their treatment, as well as the incidence of parent-child injury 
report mismatches. This information not only serves to contextualize the impact 
                                                 
33 This restriction can potentially introduce sample selection bias. Given this, I also redo the analysis on 
the sample which relaxes this restriction and find that the size and significance of the impact estimates 
are robust to sample choice along this dimension (these results are available from the author upon 
request).  
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findings reported later, but is also useful in its own right, given the limited available 
information in the literature on this particular aspect of child labor.  
Table 3.2 presents the share of working children ages 5-17 years that reported 
work-related injuries as well as the distribution of injuries and illnesses by type.  
 
Table 3.2. Incidence of work-related injuries and illnesses among children, 5-17 
year olds 
 
(1) 
All working children 
(in percent) 
(2) 
Working children with 
parental second-hand 
reports 
(in percent) 
Share reported work-related injuries 
or illnesses 
29.1 29.9 
Of which, share reported …   
   
 Injuries   
 Contusions and bruises 18.3 19.1 
 Cuts and puncture wounds 71.2 72.3 
 Crushing injuries 3.1 3.2 
 Dislocations, fractures, and sprains 4.5 4.7 
 Burns 6.3 6.2 
 Other injuries 2.1 1.8 
   
 Illnesses   
 Itching and skin rashes 24.9 25.8 
 Body aches and pains 48.0 46.7 
 Visual or hearing problems 1.3 1.1 
 Respiratory or gastrointestinal 
problems 
7.6 7.6 
 Other illnesses 6.8 6.9 
N 6,365 5,212 
Notes: Children were permitted to report more than one type of injury or illness. Consequently, the 
distribution of injuries and illnesses can exceed 100%. One category of injury was omitted: loss of 
body parts and amputation. Statistics are adjusted for sampling weights. 
 
Column 1 of the table reports statistics for the full sample of working children while 
Column 2 reports the corresponding statistics for those working children who have 
child injury reports from their respondent parents. First, looking at Column 1, roughly 
30% of children reported work-related injuries. Second, the most commonly-reported 
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injury or illness was open wounds (71%), followed, in turn, by body aches and pains 
(48%) and skin irritation and rashes (25%). The rest of the specified injuries and 
illnesses were relatively uncommon—each type garnered less than 10% of reporting 
children. Third, comparing the statistics in Column 1 to Column 2, the shares across 
the two samples appear to be similar, suggesting that negligible bias was introduced 
by restricting the sample to those working children with child injury reports from their 
parents as opposed to any household adult member.  
Table 3.3 restricts attention to those working children that reported work-
related injuries and/or illnesses and presents statistics on their treatment and the extent 
to which the injuries resulted in work cessation.  
 
Table 3.3. Treatment and severity of injuries and illnesses suffered by children 
 (1) (2) 
 Children reporting 
injuries or illnesses 
(in percent) 
Children reporting 
injuries with parental 
second-hand reports 
(in percent) 
Share received treatment 70.7 70.4 
   
Distribution of treatment by type of 
provider 
  
 Parent 48.8 51.0 
 Self 27.4 27.1 
 Employer  5.1  4.2 
 Other  3.5  2.6 
Share for whom injury/illness resulted 
in work stoppage 
16.4 16.2 
N 1,751 1,479 
Notes: Children were permitted to report more than one treatment provider; consequently, the 
distribution of treatment providers can exceed 100%. Shares are adjusted for sampling weights. 
 
Column 1 reports statistics for the full sample of working children that reported work-
related injuries while Column 2 reports the corresponding statistics for those working 
children who reported injuries and have child injury reports from their respondent 
parents. Focusing first on Column 1, the data suggest that the majority of working 
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children who reported injuries (71%) were treated for their injuries or illnesses. 
Further, the most-common provider of treatment was their parents (49%), followed by 
self-treatment (27%). This evidence seems to discount one of the alternative 
hypotheses I offered in Section 2 for the presence of parent-child injury report 
mismatches, namely asymmetric information on injuries/illnesses between the child 
and the parent.  
While one source of information which can be used to develop an indicator of 
the severity of an injury or illness is the breakdown of injuries and illnesses 
experienced by working children presented in Table 3.2, an alternative indicator is 
whether the injury or illness resulted in the cessation of work for a period of time. 
Using the latter indicator, Table 3.3 shows that roughly 16% of children stopped work. 
Comparing Column 1 to Column 2 in the table, the statistics again appear to be similar 
across the two samples, suggesting negligible sample selection bias along these lines.  
Table 3.4 presents statistics from a cross-tabulation of parents’ and children’s 
responses on work-related injuries experienced by the child. I highlight two findings 
here.  
 
Table 3.4. Work-related injury or illness experienced by the working child: parent 
vs. child’s response 
  
Parental-report of  
child work-related injury or illness 
 
Key: 
Observations 
Cell proportion 
No Yes Total 
Self-report 
(child) of 
work-related 
injury or 
illness 
No 
3,660 
70.2 
(68.6) 
73 
1.4 
(1.5) 
3,733 
71.6 
(70.1) 
Yes 
727 
14.0 
(13.9) 
752 
14.4 
(16.0) 
1,479 
28.4 
(29.9) 
Total 
4,387 
84.2 
(82.5) 
825 
15.8 
(17.5) 
5,212 
100.0 
(100.0) 
Notes: Shares corrected using sampling weights are provided in parentheses. 
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First, the data suggest that a match in the child injury report between the respondent 
parent and the child is largely the norm in the sample—specifically, for 85% of the 
sample, there is a parent-child match in responses. Decomposing this finding however 
reveals that the high incidence of parent-child injury report matches is largely the 
result of the better confirmatory performance of parents in one direction: that of a 
match in responses when the child reports no injury. If I was to restrict the sample to 
working children who reported an injury, I find that a striking 49% of respondent 
parents report that their children did not. Second, conditional on a parent-child 
mismatch in response (the cross-diagonal cells in the table), the response combination 
of the parent reporting that the child did not suffer a work-related injury when the 
child reports that she did is roughly ten-fold more likely than the response 
combination of the parent reporting that the child did suffer a work-related injury 
when the child reports that she did not; the difference in the incidences of these two 
combinations is highly statistically significant. Further, the absolute numbers of the 
latter response combination are so small relative to the full sample size that they can 
be plausibly explained by random reporting error and thus viewed as unmeaningful.  
Table 3.5 provides definitions for all variables used in the empirical analysis. 
Table 3.6 presents summary statistics for the alternative dichotomous measures of 
harmful child labor, the parent-child injury report mismatch measure, and the child, 
respondent parent, and household covariates included in the different regressions. The 
extent of harmful child labor in the sample varies from a low of 20% when measured 
using risky work to a high of 51% when measured using exposure to physical hazards. 
The share of children with parent-child injury report mismatches, the treatment 
measure, is 16%. In terms of other selected sample characteristics, the majority of 
children are male (62%), attend school (69%), and work in an own-household 
operated or owned enterprise (61%).  
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Table 3.5. Description of variables 
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Variable Description 
Outcome variables  
Physically strenuous work Indicator variable based on child’s self-report of 
frequency of arduous work. The variable equals 1 if the 
frequency is “always” or “sometimes”; 0 zero 
otherwise.  
Risky work Indicator variable based on child’s self-report of risky or 
dangerous work. The variable equals 1 if yes; 0 
otherwise. 
Exposed to physical hazards Indicator variable signifying child’s exposure to 
physical hazards. Variable equals 1 if exposed to at least 
one of the listed hazards; 0 otherwise. 
Exposed to chemical hazards Indicator variable signifying child’s exposure to 
chemical hazards. Variable equals 1 if exposed to at 
least one of the listed chemical hazards; 0 otherwise. 
  
Child covariates  
Male Male indicator 
Age/10 Age (in completed years)/ 10 
Age squared/100 Square of age (in completed years)/100 
Age first worked/10 Age at which the child first started working/10 
Age first worked squared /100 Square of age at which the child first started 
working/100  
Daily work hours: 5-8 hours Indicator variable constructed from question on normal 
working hours per day. Reference category: 1-4 hours. 
Daily work hours: 9+ hours Same as above. 
Weekly work days/10 Days worked per week/10  
Weekly work days squared /100 Square of days worked per week/100 
Night work Indicator variable constructed from question on whether 
the child worked usually in the evening or night. The 
variable equals 1 if yes; 0 otherwise. 
Presently in school Indicator variable signifying attending school presently. 
Ever left school Indicator variable signifying stopped or dropped out of 
school in the past. 
Secondary or tertiary schooling Indicator variable constructed from question on highest 
level of education completed. Variable equals 1 if 
highest level is “high school undergraduate”, “high 
school graduate”, or “college undergraduate”; 0 
otherwise. 
Location: Worked in own house Indicator variable constructed from question on place of 
work in the last twelve months. Reference category: Site 
other than farm or own home  
Location: Worked on farm Same as above. 
Worked in own household 
enterprise 
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Table 3.5 (Continued) 
Paid for work Indicator variable constructed from question on the 
nature of payment for work. Variable equals 1 if child 
received any form of payment; 0 otherwise. 
Received meals as worker benefit Indicator variable constructed from question on whether 
the child received meal allowance either in cash or kind. 
Worked for financial reasons Indicator variable constructed from question on main 
reason for working or having a job in the reference 
period. The variable equals 1 if responses are “to help 
pay own family debts”, “to pay own schooling”, “to 
supplement family income”, or “to earn money to 
establish own business”; 0 otherwise.  
Gave earnings to parents Indicator variable constructed from question on share of 
earnings given to parents. The variable equals 1 if 
responses are “Yes, wholly” or “Yes, partly”; 0 
otherwise.  
Parent supervised work Indicator variable constructed from question on whether 
the child’s work was supervised by an adult and who the 
adult was. Reference category: Employer supervised 
work. 
Other relative supervised work Same as above. 
Unsupervised Same as above. 
Interview interest Indicator variable constructed from question to 
interviewer on the level of interest of the respondent. 
The variable equals 1 if assessment is “very interested” 
or “interested”; 0 otherwise. 
Interview sincerity Indicator variable constructed from question to 
interviewer on the level of sincerity of the respondent. 
The variable equals 1 if the assessment is “sincere”; 0 
otherwise. 
  
Respondent parent covariates  
Male Male indicator. 
Age/10 Age (in completed years)/10 
Age squared/100 Square of age (in completed years)/100 
Secondary or tertiary education Indicator variable constructed from question on highest 
level of education completed. Variable equals 1 if 
highest level is “high school undergraduate”, “high 
school graduate”, or “college undergraduate”; 0 
otherwise. 
Head of household Head of household indicator 
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Table 3.5 (Continued) 
Household covariates  
Run household enterprise Indicator variable constructed form question on whether 
the household was engaged in a household 
business/enterprise in the last twelve months. 
Own farm land Indicator variable constructed from question on the 
types of land the household owns.  
Household size/10 Number of household members/10 
Household size squared/100 Square of the number of household members/100 
Children/10 Number of children (<17 years)/10 
Children squared/100 Square of the number of children (<=17 years)/100 
Household income: P2000-P2999 Average monthly gross income in the last twelve 
months. Reference category: Less than P2,000. 
Household income: P3000-4999 Same as above 
Household income: P5000-9999 Same as above 
Household income: P10000-14999 Same as above 
Household income:>P15000 Same as above 
Urban Urban indicator. 
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Table 3.6. Summary statistics for working child sample 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
     
Outcome variables     
Physically strenuous 
work 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Risky work 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Exposed to physical 
hazards 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Exposed to chemical 
hazards 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
     
Child covariates     
Male 0.62 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Age/10 1.38 0.25 0.50 1.70 
Age squared/100 1.98 0.65 0.25 2.89 
Age first worked/10 1.13 0.27 0.40 1.70 
Age first worked 
squared /100 1.35 0.63 0.16 2.89 
Daily work hours: 5-8 
hours 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Daily work hours: 9+ 
hours 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 
Weekly work days/10 0.35 0.22 0.10 0.70 
Weekly work days 
squared /100 0.17 0.18 0.01 0.49 
Night work 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Presently in work 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Ever left school 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Secondary or tertiary 
schooling 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Location: Worked in 
own house 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
Location: Worked on 
farm 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Worked in own 
household enterprise 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Paid for work 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Received meals as 
worker benefit 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 
Worked for financial 
reasons 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Gave earnings to parents 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 
 
 147 
 
Table 3.6. (Continued) 
     
Parent supervised work 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Other relative 
supervised work 0.05 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Unsupervised 0.25 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Interested during 
interview 0.78 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Sincere during interview 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Report mismatch 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 
     
Respondent parent 
covariates 
    
Male 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Age/10 4.24 0.75 2.40 7.80 
Age squared/100 18.49 6.74 5.76 60.84 
Secondary or tertiary 
education 
0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Head of household 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 
     
Household covariates     
Run household 
enterprise 0.86 0.35 0.00 1.00 
Own farm land 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Household size/10 0.67 0.22 0.20 2.30 
Household size 
squared/100 0.50 0.35 0.04 5.29 
Children/10 0.39 0.19 0.10 1.40 
Children squared/100 0.18 0.17 0.01 1.96 
Household income: 
P2000-P2999 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 
Household income: 
P3000-4999 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Household income: 
P5000-9999 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Household income: 
P10000-14999 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
Household 
income:>P15000 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00 
Urban 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Notes: Summary statistics for region dummies are omitted. All statistics are adjusted for sampling 
weights. 
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Respondent parents are mainly female (77%) and hence non-household heads; 41% 
have some secondary or tertiary education. Finally, the children come mainly from 
rural households (57%) and those that run household enterprises (86%). 
3.5.2. Effects of other regression covariates on the probability of harmful child 
labor  
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 present the full set of results from estimating the standard and 
household fixed-effects LPM regressions (see Eqns. (10) and (11)) for the alternative 
harmful child labor outcome measures, namely physically strenuous work, risky work, 
exposure to physical hazards, and exposure to chemical hazards. Before turning to the 
impact of parent-child injury report mismatches on the probability of harmful child 
labor, I discuss the estimated effects of the other covariates on the probability of 
harmful child labor given that little is known in the literature on what factors are 
associated with harmful child labor. Across the four outcome measures and the two 
regression estimators, the data suggest that only two of the covariates have generally 
consistent significant effects on the conditional probability of harmful child labor: the 
child’s gender and place of work. Specifically, boys are more likely to be engaged in 
harmful child labor than girls—for example, in absolute terms, the magnitude of the 
estimated marginal effects from the standard regression estimator ranges from a low of 
3.9 percentage points in the case of exposure to physical hazards to a high of 15.4 
percentage points in the case of physically strenuous work. Relative to the mean 
incidence of harmful child labor measured using the relevant outcome indicator, these 
effects translate into roughly 8% and 57%, respectively. In addition, children who 
work in their own homes are less likely than children who work outside their own 
homes in nonfarm employment—for example, in absolute terms, the estimated 
marginal effects from the standard regression estimator ranges from a low of 
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Table 3.7. Determinants of the probability of harmful child labor 
Linear probability model (LPM) regression estimates 
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Independent variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Physically 
strenuous work 
Risky work 
Exposure to 
physical hazards 
Exposure to 
chemical hazards 
     
Child variables     
Male 0.154*** 0.095*** 0.039** 0.063*** 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015) 
Age/10 -0.682** -0.654* 0.077 -0.111 
 (0.320) (0.336) (0.368) (0.325) 
Age squared/100 0.337*** 0.265** -0.009 0.059 
 (0.123) (0.129) (0.138) (0.125) 
Age first worked/10 0.612** -0.064 -0.947*** -0.166 
 (0.251) (0.281) (0.326) (0.259) 
Age first worked 
squared /100 -0.296*** 0.026 0.417*** 0.101 
 (0.108) (0.121) (0.138) (0.114) 
Daily work hours: 5-8 
hours 0.095*** 0.033 0.079*** 0.057*** 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.026) (0.022) 
Daily work hours: 9+ 
hours 0.099*** 0.074** 0.025 0.007 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.041) (0.032) 
Weekly work days/10 1.067*** 0.599** 0.323 0.279 
 (0.209) (0.237) (0.267) (0.225) 
Weekly work days 
squared /100 -1.221*** -0.764*** -0.619** -0.376 
 (0.248) (0.273) (0.312) (0.258) 
Night work 0.036* 0.038* 0.012 -0.002 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.027) (0.021) 
Presently attending 
school -0.022 -0.020 0.016 0.025 
 (0.028) (0.026) (0.029) (0.025) 
Ever left school 0.043* -0.006 0.020 -0.001 
 (0.023) (0.020) (0.024) (0.021) 
Secondary or tertiary 
schooling 0.000 -0.018 -0.003 -0.008 
 (0.021) (0.019) (0.022) (0.019) 
Location: Worked in 
own house -0.042* -0.149*** -0.292*** -0.133*** 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.032) (0.024) 
Location: Worked on 
farm 0.046* -0.057** 0.096*** -0.025 
 (0.024) (0.026) (0.032) (0.025) 
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Table 3.7 (Continued) 
     
Worked in own 
household enterprise 0.041 0.018 0.076* 0.096*** 
 (0.035) (0.036) (0.042) (0.032) 
Paid for work 0.030 0.055 0.024 0.080** 
 (0.037) (0.041) (0.044) (0.038) 
Received meals as 
worker benefit -0.025 -0.114*** -0.081** -0.020 
 (0.033) (0.032) (0.038) (0.035) 
Worked for financial 
reasons 0.034 0.014 0.017 0.010 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.025) (0.021) 
Gave earnings to parents 0.034 0.081*** 0.043 0.055* 
 (0.028) (0.026) (0.031) (0.029) 
Parent supervised work -0.042 0.048 -0.002 0.046 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.039) (0.031) 
Other relative 
supervised work -0.044 0.065 0.062 0.026 
 (0.044) (0.045) (0.052) (0.043) 
Unsupervised -0.018 0.051 0.004 0.034 
 (0.032) (0.033) (0.036) (0.029) 
Interested in interview 0.033 -0.029 -0.050* -0.011 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.027) (0.021) 
Sincere in interview -0.041** 0.005 0.012 -0.014 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.017) 
Injury report mismatch 0.065*** 0.118*** 0.112*** 0.049** 
 (0.023) (0.028) (0.029) (0.023) 
     
Respondent parent 
variables 
    
Male -0.040 -0.005 -0.038 -- 
 (0.041) (-0.13) (0.039) (0.046) 
Age/10 0.072 -0.007 -0.040 0.043 
 (0.083) (-0.070) (0.105) (0.078) 
Age squared/100 -0.008 0.001 0.003 -0.009 
 (0.009) (0.097) (0.011) (0.008) 
Secondary or tertiary 
education 
-0.038** -0.022 -0.013 0.010 
 (0.017) (-1.41) (0.021) (0.017) 
Head of household 0.031 0.008 0.026 0.026 
 (0.039) (0.21) (0.036) (0.040) 
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Table 3.7 (Continued) 
     
Household variables     
Run household 
enterprise 
-0.084*** 0.030 0.043 -0.010 
 (0.029) (1.13) (0.032) (0.029) 
Own farm land 0.021 -0.011 -0.054** 0.029 
 (0.018) (-0.55) (0.026) (0.018) 
Household size/10 -0.320 -0.425 -0.001 -0.199 
 (0.199) (-2.18) (0.246) (0.193) 
Household size 
squared/100 
0.198 0.255 0.068 0.275** 
 (0.124) (2.03) (0.155) (0.114) 
Children/10 0.380* 0.369 -0.016 -0.201 
 (0.212) (1.85) (0.243) (0.207) 
Children squared/100 -0.362 -0.369 -0.038 -0.127 
 (0.226) (-1.82) (0.258) (0.199) 
Household income: 
P2000-P2999 
-0.041 -0.027 0.007 0.010 
 (0.033) (-0.75) (0.041) (0.031) 
Household income: 
P3000-4999 
-0.053 -0.042 -0.059 -0.001 
 (0.035) (-1.10) (0.045) (0.034) 
Household income: 
P5000-9999 
-0.041 -0.026 -0.045 -0.007 
 (0.038) (-0.64) (0.049) (0.035) 
Household income: 
P10000-14999 
-0.048 -0.032 -0.034 0.003 
 (0.041) (-0.72) (0.054) (0.041) 
Household 
income:>P15000 
-0.047 -0.068 0.062 -0.045 
 (0.045) (-1.42) (0.059) (0.046) 
Urban -0.027 -0.013 0.033 0.091*** 
 (0.020) (-0.61) (0.025) (0.021) 
Intercept -0.167 0.539 0.969*** 0.145 
 (0.262) (1.83) (0.346) (0.257) 
Observations 4600 4600 4600 4600 
R-squared 0.20 0.13 0.18 0.09 
Notes: Standard errors reported in parentheses. * denotes statistical significance at the 10%; ** at the 
5% level; and *** at the 1% level. All estimates are adjusted for complex survey design features. 
Estimates for region dummies are not reported in table. 
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Table 3.8. Determinants of the probability of harmful child labor 
Linear probability model (LPM) regression estimates, Household fixed effects 
Independent variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Physically 
strenuous work 
Risky work 
Exposure to 
physical hazards 
Exposure to 
chemical hazards 
     
Child variables     
Male 0.088*** 0.067*** -0.012 -0.012 
 (0.020) (0.018) (0.022) (0.014) 
Age/10 -0.437 -0.100 -0.219 0.010 
 (0.382) (0.398) (0.362) (0.326) 
Age squared/100 0.253* 0.078 0.150 0.017 
 (0.149) (0.153) (0.139) (0.125) 
Age first worked/10 -0.331 -1.013** 0.369 -0.130 
 (0.374) (0.431) (0.404) (0.381) 
Age first worked 
squared /100 0.150 0.405** -0.210 0.068 
 (0.166) (0.188) (0.186) (0.166) 
Daily work hours: 5-8 
hours 0.097*** 0.013 0.146*** -0.001 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.033) (0.025) 
Daily work hours: 9+ 
hours 0.044 0.004 0.009 0.050 
 (0.051) (0.069) (0.052) (0.058) 
Weekly work days/10 0.946*** -0.077 -0.100 0.308 
 (0.318) (0.310) (0.315) (0.294) 
Weekly work days 
squared /100 -1.071*** 0.063 0.049 -0.355 
 (0.387) (0.378) (0.370) (0.369) 
Night work -0.025 -0.072* -0.021 -0.039 
 (0.037) (0.041) (0.037) (0.033) 
Presently attending 
school -0.010 -0.051 -0.037 -0.050 
 (0.043) (0.033) (0.035) (0.032) 
Ever left school 0.055* 0.004 0.012 -0.000 
 (0.033) (0.034) (0.030) (0.028) 
Secondary or tertiary 
schooling 0.001 0.019 -0.055*** -0.020 
 (0.031) (0.027) (0.021) (0.022) 
Location: Worked in 
own house -0.133** -0.183** -0.483*** -0.073 
 (0.061) (0.073) (0.086) (0.063) 
Location: Worked on 
farm 0.039 -0.093 0.022 0.151*** 
 (0.064) (0.079) (0.084) (0.057) 
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Table 3.8 (Continued) 
     
Worked in own 
household enterprise 0.066 0.089 0.125 0.071 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.081) (0.048) 
Paid for work 0.106 0.156** 0.041 0.035 
 (0.081) (0.075) (0.104) (0.075) 
Received meals as 
worker benefit -0.048 -0.226*** -0.133 -0.118* 
 (0.071) (0.086) (0.084) (0.066) 
Worked for financial 
reasons 0.011 -0.039 -0.023 0.012 
 (0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) 
Gave earnings to parents 0.010 0.077* 0.019 0.009 
 (0.045) (0.042) (0.056) (0.046) 
Parent supervised work -0.102 -0.072 -0.008 -0.147*** 
 (0.063) (0.067) (0.061) (0.056) 
Other relative 
supervised work -0.068 -0.006 0.037 -0.128** 
 (0.066) (0.078) (0.070) (0.059) 
Unsupervised -0.069 -0.039 -0.096 -0.172*** 
 (0.060) (0.076) (0.070) (0.051) 
Interested in interview -0.019 -0.021 -0.079** 0.022 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.031) (0.024) 
Sincere in interview 0.007 0.008 0.015 -0.023 
 (0.027) (0.022) (0.020) (0.018) 
Injury report mismatch 0.117*** 0.070* 0.081** 0.045 
 (0.037) (0.041) (0.038) (0.029) 
     
Intercept 0.290 0.835*** 0.481* 0.236 
 (0.239) (0.259) (0.260) (0.211) 
Observations 4600 4600 4600 4600 
R-squared 0.86 0.90 0.93 0.92 
Notes: Standard errors reported in parentheses. * denotes statistical significance at the 10%; ** at the 
5% level; and *** at the 1% level. All estimates are adjusted for complex survey design features. 
Estimates for region dummies are not reported in table. 
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-4.2 percentage points (-16%) for physically strenuous work to a high of -29.2 
percentage points (-57%) for exposure to physical hazards. There is also somewhat 
less robust evidence across the outcome measures and regression estimators that 
working more hours per day and working more days per week are associated with a 
higher likelihood of harmful child labor.  
The regression-based results presented in Tables 3.7 and 3.8 also suggest that 
respondent parent and household covariates are generally not significantly associated 
with the probability of harmful child labor (that is, conditional on child labor). 
Interestingly, the evidence here directly contrasts with those from studies of the 
determinants of child labor which generally find that parental characteristics such as 
the level of formal education and household characteristics such as location (urban 
versus rural), household income and whether the household engages in a household 
enterprise significantly affect the probability of child labor (see, e.g., Dar et al. 2002 
and Sedlacek et al. 2005 who report evidence from a range of countries in Latin 
America, Africa, and Asia, including the Philippines).  
As an aside, the finding on the conditional association between household 
income and the probability of harmful child labor deserves some attention. An 
important result derived from modeling the harmful child labor decision in Chapter 1 
is that the probability of harmful child labor is decreasing in parental income. 
Proxying parental income using reported household income, and estimating the 
unconditional relationship between the probability of harmful child labor and 
household income, I find that the probability of harmful child labor, as separately 
measured by physical strenuous work, hazardous work, and exposure to physical 
hazards, is significantly and negatively associated with household income; the only 
exception is exposure to chemical hazards.34 Thus, the unconditional evidence 
                                                 
34 The estimation results of this unconditional analysis are available from the author upon request. 
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supports my result from Chapter 1.35 However, the effect of household income loses 
its significance once a range of child, parent, and other household characteristics are 
included in the regression, suggesting that much of its effect is indirect. 
 
3.5.3. Regression-based impacts of parent-child injury report mismatches  
I now turn to the regression-based estimates of the impact of parent-child injury report 
mismatches on the conditional probability of harmful child labor reported in Table 3.7. 
First, using the standard regression estimator (Eqn. 10), I find that parent-child injury 
report mismatches have a positive and highly significant impact on the probability of 
harmful child labor. This finding holds both across the self-reported measures of 
harmful child labor as well as the harmful child labor measures I constructed based on 
child reports of the presence of specific workplace hazards. In absolute terms, the 
magnitude of the estimated impacts range from a low of 4.9 percentage points in the 
case of exposure to chemical hazards to a high of 11.8 percentage points in the case of 
risky work. In relative terms (i.e., relative to the incidence of harmful child labor in the 
sample using these measures), the magnitude of these estimated impacts translate to 
21% and 59%, respectively.  
As noted earlier, the household fixed-effects regressions of the probability of 
harmful child labor (Eqn. 11) identify the effects of the covariates by exploiting the 
variation across working children within the household. Using this estimator, across 
the harmful child labor measures examined, I find that over 90% of the variation in 
harmful child labor is explained by this regression model, suggesting that inter-
household differences (captured through the household fixed effects) explain much of 
                                                 
35 I find this despite the fact that the strength of the relationship between household income and the 
probability of harmful child labor will be dampened in the presence of positive compensating wages for 
children working in harmful settings (which I find some evidence of in Chapter 2) given that these 
wages will also be included in household income.  
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the variation in harmful child labor outcomes between working children. In other 
words, differences in the household characteristics (both observed and unobserved) 
across working children matter a great deal in explaining whether the child works in a 
harmful setting or not. Notwithstanding, similar to the standard regression estimator 
results, with the exception of exposure to chemical hazards, the impact parameter 
estimates from the fixed-effects regression estimator are positive and statistically 
significant. In absolute terms, the magnitude of the estimates range from a low of 7 
percentage points in the case of risky work to a high of 11.7 percentage points in the 
case of physically strenuous work. In relative terms, the magnitude of the estimates 
range from 16% in the case of exposure to physical hazards to a high of 43% in the 
case of physically strenuous work. 
 
Implementation of the matching estimator  
For the discussion of the matching-based results, to avoid any confusion, I revert back 
to referring to parent-child injury report mismatches as the treatment, and children 
with and without parent-child injury report mismatches as the treated and untreated 
groups, respectively. While Section 3.3 discussed the specific matching estimator 
applied in the study, before presenting its results, I provide some details on the 
practical implementation of the matching estimator here.  
A three-step process is followed in order to arrive at the matching-based 
impact estimates. First, the model to estimate the probability of treatment (the 
propensity score model) is specified and estimated. Second, the common support 
restriction and various tests to assess the quality of the matching procedure (via 
whether the propensity score model covariates balance across the treated and untreated 
samples) are implemented. Third, for the matched sample, the impact of the treatment 
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variable on harmful child labor is estimated via local linear matching. The first two 
steps are discussed in this subsection. 
Specification of the propensity score model: In order to match treated children to 
untreated children, I estimate the conditional probability (or propensity score) of 
parent-child injury report mismatches by fitting a binomial logit to the data. These 
results of this estimation are presented in Table 3.9. In specifying the propensity score 
model, I include a rich set of covariates that potentially predict both the probability of 
treatment as well as the probability of harmful child labor—these covariates comprise 
of the full set of child, respondent parent, and household covariates included in the 
outcome regressions. As discussed by Heckman et al. (1997) and Heckman et al. 
(1998), including a rich set of covariates greatly increases the likelihood that matching 
generates valid impact estimates. Note the results of the propensity score estimation 
are not discussed here as the objective of this step is not statistical inference but rather 
generating the predicted propensity scores.  
Figure 3.1 depicts the densities of the propensity scores for the treated and 
untreated samples generated from the estimated propensity score model. It is easy to 
see that the supports of both samples largely overlap, with most observations lying 
between a propensity score of 0.1 and 0.3. This finding implies that applying the 
common support restriction will only have a minimal effect in terms of the number of 
discarded observations. Thus, the resulting sample for the matching exercise is 
expected to largely mirror the original underlying sample of working children. 
Implementation of the common support restriction: Given that the impact parameter is 
only defined over the region of common support, applying the min-max method 
discussed in Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), I discard treated observations whose 
propensity scores are smaller than the smallest and larger than the largest propensity 
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Table 3.9. Propensity score model: Determinants of parent-child injury report 
mismatch 
Pseudo-MLE logit regression estimates 
Covariates Estimated coefficients 
  
Child variables  
Male 0.153 
 (0.116) 
Age/10 -0.372 
 (2.341) 
Age squared/100 0.259 
 (0.897) 
Age first worked/10 -3.313* 
 (1.904) 
Age first worked squared /100 1.323 
 (0.810) 
Daily work hours: 5-8 hours -0.025 
 (0.138) 
Daily work hours: 9+ hours -0.249 
 (0.248) 
Weekly work days/10 2.353 
 (1.625) 
Weekly work days squared /100 -2.398 
 (1.925) 
Night work 0.114 
 (0.148) 
Presently in work -0.270 
 (0.165) 
Ever left school -0.062 
 (0.143) 
Secondary or tertiary schooling -0.004 
 (0.137) 
Location: Worked in own house -0.327 
 (0.226) 
Location: Worked on farm 0.391** 
 (0.172) 
Worked in own household enterprise -0.142 
 (0.243) 
Paid for work -0.105 
 (0.263) 
Received meals as worker benefit 0.083 
 (0.222) 
Worked for financial reasons 0.259* 
 (0.147) 
Gave earnings to parents 0.125 
 (0.178) 
Parent supervised work 0.190 
 (0.252) 
Other relative supervised work 0.268 
 (0.297) 
Unsupervised 0.300 
 (0.229) 
Interested in interview 0.272 
 (0.176) 
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Table 3.9 (Continued)  
  
Sincere in interview -0.162 
 (0.133) 
  
Respondent parent variables  
Male -0.428 
 (0.295) 
Age/10 -0.413 
 (0.629) 
Age squared/100 0.046 
 (0.066) 
Secondary or tertiary education 0.228* 
 (0.129) 
Head of household 0.183 
 (0.253) 
  
Household variables  
Run household enterprise -0.005 
 (0.191) 
Own farm land 0.211 
 (0.129) 
Household size/10 1.959 
 (1.395) 
Household size squared/100 -0.820 
 (0.812) 
Children/10 -2.914** 
 (1.475) 
Children squared/100 2.754** 
 (1.371) 
Household income: P2000-P2999 -0.523** 
 (0.214) 
Household income: P3000-4999 -0.460** 
 (0.206) 
Household income: P5000-9999 -0.561** 
 (0.226) 
Household income: P10000-14999 -0.578** 
 (0.288) 
Household income:>P15000 -0.250 
 (0.346) 
Urban -0.174 
 (0.142) 
Intercept -0.163 
 (2.168) 
LR χ-squared 238.89 
p-value 0.000 
McFadden’s Pseudo R-squared 0.0670 
N 4600 
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * denotes statistical significance at the 10%; 
** at the 5% level; and *** at the 1% level. All estimates are adjusted for complex survey design 
features. Estimates for region dummies are not reported in table. 
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score for the untreated sample. In principle, this is particularly important in the case of 
kernel-based matching estimators such as the local linear matching estimator, since all 
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Figure 3.1. Distribution of predicted propensity scores by report mismatch 
status 
 
available observations are used to estimate the missing counterfactual. However, in 
practice here, applying this procedure results in only three treated observations (less 
than 1% of the treated sample) being discarded. This negligible reduction in the 
sample suggests that any emerging differences in the impact estimates between the 
outcome regressions (Eqns. 10 and 11) and matching are not driven by the common 
support restriction. Rather, they will be driven by the weighting process in matching, 
in which the counterfactual for a given treated observations is formed by weighting 
more similar untreated observations higher (recall that in regression, the counterfactual 
is formed by weighting all untreated observations equally).  
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Implementation of alternative balancing tests: In order to assess the quality of the 
matching procedure, I implement three alternative common tests to see if the 
covariates across the treated and matched untreated samples have comparable 
distributions, or are “balanced” (see Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008 for a review of 
alternative tests in the literature). This is important since I match on the propensity 
score (a coarse summary measure of the predictive information contained within the 
covariates) and not on the values of the individual covariates themselves. 
As a first test, I examine the means of included covariates for the matched 
treated and untreated samples (see Table 3.A3). I find that the difference in means for 
the two samples is not statistically different for any of the included covariates. As a 
second test, I examine the pseudo R-squared of the propensity score model before and 
after matching, using observations in the common support region only as well as 
weights generated from the matching algorithm (see Table 3.A4).36 The measure 
provides information on how well the covariates predict the probability of treatment. I 
find that the pseudo R-squared is smaller after matching. I also find that the joint 
significance of the covariates of the model after matching is rejected; in contrast, the 
joint significance of the covariates before matching was not rejected. As a third and 
final test, I examine the standardized difference before and after matching (also see 
Table 3.A4). The standardized difference for a variable is the difference in means 
between the treated and matched untreated samples, as a percentage of the square root 
of the mean variance across the samples. As expected, I find that the standardized 
difference is smaller after matching and below a value of three, which is well within 
the acceptable limits per guidance available in the literature. Thus, to summarize, all 
                                                 
36 The pseudo R-squared indicates how well the covariates predict the probability of treatment. If the 
covariates are balanced after matching, the pseudo R-squared should be low since there should be no 
systematic differences in the distribution of covariates between the matched treated and untreated 
groups. 
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three tests strongly suggest that the covariates are comparable or balance across the 
treated and untreated samples.  
 
3.5.4 Matching-based impact estimates of parent-child injury report 
mismatches 
Table 3.10 presents the local linear matching-based estimates of the impact of parent-
child injury report mismatches on the probability of harmful child labor measured 
variously (see Eqn. 16 for the estimator). The estimator is parameterized by using the 
Epanechnikov kernel as the weighting function and a kernel bandwidth size of 0.01 
(which was found to be optimal by minimizing the MSE).37 Consistent with the 
regression-based findings presented earlier, the matching-based estimates suggest that 
parent-child injury report mismatches have a positive and statistically-significant 
impact on the probability of harmful child labor, regardless of the outcome measure 
examined. The magnitudes of the impacts are also generally comparable to those from 
the regressions. In absolute terms, the estimated impacts vary from a low of 5.9 
percentage points in the case of exposure to chemical hazards to a high of 12.3 
percentage points in the case of risky work. In relative terms, the estimated impacts 
vary from a low of 24% in the case of exposure to physical hazards to a high of 62% 
in the case of risky work. The magnitudes of the impacts are also generally 
comparable to those from the regressions. In absolute terms, the estimated impacts 
vary from a low of 5.9 percentage points in the case of exposure to chemical hazards 
to a high of 12.3 percentage points in the case of risky work. In relative terms, the 
estimated impacts vary from a low of 24% in the case of exposure to physical hazards 
to a high of 62% in the case of risky work.  
                                                 
37 I examine the MSE for a range of bandwidth sizes between 0.01 and 0.21, in 0.05 increments. The 
bandwidth size used for the final analysis, 0.01, has the lowest MSE for the outcome measures in 
general. 
 164 
Table 3.10: Impact of mismatch in injury reports on harmful child labor 
outcomes 
Local linear regression propensity score matching estimates 
     
 Physically 
strenuous work 
Risky work Exposure to 
physical hazards 
Exposure to 
chemical 
hazards 
ATT  0.094***  0.123***  0.124***  0.059*** 
S.E. (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020) 
Notes: * Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level; and *** at the 1% level. 
Analytical standard errors in parentheses.  
 
Sensitivity of impact estimates to unobserved heterogeneity: The assumption that 
treatment status can be predicted based on observables is central to the validity of the 
matching estimates. While this assumption is untestable, following common practice 
in the applied matching literature, I apply a bounding test proposed by Rosenbaum 
(2002) which basically evaluates how strongly an arbitrary unobserved factor must 
influence selection into treatment to alter inference on any significant impacts. 
Following Aakvik (2001), the bounding test I apply uses the Mantel and Haenszel 
(MH) test statistic MHQ (see the appendix for a detailed discussion of the method). 
This test statistic can be bounded by two known distributions: 
MHQ
+ for overestimation 
of the impact (which would be the case if children who are more likely have a parent-
child injury report mismatch are also more likely to engage in harmful child labor) and 
MHQ
−  for underestimation of the impact (which would be the case if children who are 
more likely to have a parent-child injury report mismatch are less likely to engage in 
harmful child labor). The parameter eγ  is a measure of the extent to which the 
analysis suffers from bias due to unobserved heterogeneity, which indicates the odds 
of differential assignment to treatment (i.e., the odds of having an injury report 
mismatch) due to unobserved factors. By examining the significance level of the 
MHQ statistic as e
γ  varies, the sensitivity of the matching estimates to unobserved 
heterogeneity can be evaluated.  
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Table 3.11 presents the results of such a sensitivity test, where I vary eγ  
between 1 and 10 in one unit increments.38 While 1eγ =  represents no bias due to 
unobserved heterogeneity, higher levels of eγ  denote increasing bias due to 
unobservables. For example, if the results lose significance at 2,eγ =  it implies that 
two units that are similar based on observables need differ only by a factor of two (or 
100%) due to unobservables in order for inference to be altered. The selected range 
[0,10]eγ ∈  therefore represents a fairly large range of potential bias due to unobserved 
heterogeneity.  
 
Table 3.11: Sensitivity of treatment effect estimates to unobserved heterogeneity 
 
γe  MHQ
+
 MHp
+
 MHQ
−
 MHp
−
 
1.0 67.692 0.000 67.692 0.000 
2.0 52.535 0.000 89.819 0.000 
3.0 45.894 0.000 107.234 0.000 
4.0 41.914 0.000 122.126 0.000 
5.0 39.167 0.000 135.363 0.000 
6.0 37.111 0.000 147.403 0.000 
7.0 35.489 0.000 158.524 0.000 
8.0 34.162 0.000 168.911 0.000 
9.0 33.046 0.000 178.692 0.000 
10.0 32.089 0.000 187.963 0.000 
Notes: eγ : odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors. 
MHQ
+ : Mantel-Haenszel 
statistic (assumption: overestimation of treatment effect). 
MHQ
− : Mantel-Haenszel statistic 
(assumption: underestimation of treatment effect). 
MHp
+ : p-value (assumption: overestimation of 
treatment effect). 
MHp
− : p-value (assumption: underestimation of treatment effect). 
 
Within the range examined, I find that my results are not sensitive to unobserved 
heterogeneity. To reiterate, while the test results do not provide conclusive evidence 
that the probability of treatment is based entirely on observables, it offers a level of 
confidence that inference is robust to unobservable heterogeneity within the range 
examined.  
                                                 
38 Following Becker and Caliendo (2007), I use the mhbounds procedure in Stata to implement this 
sensitivity test. 
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3.5.5. Heterogeneous impacts of parent-child injury report mismatches  
Regression-based impact estimates: Given the interest in the intrahousehold modeling 
and empirical literature on how gender differences affect outcomes, Tables 3.12 and 
3.13 present regression-based impact estimates for the standard and fixed-effects 
regression estimators (Eqns. 10 and 11), respectively, where the parent-child injury 
report mismatch variable is separately interacted with the child’s gender and the 
respondent parent’s gender. Across estimators and outcome measures, I find generally 
consistent evidence that the child’s gender and parent-child injury report mismatches 
individually have significant positive impacts on the conditional probability of 
harmful child labor. However, I find little consistent evidence that the impact of  
 
Table 3.12. Regression estimates of heterogeneous impacts of parent-child injury 
report mismatches 
Linear probability model (LPM) regression results 
Covariate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Physically 
strenuous 
work 
Risky work 
Exposure to 
physical 
hazards 
Exposure to 
chemical 
hazards 
     
Interaction with child’s gender     
Male 0.154*** 0.096*** 0.051*** 0.065*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.016) 
Injury report mismatch 0.065** 0.119*** 0.182*** 0.063* 
 (0.030) (0.045) (0.051) (0.038) 
Male × Injury report mismatch 0 -0.002 -0.104** -0.02 
 (0.040) (0.047) (0.052) (0.044) 
     
Interaction with the respondent 
parent’s gender 
    
Male -0.041 -0.008 -0.042 0.004 
 (0.043) (0.039) (0.040) (0.047) 
Injury report mismatch 0.064** 0.114*** 0.109*** 0.056** 
 (0.027) (0.031) (0.031) (0.026) 
Male × Injury report mismatch 0.005 0.017 0.015 -0.034 
 (-0.041) (-0.008) (-0.042) 0.004 
Notes: Standard errors reported in parentheses. * denotes statistical significance at the 10%; ** at the 
5% level; *** at the 1% level. All estimates are adjusted for complex survey design features. All 
regression includes the full set of child, respondent parent, and household covariates. 
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parent-child injury report mismatches on the probability of harmful child labor differs 
systematically by the child’s gender. Likewise, I do not find evidence that the impact 
of parent-child injury report mismatches on the probability of harmful child labor 
differs systematically by the respondent parent’s gender.  
 
Table 3.13. Regression estimates of heterogeneous impacts of parent-child injury 
report mismatches 
Linear probability model (LPM) regression results, Household fixed effects 
Covariate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Physically 
strenuous 
work 
Risky work 
Exposure to 
physical 
hazards 
Exposure to 
chemical 
hazards 
     
Interaction with child’s gender     
Male 0.086*** 0.064*** -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.021) (0.018) (0.019) (0.016) 
Injury report mismatch 0.110** -0.004 0.096** 0.036 
 (0.050) (0.043) (0.048) (0.041) 
Male × Injury report mismatch 0.013 0.117** -0.025 -0.012 
 (0.057) (0.056) (0.053) (0.043) 
Notes: Standard errors reported in parentheses. * denotes statistical significance at the 10%; ** at the 
5% level; *** at the 1% level. All estimates are adjusted for complex survey design features. All 
regression includes the full set of child, respondent parent, and household covariates. 
 
Matching-based impact results: In order to estimate the differential impacts of parent-
child injury report mismatches by the child’s and respondent parent’s gender, I 
implement the matching analysis on the relevant subsamples, namely boys only, girls 
only, male parent respondents only, and female parent respondents only.  
I follow the same implementation steps discussed earlier with respect to the 
full sample. I estimate the conditional probability of treatment as a function of the full 
set of relevant child, respondent parent, and household covariates by fitting a binomial 
logit regression to the data (see Table 3.14 for the results from the estimated 
propensity score models for the subsamples). The density plots of the propensity 
scores for the treated and untreated groups for each subsample show that the supports 
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largely overlap (see Figures 3.2-3.5). Thus, the application of the common support 
restriction using the min-max method results in a negligible percentage of 
observations being discarded. Specifically, in each subsample, less than ten treated 
observations (less than 1% of the relevant treated subsample) were discarded. Finally, 
the results from testing differences in covariate means as well as differences in the 
pseudo R-squared and the standardized difference before and after matching strongly 
suggest that the covariates are balanced for the matched treated and untreated 
subsamples (see Tables 3.A5-3.A9). 
Table 3.15 presents the impacts of parent-child injury report mismatches on the 
probability of harmful child labor measured variously in each of the subsamples. As 
before, the impacts in each subsample are estimated using a local linear matching 
estimator parameterized using the Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth size of 0.01. 
To allow statistical inference between subsamples, the 95% confidence interval are 
reported. Comparing the impact estimates for boys versus girls, I find that, with the 
exception of exposure to physical hazards where the estimated impact was higher for 
girls than for boys (23 versus 9 percentage points), the impact estimates do not appear 
to systematically differ between boys and girls. Comparing the impact estimates for 
children with injury reports provided by fathers versus mothers, I find that the impact 
estimates do not systematically differ between these children. Applying the 
Rosenbaum bounding test and varying eγ  between 1 and 10, I find that, across the 
subsamples, inference is not sensitive to unobservable heterogeneity within the range 
examined (see Table 3.16). Thus, in general, the matching-based findings on 
differential impacts by gender are consistent with the regression-based findings: the 
estimated impacts of parent-child injury report mismatches on the probability of  
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Table 3.14. Propensity score model for estimation of heterogeneous effects: 
Determinants of parent-child injury report mismatches 
Pseudo-MLE binomial logit regression estimates 
Variable 
Coefficients 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Boys only Girls only Fathers only  Mothers only  
     
Child variables     
Male -- -- 0.182 0.173 
   (0.271) (0.135) 
Age/10 0.944 -2.002 -1.486 0.136 
 (3.143) (4.526) (6.703) (2.618) 
Age squared/100 -0.184 0.871 1.121 0.009 
 (1.176) (1.762) (2.512) (1.001) 
Age first worked/10 -5.257*** 0.076 -5.897 -3.310* 
 (2.010) (3.310) (3.851) (1.951) 
Age first worked squared /100 2.243** -0.485 2.726* 1.216 
 (0.874) (1.425) (1.645) (0.845) 
Daily work hours: 5-8 hours 0.109 -0.174 0.406 -0.123 
 (0.172) (0.239) (0.343) (0.149) 
Daily work hours: 9+ hours -0.256 0.308 -0.213 -0.283 
 (0.301) (0.412) (0.556) (0.276) 
Weekly work days/10 1.823 2.789 6.445* 1.268 
 (1.914) (2.778) (3.612) (1.928) 
Weekly work days squared /100 -1.753 -3.328 -7.147* -1.158 
 (2.247) (3.315) (4.316) (2.281) 
Night work 0.005 0.309 0.131 0.128 
 (0.193) (0.253) (0.323) (0.172) 
Presently in work -0.297 -0.188 0.328 -0.411** 
 (0.201) (0.331) (0.374) (0.192) 
Ever left school -0.169 0.092 0.067 -0.079 
 (0.170) (0.265) (0.322) (0.157) 
Secondary or tertiary schooling -0.035 0.041 -0.051 0.023 
 (0.166) (0.273) (0.305) (0.158) 
Location: Worked in own house -0.589* -0.319 0.048 -0.404* 
 (0.332) (0.324) (0.479) (0.244) 
Location: Worked on farm 0.563*** -0.016 -0.009 0.499*** 
 (0.203) (0.308) (0.348) (0.192) 
Worked in own household 
enterprise -0.155 0.183 -0.031 -0.082 
 (0.282) (0.363) (0.391) (0.297) 
Paid for work -0.036 -0.451 -0.218 0.005 
 (0.301) (0.452) (0.556) (0.308) 
Received meals as worker benefit 0.066 0.252 0.248 0.058 
 (0.261) (0.375) (0.546) (0.265) 
Worked for financial reasons 0.252 0.356 0.447 0.201 
 (0.177) (0.222) (0.303) (0.171) 
Gave earnings to parents 0.224 -0.163 -0.376 0.267 
 (0.211) (0.379) (0.458) (0.198) 
Parent supervised work 0.283 -0.164 0.371 0.220 
 (0.268) (0.461) (0.516) (0.285) 
Other relative supervised work 0.331 -0.111 0.418 0.252 
 (0.332) (0.527) (0.597) (0.332) 
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Table 3.14 (Continued) 
Unsupervised 0.317 0.004 0.241 0.313 
 (0.264) (0.424) (0.480) (0.249) 
Interested in interview 0.402** -0.014 0.302 0.251 
 (0.197) (0.280) (0.356) (0.185) 
Sincere in interview -0.169 -0.032 0.101 -0.219 
 (0.157) (0.207) (0.295) (0.138) 
Respondent parent variables     
Male -0.682** 0.078 -- -- 
 (0.313) (0.503)   
Age/10 -1.419* 1.440 -0.016 -0.794 
 (0.785) (1.178) (1.103) (0.881) 
Age squared/100 0.161* -0.162 0.004 0.089 
 (0.084) (0.123) (0.108) (0.099) 
Secondary or tertiary education 0.159 0.407* -0.295 0.289* 
 (0.156) (0.217) (0.319) (0.148) 
Head of household 0.371 -0.162 -- 0.271 
 (0.279) (0.424)  (0.252) 
Household variables     
Run household enterprise 0.212 -0.784** -0.107 0.034 
 (0.208) (0.381) (0.425) (0.230) 
Own farm land 0.204 0.171 -0.199 0.259* 
 (0.159) (0.195) (0.261) (0.150) 
Household size/10 0.774 2.194 -2.600 2.938* 
 (1.827) (2.487) (3.164) (1.670) 
Household size squared/100 -0.529 -0.079 1.326 -1.267 
 (1.069) (1.512) (1.824) (1.018) 
Children/10 -1.714 -4.737* 5.526 -4.687*** 
 (1.911) (2.501) (3.830) (1.649) 
Children squared/100 2.406 3.077 -4.254 4.114*** 
 (1.835) (2.349) (3.665) (1.533) 
Household income: P2000-P2999 -0.197 -1.261*** -0.632 -0.449* 
 (0.263) (0.373) (0.422) (0.243) 
Household income: P3000-4999 -0.163 -0.929*** -1.155*** -0.251 
 (0.260) (0.301) (0.392) (0.240) 
Household income: P5000-9999 -0.290 -1.186*** -1.227*** -0.362 
 (0.276) (0.341) (0.384) (0.263) 
Household income: P10000-14999 -0.205 -1.415*** -1.569*** -0.329 
 (0.354) (0.456) (0.525) (0.335) 
Household income:>P15000 0.271 -1.264*** -0.162 -0.175 
 (0.434) (0.460) (0.617) (0.407) 
Urban -0.209 -0.140 0.177 -0.235 
 (0.168) (0.227) (0.312) (0.163) 
Intercept 1.505 -2.737 -0.515 0.269 
 (2.684) (3.749) (5.541) (2.376) 
LR χ2 182.35 141.09 113.85 204.80 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.0775 0.118 0.146 0.0737 
N 2898 1702 1093 3506 
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * denotes statistical significance at the 10%; 
** at the 5% level; *** at the 1% level. All estimates are adjusted for complex survey design 
features. Estimates for region dummies are not reported in table. 
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Figure 3.2. Distribution of predicted propensity scores by report mismatch status 
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Figure 3.3. Distribution of predicted propensity scores by report mismatch status 
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Figure 3.4. Distribution of predicted propensity scores by report mismatch status  
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Figure 3.5. Distribution of predicted propensity scores by report mismatch status  
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Table 3.15: Heterogeneous impacts of injury report mismatches on harmful child 
labor  
Local linear regression propensity score matching estimates 
Sample 
Physically 
strenuous work 
Risky work 
Exposure to 
physical hazards 
Exposure to 
chemical hazards 
Boys only     
ATT  0.100***  0.114***  0.087***  0.036 
S.E. (0.028) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) 
95% C.I. [0.045,0.155] [0.063,0.165] [0.034,0.140] [-0.017,0.089] 
     
Girls only     
ATT  0.075**  0.136***  0.229***  0.097*** 
S.E. (0.033) (0.034) (0.042) (0.035) 
95% C.I. [0.010,0.140] [0.069,0.203] [0.147,0.311] [0.028,0.166] 
     
Fathers only     
ATT  0.094*  0.124***  0.160***  0.080* 
S.E. (0.048) (0.046) (0.049) (0.044) 
95% C.I. [0.000,0.188] [0.034,0.214] [0.064,0.256] [-0.006,0.166] 
     
Mothers only     
ATT  0.088***  0.121***  0.125***  0.056** 
S.E. (0.025) (0.023) (0.025) (0.023) 
95% C.I. [0.039,0.137] [0.076,0.166] [0.076,0.174] [0.011,0.101] 
 
Notes: * Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level; and *** at the 1% level. 
Analytical standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table 3.16: Sensitivity of treatment effect estimates to unobserved heterogeneity 
γe  MHQ
+
 MHp
+
 MHQ
−
 MHp
−
 
Sample: boys only 
1.0 53.588 0.000 53.588 0.000 
2.0 41.790 0.000 70.787 0.000 
3.0 36.596 0.000 84.327 0.000 
4.0 33.472 0.000 95.912 0.000 
5.0 31.309 0.000 106.217 0.000 
6.0 29.686 0.000 115.595 0.000 
7.0 28.404 0.000 124.260 0.000 
8.0 27.353 0.000 132.355 0.000 
9.0 26.468 0.000 139.980 0.000 
10.0 25.708 0.000 147.209 0.000 
     
Sample: girls only 
1.0 40.888 0.000 40.888 0.000 
2.0 31.412 0.000 54.770 0.000 
3.0 27.286 0.000 65.671 0.000 
4.0 24.830 0.000 74.976 0.000 
5.0 23.145 0.000 83.237 0.000 
6.0 21.889 0.000 90.744 0.000 
7.0 20.902 0.000 97.672 0.000 
8.0 20.098 0.000 104.139 0.000 
9.0 19.423 0.000 110.226 0.000 
10.0 18.846 0.000 115.993 0.000 
     
Sample: Fathers only 
1.0 32.650 0.000 32.650 0.000 
2.0 25.109 0.000 43.707 0.000 
3.0 21.820 0.000 52.387 0.000 
4.0 19.861 0.000 59.797 0.000 
5.0 18.516 0.000 66.376 0.000 
6.0 17.512 0.000 72.355 0.000 
7.0 16.724 0.000 77.874 0.000 
8.0 16.081 0.000 83.025 0.000 
9.0 15.541 0.000 87.874 0.000 
10.0 15.079 0.000 92.469 0.000 
     
Sample: Mothers only 
1.0 59.020 0.000 59.020 0.000 
2.0 45.901 0.000 78.163 0.000 
3.0 40.142 0.000 93.231 0.000 
4.0 36.684 0.000 106.119 0.000 
5.0 34.294 0.000 117.579 0.000 
6.0 32.504 0.000 128.005 0.000 
7.0 31.090 0.000 137.636 0.000 
8.0 29.933 0.000 146.632 0.000 
9.0 28.960 0.000 155.105 0.000 
10.0 28.124 0.000 163.136 0.000 
Notes: See Table 3.11 for definitions of 
γe , MHQ
+
, MHQ
−
, MHp
+
, MHp
−
. 
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harmful child labor do not appear to differ by the child’s or respondent parent’s 
gender. 
 
3.6 Summary and concluding remarks 
Recent ILO estimates show that child labor in potentially harmful settings 
constitutes a widespread and significant problem across the developing world. In 
addition, there is growing evidence that such child labor has adverse short- and long-
term health effects which are undesirable in themselves leave alone other negative 
effects of child labor in general such as reduced educational attainment, cognitive 
achievement, and future labor market earnings, as well as the intergenerational 
persistence in child labor. Despite this, few studies attempt to carefully distinguish 
between different forms of child labor and focus narrowly on the causes of and 
attributes that typify harmful child labor.  
This chapter contributes to the presently limited literature on the specific 
determinants of the harmful child labor decision, albeit from an unconventional angle. 
Using household sample survey data from the Philippines, the chapter examines 
whether parent-child injury report mismatches have an impact on the probability of 
harmful child labor. Given the interest in the intrahousehold literature of investigating 
potential gender differences, the chapter also examines whether the impacts 
systematically vary between working boys and girls as well as by whether the 
respondent parent is the father or the mother. The above questions are based on a  
decidedly intrahousehold view of the interactions between the parent and the child, 
where the harmful child labor decision is framed as the outcome of a potentially 
adversarial relationship between the parent and the child arising from different 
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perceptions on and preferences over harmful child labor along with asymmetries in the 
decisionmaking power between the two agents.  
Assuming that differences in children with parent-child injury report 
mismatches and children without are largely explained by selection on observables, I 
use both multiple regression (with and without household fixed effects) and propensity 
score matching methods to infer the impact of parent-child injury report mismatches 
on the conditional probability of harmful child labor. Harmful child labor is measured 
using variables that capture different types of harm such as an immediate condition 
(physical strain) and a future stochastic condition (hazardous work). Harmful child 
labor is also measured using both self-reported and constructed measures to assess 
whether the findings differ across subjective and objective measures of potential harm.  
 Across estimators and the harmful child labor measures examined, I find 
consistent and statistically-significant evidence that parent-child injury report 
mismatches increase the probability of harmful child labor. I also find that in general 
the impacts do not systematically vary by the child’s gender or the respondent 
parent’s. With respect to the matching estimation, statistical tests based on Rosenbaum 
bounds suggest that the impact estimates are not sensitive to potential unobserved 
heterogeneity in explaining the presence of parent-child injury report mismatches, 
indicating the robustness of the results to potential “hidden bias”.  
 If these findings indeed reflect the outcome of differences in preferences over 
harmful child labor between the parent and the child, where the parent wields higher 
bargaining/decisionmaking power than the child, then a policy solution such as 
effectively banning harmful child labor can potentially lead to a welfare gain for the 
child, though at the expense of the parent’s welfare. In general, the net welfare result 
for the household is hence ambiguous. However, in the case where harmful child labor 
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is a result of information asymmetries within the household (specifically, the parent’s 
information set is poorer), if banning harmful child labor “reveals” information that 
leads to the parent’s perception and valuation of harmful child labor converging to 
those of the child, under certain formulations, the intervention can simultaneously 
yield welfare gains for the child as well as the parent.  Thus, banning harmful child 
labor functions as a signal of the nature of harm in the child labor market that is 
accurately read by parents.     
Notwithstanding a ban on harmful child labor, policymakers can also raise the 
welfare of both children and parents by expanding the set of decision options to 
include other potentially desirable ones or increasing the relative attractiveness of 
existing options. For example, this could entail providing affordable, higher-quality 
schooling, potentially increasing the opportunity cost of harmful child labor, and, thus, 
leading to household members to optimally choosing more schooling and less harmful 
child labor. It could also entail simply improving the occupational health and safety 
levels of child labor. An intrahousehold view of household decisionmaking would 
only imply that the welfare gains across household members will vary to the extent 
that preferences and power vary between the members.  
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APPENDIX 
 
SENSITIVITY TO UNOBSERVED HETEROGENEITY: 
USING THE ROSENBAUM BOUNDING APPROACH 
 
In the matching-based program evaluation literature, the assumption that selection into 
participation can be modeled using observable characteristics is central. In order to 
ascertain the validity of matching estimates, it is therefore important to examine their 
sensitivity to any deviation from this identifying assumption. In this context, 
sensitivity analysis using a bounding approach suggested by Rosenbaum (2002) is 
increasingly used in matching applications. The objective of this analysis is to 
examine the extent to which unobserved variables or “hidden bias” may alter inference 
about treatment effects. 
Following the exposition in Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), and using the 
language of program evaluation, I denote the probability of participation Pi as follows:  
P(m 1| ) ( ),i i i ix F x uβ γ= = +  
where ix are the observed characteristics for individual i , iu  are unobserved 
characteristics, and β and γ  are the impacts of ix  and iu  on the participation decision. 
If no unobservable characteristics affect participation, i.e., 0,γ = then two individuals 
with the same set of observable characteristics have the same probability of 
participation. However, if 0,γ ≠ i.e., there are unobservable characteristics that affect 
participation, then two individuals with the same x have differing probabilities of 
participation. If F is the logistic distribution, the odds that two individuals i and 
j participate are given by P / (1 P )i i− and P / (1 P )j j− respectively. Then, the odds ratio 
can be written as  
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P / (1 P ) exp( )
P (1 P ) / P (1 P ) .
P / (1 P ) exp( )
i i i i
i j j i
j j j j
x u
x u
β γ
β γ
− +
= − − =
− +
 
If i and j form a matched pair, then the x vector cancels out and the odds ratio can be 
simply 
written as exp[ ( )]i ju uγ − . If there are no differences in unobservables, i.e. ,i ju u=  or 
the unobservable factors do not affect the probability of participating, i.e. 0,γ = the 
odds ratio equals 1, implying that the matching estimates do not suffer from 
unobserved selection bias. However, if this is not the case, then the matching estimates 
are said to suffer from a “hidden bias”. In this context, Rosenbaum (2002) shows that 
the following bounds can be placed on the odds ratio: 
P / (1 P )1
.
P / (1 P )
i i
j j
e
e
γ
γ
−
≤ ≤
−
 
As eγ increases, the bounds move apart reflecting uncertainty due to the presence of 
unobserved selection bias. Thus, eγ is a measure of the extent to which the analysis 
suffers from this bias. 
For binary outcomes, Aakvik (2001) suggests using a test based on the Mantel 
and Haenszel statistic. As discussed by Aakvik (2001), the treatment effect on 
outcome y  (which in this case is the impact on the harmful child labor decision) is 
said to be significant if it crosses some test statistic ( , ),t m y where m is a dummy 
variable denoting program participation (which in this case is response mismatch). Let 
1n and 0n be the number of households with and without response mismatched reports, 
where 1 0n n n= + . Let 1y and 0y  denote households with and without response 
mismatches, where 1 0ty y y= + . The test statistic ,MHQ which asymptotically follows 
the normal distribution, is given by  
1
1
1 1
1 1 0
2
0.5
( ) 0.5
( ) ( )
( 1)
t
MH
t t
n y
y
y E y n
Q
Var y n n y n y
n n
− −
− −
= =
−
−
. 
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As shown by Rosenbaum (2002), MHQ can be bounded by two known distributions. 
Let 
MHQ
+ denote the test statistic in the case of overestimation of the treatment effect 
(which in this case would occur if households that are more likely to have a parent-
child response mismatch are also households that are more likely to have a harmful 
child labor outcome) and 
MHQ
−  in the case of underestimation of the treatment effect 
(which in this case would occur if households that are more likely to have a parent-
child response mismatch are households that are less likely to have a harmful child 
labor outcome). The bounds for overestimation and underestimation of the true 
treatment effect are given by: 
( )
1 0.5
MH
y E
Q
Var E
+
+
+
− −
=
ɶ
ɶ
 
and 
( )
1 0.5
,MH
y E
Q
Var E
−
−
−
− −
=
ɶ
ɶ
 
where Eɶ and ( )Var Eɶ are the estimated large sample expectation and variance of 
treated units with a successful outcome, for given values of γ .  
1eγ =  implies no unobservable bias, while higher levels of eγ  denote 
increasing bias due to unobservable characteristics. The p-values indicate the level of 
significance as eγ is varied. For example, if the results lose significance at 2,eγ =  it 
implies that two units that are similar based on observables need differ by a factor of 2 
(or 100%) due to unobservables for inference to be altered. 
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Table 3.A1. Binomial logit estimates of the determinants of harmful child labor 
Estimated coefficients 
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Covariates 
Estimated Coefficients 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Physically 
strenuous work 
Risky work 
Exposure to 
physical hazards 
Exposure to 
chemical hazards 
     
Child variables     
Male 1.095*** 0.720*** 0.182** 0.439*** 
 (0.121) (0.134) (0.092) (0.115) 
Age/10 -2.385 -4.354* 0.324 -0.505 
 (2.321) (2.275) (1.799) (2.337) 
Age squared/100 1.364 1.755** -0.021 0.315 
 (0.850) (0.858) (0.674) (0.878) 
Age first worked/10 3.240* -0.693 -4.816*** -0.143 
 (1.834) (1.950) (1.622) (1.896) 
Age first worked 
squared /100 -1.543** 0.244 2.110*** 0.255 
 (0.759) (0.816) (0.685) (0.795) 
Daily work hours: 5-8 
hours 0.523*** 0.201 0.376*** 0.334** 
 (0.125) (0.138) (0.122) (0.135) 
Daily work hours: 9+ 
hours 0.607*** 0.468** 0.131 0.065 
 (0.194) (0.195) (0.185) (0.203) 
Weekly work days/10 6.325*** 4.259** 1.547 1.907 
 (1.375) (1.673) (1.267) (1.520) 
Weekly work days 
squared /100 -7.179*** -5.459*** -3.062** -2.606 
 (1.622) (1.930) (1.493) (1.749) 
Night work 0.255* 0.238* 0.067 -0.017 
 (0.133) (0.143) (0.137) (0.140) 
Presently attending 
school -0.046 -0.097 0.065 0.162 
 (0.149) (0.157) (0.137) (0.160) 
Ever left school 0.241* -0.044 0.098 0 
 (0.126) (0.129) (0.114) (0.135) 
Secondary or tertiary 
schooling 0.096 -0.068 -0.012 -0.06 
 (0.120) (0.126) (0.104) (0.120) 
Location: Worked in 
own house -0.628*** -1.491*** -1.501*** -1.080*** 
 (0.198) (0.240) (0.170) (0.185) 
Location: Worked on 
farm 0.251* -0.334** 0.438*** -0.117 
 (0.143) (0.157) (0.145) (0.154) 
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Table 3.A1 (Continued) 
     
Worked in own 
household enterprise 0.25 0.123 0.360* 0.642*** 
 (0.217) (0.228) (0.201) (0.233) 
Paid for work 0.202 0.318 0.115 0.502** 
 (0.218) (0.239) (0.209) (0.235) 
Received meals as 
worker benefit -0.061 -0.668*** -0.370** -0.082 
 (0.182) (0.227) (0.179) (0.207) 
Worked for financial 
reasons 0.206* 0.073 0.087 0.082 
 (0.119) (0.125) (0.118) (0.134) 
Gave earnings to parents 0.172 0.476*** 0.205 0.339* 
 (0.164) (0.161) (0.150) (0.175) 
Parent supervised work -0.226 0.252 -0.002 0.269 
 (0.180) (0.191) (0.182) (0.182) 
Other relative 
supervised work -0.267 0.322 0.297 0.152 
 (0.246) (0.251) (0.246) (0.252) 
Unsupervised -0.074 0.269 0.02 0.169 
 (0.168) (0.182) (0.168) (0.167) 
Interested in interview 0.192 -0.209 -0.248* -0.077 
 (0.134) (0.143) (0.130) (0.134) 
Sincere in interview -0.248** 0.034 0.081 -0.091 
 (0.113) (0.120) (0.103) (0.108) 
Injury report mismatch 0.354*** 0.700*** 0.546*** 0.281** 
 (0.130) (0.159) (0.143) (0.137) 
     
Respondent parent 
variables 
    
Male -0.279 -0.044 -0.19 -0.019 
 (0.245) (0.259) (0.194) (0.290) 
Age/10 0.461 0.009 -0.162 0.381 
 (0.556) (0.664) (0.495) (0.625) 
Age squared/100 -0.05 0.002 0.012 -0.069 
 (0.060) (0.073) (0.053) (0.068) 
Secondary or tertiary 
education -0.253** -0.148 -0.067 0.07 
 (0.107) (0.110) (0.101) (0.110) 
Head of household 0.212 0.051 0.128 0.187 
 (0.227) (0.244) (0.177) (0.258) 
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Table 3.A1 (Continued) 
     
Household variables     
Run household 
enterprise -0.437*** 0.16 0.206 -0.044 
 (0.153) (0.143) (0.145) (0.166) 
Own farm land 0.116 -0.065 -0.271** 0.194 
 (0.117) (0.139) (0.125) (0.122) 
Household size/10 -1.632 -2.553** -0.175 -0.95 
 (1.163) (1.215) (1.483) (1.330) 
Household size 
squared/100 1.054 1.477** 0.466 1.517* 
 (0.674) (0.694) (0.986) (0.802) 
Children/10 2.091 2.334* 0.058 -1.475 
 (1.356) (1.388) (1.214) (1.316) 
Children squared/100 -1.963 -2.279* -0.389 -0.623 
 (1.420) (1.350) (1.302) (1.293) 
Household income: 
P2000-P2999 -0.281 -0.18 0.039 0.101 
 (0.192) (0.215) (0.197) (0.229) 
Household income: 
P3000-4999 -0.336 -0.282 -0.28 0.031 
 (0.205) (0.235) (0.213) (0.245) 
Household income: 
P5000-9999 -0.277 -0.194 -0.226 0.013 
 (0.218) (0.254) (0.232) (0.254) 
Household income: 
P10000-14999 -0.334 -0.258 -0.168 0.1 
 (0.261) (0.285) (0.258) (0.284) 
Household 
income:>P15000 -0.372 -0.559 0.315 -0.266 
 (0.312) (0.371) (0.297) (0.338) 
Urban -0.19 -0.068 0.164 0.615*** 
 (0.133) (0.145) (0.126) (0.134) 
Intercept -5.293*** 0.746 2.44 -2.864 
 (1.906) (1.997) (1.671) (1.941) 
Observations 4600 4600 4600 4600 
Log likelihood, intercept 
only model -2686 -2370 -3187 -2373 
Log likelihood, full 
model -2166 -2046 -2731 -2139 
Pseudo R-squared 0.194 0.137 0.143 0.0986 
Notes: Standard errors reported in parentheses. * denotes statistical significance at the 10% 
level; ** at the 5% level; and *** at the 1% level. Estimates are adjusted for complex survey 
design features. Estimates for region dummies are not reported in table. 
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Table 3.A2. Binomial logit estimates of the determinants of harmful child labor 
Average marginal effects 
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Covariates 
Average marginal effects 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Physically 
strenuous work 
Risky work 
Exposure to 
physical hazards 
Exposure to 
chemical hazards 
     
Child variables     
Male 0.162*** 0.098*** 0.038** 0.064*** 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) 
Age/10 -0.368 -0.621* 0.066 -0.076 
 (0.352) (0.321) (0.368) (0.351) 
Age squared/100 0.21 0.251** -0.004 0.047 
 (0.129) (0.122) (0.138) (0.132) 
Age first worked/10 0.499* -0.099 -0.972*** -0.021 
 (0.282) (0.279) (0.315) (0.284) 
Age first worked 
squared /100 -0.238** 0.035 0.431*** 0.038 
 (0.117) (0.117) (0.138) (0.119) 
Daily work hours: 5-8 
hours 0.084*** 0.029 0.077*** 0.051** 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.025) (0.022) 
Daily work hours: 9+ 
hours 0.100*** 0.073** 0.027 0.01 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.037) (0.031) 
Weekly work days/10 0.966*** 0.607** 0.316 0.286 
 (0.206) (0.239) (0.258) (0.227) 
Weekly work days 
squared /100 -1.108*** -0.780*** -0.625** -0.39 
 (0.250) (0.276) (0.304) (0.261) 
Night work 0.040* 0.035 0.014 -0.003 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.028) (0.021) 
Presently attending 
school -0.007 -0.014 0.013 0.024 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.028) (0.024) 
Ever left school 0.038* -0.006 0.02 0 
 (0.021) (0.018) (0.023) (0.020) 
Secondary or tertiary 
schooling 0.015 -0.01 -0.002 -0.009 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.018) 
Location: Worked in 
own house -0.091*** -0.163*** -0.314*** -0.134*** 
 (0.025) (0.015) (0.029) (0.016) 
Location: Worked on 
farm 0.039* -0.048** 0.092*** -0.018 
 (0.023) (0.021) (0.030) (0.022) 
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Table 3.A2 (Continued) 
     
Worked in own 
household enterprise 0.038 0.017 0.073* 0.092** 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.040) (0.038) 
Paid for work 0.032 0.047 0.024 0.078* 
 (0.035) (0.038) (0.043) (0.041) 
Received meals as 
worker benefit -0.009 -0.084*** -0.076** -0.012 
 (0.028) (0.024) (0.037) (0.030) 
Worked for financial 
reasons 0.032* 0.011 0.018 0.012 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.024) (0.021) 
Gave earnings to parents 0.027 0.071*** 0.042 0.052* 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.030) (0.029) 
Parent supervised work -0.035 0.036 0 0.04 
 (0.027) (0.029) (0.037) (0.029) 
Other relative 
supervised work -0.04 0.049 0.06 0.023 
 (0.035) (0.041) (0.049) (0.040) 
Unsupervised -0.011 0.04 0.004 0.026 
 (0.025) (0.028) (0.034) (0.026) 
Interested in interview 0.029 -0.031 -0.050* -0.012 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.027) (0.020) 
Sincere in interview -0.039** 0.005 0.017 -0.014 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.016) 
Injury report mismatch 0.057*** 0.111*** 0.110*** 0.044* 
 (0.022) (0.028) (0.028) (0.023) 
     
Respondent parent 
variables 
    
Male -0.042 -0.006 -0.039 -0.003 
 (0.035) (0.037) (0.040) (0.043) 
Age/10 0.071 0.001 -0.033 0.057 
 (0.087) (0.095) (0.101) (0.093) 
Age squared/100 -0.008 0 0.002 -0.01 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
Secondary or tertiary 
education -0.039** -0.021 -0.014 0.011 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.021) (0.017) 
Head of household 0.033 0.007 0.026 0.028 
 (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.041) 
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Table 3.A2 (Continued) 
     
Household variables     
Run household 
enterprise -0.071*** 0.022 0.042 -0.007 
 (0.023) (0.021) (0.030) (0.025) 
Own farm land 0.018 -0.009 -0.055** 0.029 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.026) (0.019) 
Household size/10 -0.252 -0.365** -0.036 -0.142 
 (0.179) (0.173) (0.303) (0.200) 
Household size 
squared/100 0.163 0.211** 0.095 0.227* 
 (0.104) (0.100) (0.201) (0.121) 
Children/10 0.322 0.333* 0.012 -0.221 
 (0.209) (0.198) (0.248) (0.197) 
Children squared/100 -0.303 -0.326* -0.08 -0.093 
 (0.220) (0.193) (0.266) (0.194) 
Household income: 
P2000-P2999 -0.042 -0.025 0.008 0.015 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.040) (0.036) 
Household income: 
P3000-4999 -0.051* -0.039 -0.057 0.005 
 (0.029) (0.031) (0.044) (0.037) 
Household income: 
P5000-9999 -0.042 -0.027 -0.046 0.002 
 (0.032) (0.034) (0.048) (0.038) 
Household income: 
P10000-14999 -0.049 -0.035 -0.035 0.015 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.053) (0.044) 
Household 
income:>P15000 -0.055 -0.071* 0.063 -0.038 
 (0.043) (0.041) (0.059) (0.045) 
Urban -0.029 -0.01 0.033 0.098*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.025) (0.024) 
Intercept     
     
Observations 4600 4600 4600 4600 
Notes: Standard errors reported in parentheses. * denotes statistical significance at the 10% 
level; ** at the 5% level; and *** at the 1% level. Estimates are adjusted for complex survey 
design features. Estimates for region dummies are not reported in table. 
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Table 3.A3: Balancing t-tests for propensity score model covariates 
Matched treated and untreated groups, based on kernel propensity score matching 
Variables 
Means  
( 1m = ) 
(1) 
Means  
( 0m = ) 
(2) 
Difference in 
means 
(1)-(2) 
t-statistic 
     
Child variables     
Male 0.672 0.682 -0.010 0.721 
Age/10 1.396 1.396 0.000 0.999 
Age squared/100 2.007 2.008 -0.001 0.980 
Age first worked/10 1.124 1.121 0.003 0.835 
Age first worked squared /100 1.339 1.333 0.007 0.861 
Daily work hours: 5-8 hours 0.439 0.435 0.003 0.912 
Daily work hours: 9+ hours 0.077 0.069 0.008 0.579 
Weekly work days/10 0.340 0.352 -0.013 0.300 
Weekly work days squared /100 0.159 0.170 -0.011 0.272 
Night work 0.188 0.200 -0.011 0.622 
Presently in work 0.657 0.646 0.011 0.688 
Ever left school 0.378 0.374 0.004 0.885 
Secondary or tertiary schooling 0.400 0.394 0.006 0.831 
Location: Worked in own house 0.113 0.118 -0.005 0.771 
Location: Worked on farm 0.593 0.571 0.023 0.428 
Worked in own household 
enterprise 0.624 0.602 0.021 0.448 
Paid for work 0.331 0.348 -0.017 0.538 
Received meals as worker benefit 0.084 0.076 0.009 0.589 
Worked for financial reasons 0.461 0.446 0.015 0.604 
Gave earnings to parents 0.355 0.375 -0.020 0.466 
Parent supervised work 0.524 0.522 0.002 0.941 
Other relative supervised work 0.049 0.052 -0.003 0.803 
Unsupervised 0.297 0.284 0.014 0.605 
Interested in interview 0.783 0.801 -0.018 0.454 
Sincere in interview 0.551 0.564 -0.013 0.652 
     
Respondent parent variables     
Male 0.212 0.210 0.002 0.929 
Age/10 4.302 4.282 0.020 0.651 
Age squared/100 19.075 18.922 0.153 0.701 
Secondary or tertiary education 0.397 0.408 -0.012 0.682 
Head of household 0.284 0.280 0.004 0.891 
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Table 3.A3 (Continued) 
     
Household variables     
Run household enterprise 0.861 0.854 0.007 0.746 
Own farm land 0.449 0.430 0.019 0.518 
Household size/10 0.699 0.699 0.000 0.993 
Household size squared/100 0.543 0.535 0.008 0.729 
Children/10 0.409 0.413 -0.004 0.731 
Children squared/100 0.208 0.209 -0.001 0.917 
Household income: P2000-P2999 0.175 0.169 0.006 0.793 
Household income: P3000-4999 0.301 0.305 -0.004 0.88 
Household income: P5000-9999 0.261 0.265 -0.005 0.854 
Household income: P10000-14999 0.071 0.082 -0.012 0.445 
Household income:>P15000 0.069 0.061 0.008 0.593 
Urban 0.343 0.360 -0.018 0.527 
Notes: * Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level; *** at the 1% level. Estimates 
for region dummies not reported in table. 
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Table 3.A4: Balancing tests using measure of pseudo R-squared and standardized 
bias 
Pseudo-R2 Wald test 
p-value 
Standardized bias 
Before 
matching 
After 
matching 
Before 
matching 
After 
matching 
Before 
matching 
After 
matching 
0.061 0.009 0.000 1.000 7.323 2.273 
Notes: Tests after matching only on observations in matched sample having common support.  
Pseudo R-squared from logit estimation of the propensity score (the conditional treatment 
probability) on all the control variables before and after matching. p-values of the likelihood-ratio 
test of the joint insignificance of all the regressors before and after matching.  
Standardized bias is the difference of the sample means in the treated and non-treated sub-samples 
as a percentage of the square root of the average of the sample variances in the treated and non-
treated groups.  
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Table 3.A5: Balancing t-tests for propensity score model covariates (Sample: Boys 
only) 
Matched treated and untreated samples, based on kernel propensity score matching 
Variables 
Means  
( 1m = ) 
(1) 
Means  
( 0m = ) 
(2) 
Difference in 
means 
(1)-(2) 
t-statistic 
     
Child variables     
Age/10 1.411 1.413 -0.002 0.893 
Age squared/100 2.047 2.054 -0.007 0.878 
Age first worked/10 1.142 1.140 0.003 0.881 
Age first worked squared /100 1.381 1.373 0.007 0.869 
Daily work hours: 5-8 hours 0.511 0.519 -0.008 0.823 
Daily work hours: 9+ hours 0.062 0.057 0.005 0.765 
Weekly work days/10 0.354 0.361 -0.008 0.608 
Weekly work days squared /100 0.167 0.175 -0.007 0.541 
Night work 0.165 0.171 -0.006 0.821 
Presently in work 0.596 0.570 0.026 0.461 
Ever left school 0.429 0.426 0.003 0.925 
Secondary or tertiary schooling 0.384 0.369 0.015 0.664 
Location: Worked in own house 0.052 0.063 -0.011 0.507 
Location: Worked on farm 0.653 0.643 0.010 0.763 
Worked in own household 
enterprise 0.589 0.562 0.027 0.445 
Paid for work 0.369 0.382 -0.013 0.711 
Received meals as worker benefit 0.077 0.058 0.019 0.281 
Worked for financial reasons 0.491 0.481 0.011 0.765 
Gave earnings to parents 0.406 0.433 -0.027 0.443 
Parent supervised work 0.526 0.525 0.001 0.977 
Other relative supervised work 0.052 0.057 -0.004 0.791 
Unsupervised 0.289 0.268 0.022 0.493 
Interested in interview 0.781 0.798 -0.018 0.544 
Sincere in interview 0.514 0.536 -0.022 0.532 
     
Respondent parent variables     
Male 0.217 0.201 0.016 0.584 
Age/10 4.286 4.264 0.022 0.689 
Age squared/100 18.945 18.800 0.145 0.771 
Secondary or tertiary education 0.379 0.373 0.006 0.859 
Head of household 0.289 0.271 0.018 0.566 
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Table 3.A5 (Continued) 
     
Household variables     
Run household enterprise 0.850 0.849 0.001 0.959 
Own farm land 0.446 0.438 0.008 0.811 
Household size/10 0.694 0.695 -0.002 0.917 
Household size squared/100 0.536 0.529 0.007 0.799 
Children/10 0.412 0.420 -0.007 0.598 
Children squared/100 0.210 0.214 -0.004 0.761 
Household income: P2000-P2999 0.187 0.189 -0.002 0.951 
Household income: P3000-4999 0.309 0.297 0.012 0.712 
Household income: P5000-9999 0.267 0.276 -0.009 0.773 
Household income: P10000-14999 0.072 0.085 -0.013 0.509 
Household income:>P15000 0.065 0.061 0.004 0.823 
Urban 0.334 0.348 -0.014 0.680 
Notes: * Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level; *** at the 1% level. Estimates 
for region dummies not reported in table. 
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Table 3.A6: Balancing t-tests for propensity score model covariates (Sample: Girls 
only) 
Matched treated and untreated samples, based on kernel propensity score matching 
Variables 
Means  
( 1m = ) 
(1) 
Means  
( 0m = ) 
(2) 
Difference in 
means 
(1)-(2) 
t-statistic 
     
Child variables     
Age/10 1.368 1.387 -0.019 0.446 
Age squared/100 1.930 1.984 -0.054 0.425 
Age first worked/10 1.093 1.091 0.002 0.944 
Age first worked squared /100 1.263 1.263 0.000 0.999 
Daily work hours: 5-8 hours 0.296 0.267 0.028 0.547 
Daily work hours: 9+ hours 0.108 0.099 0.009 0.777 
Weekly work days/10 0.310 0.339 -0.029 0.192 
Weekly work days squared /100 0.140 0.163 -0.023 0.205 
Night work 0.210 0.240 -0.031 0.482 
Presently in work 0.790 0.794 -0.004 0.929 
Ever left school 0.269 0.258 0.011 0.811 
Secondary or tertiary schooling 0.435 0.476 -0.041 0.430 
Location: Worked in own house 0.226 0.243 -0.017 0.695 
Location: Worked on farm 0.478 0.429 0.050 0.338 
Worked in own household 
enterprise 0.694 0.702 -0.008 0.868 
Paid for work 0.253 0.241 0.012 0.789 
Received meals as worker benefit 0.108 0.087 0.020 0.507 
Worked for financial reasons 0.403 0.368 0.035 0.488 
Gave earnings to parents 0.258 0.267 -0.009 0.851 
Parent supervised work 0.527 0.551 -0.024 0.646 
Other relative supervised work 0.043 0.049 -0.006 0.776 
Unsupervised 0.306 0.283 0.024 0.616 
Interested in interview 0.790 0.801 -0.011 0.792 
Sincere in interview 0.618 0.618 0.001 0.989 
     
Respondent parent variables     
Male 0.199 0.222 -0.023 0.587 
Age/10 4.342 4.350 -0.008 0.916 
Age squared/100 19.395 19.405 -0.010 0.988 
Secondary or tertiary education 0.441 0.436 0.005 0.924 
Head of household 0.274 0.301 -0.027 0.566 
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Table 3.A6 (Continued) 
     
Household variables     
Run household enterprise 0.887 0.895 -0.008 0.801 
Own farm land 0.468 0.406 0.062 0.230 
Household size/10 0.706 0.704 0.002 0.937 
Household size squared/100 0.552 0.548 0.004 0.917 
Children/10 0.400 0.395 0.005 0.805 
Children squared/100 0.200 0.196 0.004 0.849 
Household income: P2000-P2999 0.156 0.150 0.006 0.870 
Household income: P3000-4999 0.296 0.325 -0.030 0.539 
Household income: P5000-9999 0.253 0.267 -0.014 0.756 
Household income: P10000-14999 0.070 0.082 -0.012 0.662 
Household income:>P15000 0.081 0.057 0.024 0.369 
Urban 0.371 0.385 -0.014 0.783 
Notes: * Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level; *** at the 1% level. Estimates 
for region dummies not reported in table. 
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Table 3.A7: Balancing t-tests for propensity score model covariates (Sample: 
Fathers only) 
Matched treated and untreated samples, based on kernel propensity score matching 
Variables 
Means  
( 1m = ) 
(1) 
Means  
( 0m = ) 
(2) 
Difference in 
means 
(1)-(2) 
t-statistic 
     
Child variables   
Male 0.694 0.638 0.057 0.354 
Age/10 1.426 1.424 0.002 0.957 
Age squared/100 2.087 2.083 0.004 0.962 
Age first worked/10 1.152 1.150 0.002 0.956 
Age first worked squared /100 1.405 1.396 0.009 0.914 
Daily work hours: 5-8 hours 0.512 0.455 0.058 0.371 
Daily work hours: 9+ hours 0.066 0.068 -0.002 0.962 
Weekly work days/10 0.369 0.366 0.002 0.929 
Weekly work days squared /100 0.182 0.179 0.003 0.892 
Night work 0.190 0.215 -0.025 0.635 
Presently in work 0.620 0.633 -0.013 0.832 
Ever left school 0.380 0.367 0.013 0.837 
Secondary or tertiary schooling 0.430 0.435 -0.005 0.933 
Location: Worked in own house 0.141 0.169 -0.028 0.544 
Location: Worked on farm 0.570 0.521 0.049 0.445 
Worked in own household 
enterprise 0.620 0.581 0.039 0.537 
Paid for work 0.339 0.359 -0.020 0.75 
Received meals as worker benefit 0.066 0.087 -0.021 0.54 
Worked for financial reasons 0.471 0.478 -0.007 0.914 
Gave earnings to parents 0.355 0.369 -0.014 0.825 
Parent supervised work 0.496 0.495 0.001 0.984 
Other relative supervised work 0.050 0.040 0.009 0.73 
Unsupervised 0.281 0.270 0.011 0.845 
Interested in interview 0.810 0.800 0.010 0.841 
Sincere in interview 0.620 0.596 0.024 0.701 
     
Respondent parent variables     
Age/10 4.596 4.567 0.029 0.783 
Age squared/100 21.745 21.528 0.217 0.832 
Secondary or tertiary education 0.413 0.372 0.041 0.514 
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Table 3.A7 (Continued) 
     
Household variables     
Run household enterprise 0.860 0.867 -0.008 0.863 
Own farm land 0.372 0.394 -0.022 0.723 
Household size/10 0.697 0.685 0.012 0.71 
Household size squared/100 0.558 0.513 0.045 0.501 
Children/10 0.409 0.406 0.003 0.888 
Children squared/100 0.208 0.196 0.012 0.662 
Household income: P2000-P2999 0.174 0.181 -0.008 0.88 
Household income: P3000-4999 0.223 0.274 -0.051 0.366 
Household income: P5000-9999 0.289 0.273 0.016 0.782 
Household income: P10000-14999 0.074 0.055 0.020 0.537 
Household income:>P15000 0.099 0.082 0.017 0.649 
Urban 0.380 0.398 -0.018 0.781 
Notes: * Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level; *** at the 1% level. Estimates 
for region dummies not reported in table. 
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Table 3.A8: Balancing t-tests for propensity score model covariates (Sample: 
Mothers only) 
Matched treated and untreated samples, based on kernel propensity score matching 
Variables 
Means  
( 1m = ) 
(1) 
Means  
( 0m = ) 
(2) 
Difference in 
means 
(1)-(2) 
t-statistic 
     
Child variables     
Male 0.666 0.678 -0.012 0.69 
Age/10 1.386 1.386 -0.001 0.973 
Age squared/100 1.979 1.982 -0.003 0.946 
Age first worked/10 1.116 1.110 0.006 0.73 
Age first worked squared /100 1.321 1.307 0.013 0.75 
Daily work hours: 5-8 hours 0.418 0.428 -0.010 0.746 
Daily work hours: 9+ hours 0.081 0.072 0.009 0.604 
Weekly work days/10 0.331 0.343 -0.013 0.349 
Weekly work days squared /100 0.152 0.163 -0.011 0.297 
Night work 0.188 0.197 -0.008 0.753 
Presently in work 0.672 0.653 0.020 0.524 
Ever left school 0.373 0.368 0.005 0.879 
Secondary or tertiary schooling 0.392 0.381 0.011 0.731 
Location: Worked in own house 0.107 0.110 -0.003 0.874 
Location: Worked on farm 0.597 0.587 0.010 0.754 
Worked in own household 
enterprise 0.627 0.617 0.011 0.739 
Paid for work 0.330 0.346 -0.016 0.605 
Received meals as worker benefit 0.088 0.071 0.017 0.335 
Worked for financial reasons 0.452 0.421 0.030 0.35 
Gave earnings to parents 0.353 0.376 -0.023 0.474 
Parent supervised work 0.535 0.533 0.002 0.953 
Other relative supervised work 0.047 0.052 -0.005 0.717 
Unsupervised 0.300 0.282 0.018 0.544 
Interested in interview 0.777 0.799 -0.022 0.411 
Sincere in interview 0.537 0.560 -0.023 0.49 
     
Respondent parent variables     
Age/10 4.217 4.193 0.024 0.612 
Age squared/100 18.293 18.088 0.205 0.617 
Secondary or tertiary education 0.398 0.416 -0.018 0.58 
Head of household 0.092 0.090 0.002 0.899 
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Table 3.A8 (Continued) 
     
Household variables     
Run household enterprise 0.863 0.856 0.007 0.767 
Own farm land 0.469 0.433 0.036 0.271 
Household size/10 0.700 0.700 0.000 0.984 
Household size squared/100 0.539 0.537 0.002 0.933 
Children/10 0.409 0.414 -0.005 0.721 
Children squared/100 0.207 0.212 -0.005 0.699 
Household income: P2000-P2999 0.176 0.171 0.005 0.848 
Household income: P3000-4999 0.321 0.305 0.016 0.602 
Household income: P5000-9999 0.257 0.264 -0.007 0.815 
Household income: P10000-14999 0.071 0.092 -0.021 0.237 
Household income:>P15000 0.062 0.057 0.005 0.743 
Urban 0.338 0.352 -0.014 0.658 
Notes: * Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level; *** at the 1% level. Estimates 
for region dummies not reported in table. 
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Table 3.A9: Balancing tests using measure of pseudo R-squared and standardized 
bias (by separate samples) 
Sample 
Pseudo R-squared Wald test 
p-value 
Standardized bias 
Before 
matching 
After 
matching 
Before 
matching 
After 
matching 
Before 
matching 
After 
matching 
Boys only 0.078 0.012 0.000 1.000 6.984 2.156 
Girls only 0.118 0.047 0.000 1.000 8.855 3.160 
Fathers only  0.146 0.039 0.000 1.000 11.542 3.526 
Mothers only 0.074 0.013 0.000 1.000 6.744 2.468 
Notes: Tests after matching only on observations in matched sample having common support.  
Pseudo-R2 from logit estimation of the propensity score (the conditional treatment probability) on 
all the control variables before and after matching. p-values of the likelihood-ratio test of the joint 
insignificance of all the regressors before and after matching.  
Standardized bias is the difference of the sample means in the treated and non-treated sub-samples 
as a percentage of the square root of the average of the sample variances in the treated and non-
treated groups.  
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